

Plato's *Parmenides*: Annotated bibliography of the studies in English

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Annotated bibliography on Plato's *Parmenides*

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Contents of the studies in English: Sylvana Chrysakapoulou, Benoît Castelnérac: Introduction [English] 381; Constance Meinwald: How Does Plato's Exercise Work? 465; Mary Louise Gill: Select Design of the Exercise in Plato's *Parmenides* 495; Spyridon Rangos: Plato on the Nature of the Sudden Moment, and the Asymmetry of the Second Part of the *Parmenides* 538-574.

2. Abaci, Uygur. 2021. "The Greatest Aporia in the *Parmenides* (133b-134e) and the Reciprocity of *Pros* Relations." *Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 60:169–192.

Abstract: "The extant attempts in the literature to refute the greatest difficulty argument in the *Parmenides* have focused on denying the parallelism between the *pros* relations among Forms and those among particulars. However, these attempts are unsatisfactory, for the argument can reach its conclusion that we cannot know any Forms without relying on this parallelism. I argue that a more effective strategy is to deny the more essential premise that the knowledge-object relation is a *pros* relation. This premise is false because *pros* relations require definitional and ontological codependence between the relata, and the knowledge-object relation does not satisfy this reciprocity condition."

3. Acerbi, Fabio. 2000. "Plato: *Parmenides* 149a7-c3. A Proof by Complete Induction?" *Archive for History of Exact Sciences* no. 55:57–76.

"It is a generally accepted opinion that the first instance of *conscious* use of Complete Induction (henceforth CI) as a proof method is contained in the *Traité du triangle arithmétique* by Blaise Pascal (1623–1662).

(...)

A very different question is to establish whether, before Pascal, convincing examples of use of CI as a proof technique are attested, disconnected from the perception of the fact that it happened to be a particular instance of a general demonstrative scheme." (p. 57)

(...)

"In fact, I suggest to regard a Platonic passage, i.e. *Parmenides* 149a7-c3, as a full-fledged example of proof by CI.

A comparison with an extremely similar text by Aristotle (*An. pr.* 42b6-16) will allow me to put forward a conjecture about the sources of the Platonic text.

The paper is organized as follows: in Sect. 2 I discuss the meaning and structure of a proof by CI, extracting from its "ritual structure" the characteristics I regard as essential.

In Sect. 3 the Platonic passage is presented and analysed. On the basis of the discussion of Sect. 2, I propose to regard it as the only extant example of proof by CI in the ancient mathematical corpus.(4) In Sect. 4 I briefly discuss other alleged examples of CI in ancient mathematical and philosophical works." (p. 58)

(4) prefer not to use the term "ancient Greek mathematics". I intend to refer to a very concrete, tangible object, not to a conceptual framework or to a specific way of doing mathematics. I agree with O. Neugebauer that "a concept as "Greek mathematics" [. . .] seems to me more misleading than helpful." (Neugebauer 1969, p. 190.)

References

Neugebauer O. 1969, *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity*. New York, Dover.

4. Ahbel-Rappe, Sara. 2010. "Damascius on the Third Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 143–156. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"In what follows, I will be discussing how Damascius's treatment of the third hypothesis of the Parmenides correlates to the Neoplatonic interpretation of the *Parmenides* as accounting for the devolution of reality: the soul and its multiply realized configurations are the foundation of a "way of seeming" that is the ultimate subject of Damascius's *Commentary on the Parmenides*." (p. 143)

(...)

"Again, Damascius offers this solution to the problem of embodiment by suggesting that the individual soul is best understood as a function of the intelligible domain, as a modality of its seeing. But in the *Commentary on the Parmenides*, Damascius is much more concerned with the devolution of reality from the realm of Being into the realm of Non-Being. In this respect of course, he relies on the central Neoplatonic interpretation of the hypotheses of the *Parmenides*, since the Neoplatonists essentially took this to be Plato's explanation for Non-Being, or Plato's own "way of seeming."" (p. 156)

5. Allan, Donald J. 1960. "Aristotle and the *Parmenides*." In *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century: Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum held at Oxford in August, 1857*, edited by Düring, Ingemar and Owen, G.E.L., 133–144. Göteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag.

"The old problem why Aristotle in his treatises, when explaining and criticizing Plato's doctrine of Ideas, does not mention the *Parmenides*, or indicate what he understood to be its purpose, is one which does not seem to admit of a simple solution. Some scholars in the past have fallen back on the hypothesis that in the *De Ideis*, or some other writing now lost, his position may have been fully explained. But recent research does not confirm this, and it seems worth while to examine with care any passages in the treatises which can plausibly be regarded as allusions to the *Parmenides*, in the hope of bringing to light his view of the dialogue. This road was followed with interesting results by A. E. Taylor in an Appendix to his translation of the *Parmenides* (Oxford, 1934). What I here offer is a small contribution of the same kind." (p. 133)

(...)

"I have tried to show that contemporary readers thought that Plato was not speaking ironically, but issuing a serious challenge, when he makes 'Parmenides' say to Socrates (13S a): the difficulties are very serious: well-endowed, indeed, is the man who has first perceived that the generic form must exist in its own right, and still more admirable will he be, who can dispose of all the problems and teach others what he has discovered. The difficulty is not all on one side, for if the unchanging Idea is not assumed, there remains no object on which the intellect can fasten."

6. Allen, Reginald Edgar. 1964. "The Interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*: Zeno's Paradox and the Theory of Forms." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 2:143–155.

"I propose here to examine the first part of the dialogue, the interchange between Zeno and Socrates, and to examine it with special attention to the bearing which questions of dialectical structure and dramatic characterization may have upon its interpretation." (p. 143)

(,,)

"Let me now summarize my argument. I have been concerned to examine the relationship between Zeno's paradox and Socrates' proposed solution to it, the Theory of Forms. That relationship has been found complex. The Theory of Forms solves the paradox by distinguishing what the paradox, and Eleatic logic generally, identifies: things characterized and characteristics. For the Theory, this distinction is the distinction between exemplars and exemplifications.

Yet in solving the paradox, the Theory falls prey to it. The required distinction, as Plato draws it, works well enough when restricted terms are in question. But it does not work at all when applied to unrestricted terms--the terms that Zeno, and Parmenides before him, had had mainly in view. To the degree that the Theory of Forms cannot explain joint qualification by unrestricted opposites, to that degree Plato's defense of plurality fails, and with it his attempt to reconcile the Parmenidean requirements of Being with the existence of the sensible world. When thought through, Plato's middle ontology faced crisis.

The Theory of Forms, then, was an instrument for the laying of a ghost in Elea. But the ghost rose, and walked abroad in Athens. In the *Parmenides*, it speaks." (pp. 154-155)

7. ———. 1970. "The Generation of Numbers in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Classical Philology* no. 65:30–34.

"At Parmenides 143A-B, Unity (or "the One") is distinguished from being (or its own being) and difference. At 143C-D, it is shown that these items are numberable; for if we pick out being and difference, or being and unity, or unity and difference, in each case we pick out both of two things; each of two is one; and when any one whatever is added to any pair whatever, the sum is three.

(...)

Parmenides' account has often been taken as a generation or derivation of number, an interpretation that appears to be as old as Aristotle.⁽¹⁾ I propose here to argue, however, that in either of the two senses of number relevant to the discussion—number as a plurality of units, or as a property of such pluralities—this interpretation is mistaken." (p. 30)

(...)

"The effect of Parmenides' argument is simply to establish the implication that Proclus claims for it: "If One exists, number will exist, from which it follows that (infinite) plurality exists." 19 If it is true that unity, being, and difference exist if anything exists, the effect is still broader; Parmenides' argument provides an explanation of the Eleatic Stranger's remark in the *Sophist* (238A-B) that number must exist if anything exists, and it helps to explain why, in the *Theaetetus* (185D), numbers are listed along with unity, existence and nonexistence, likeness and unlikeness, and sameness and difference, as Common Terms which the mind is capable of contemplating through its own activity apart from the organs of sense." (pp. 33-34)

(1) 1. See *Metaph.* 1. 987b32-34; (...)

(19) *Schol. in Parm.* 1261. 18-21, Cousin.

8. ———. 1974. "Unity and Infinity: *Parmenides* 142b-145a." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 27:697–725.

"At *Parmenides* 142b-145a, Parmenides attempts to prove that Unity, if it is and thus partakes of Being, is one and many, whole and parts, limited and unlimited in multitude." (p.697)

(...)

"I shall argue that Parmenides is dealing, not with one but with two kinds of infinity: a dense infinite allied to that of continuity, typical of extensive magnitudes, and the infinity of succession, typical of number.

These two types of infinity were distinct in Greek mathematics in a way in which they are not in our own, since the Greeks, identifying number with the positive integers greater than 1, and thus lacking both reals and rationals, had no concept of number as either continuous or dense, and no notion of isomorphism between numbers and (say) lines. In the *Parmenides*, Unity is proved to have infinitely many dense parts, and infinitely many successive parts, and its simultaneous possession of these different kinds of parts explains the apparent redundancy of the argument. If this account is correct, the Parmenides anticipates important features of Aristotle's analysis of infinity and continuity in the *Physics*, though there are also important differences. Still, this is evidence that Aristotle drew on a tradition of physical speculation inherited from the Academy, and that the *Physics* may therefore be looked to as an important source of understanding for given arguments in the *Parmenides*, especially those involving place, time, and motion." (pp. 698-699, a note omitted)

9. ———. 1980. "Ideas as Thoughts: *Parmenides* 132 b-c." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 1:29–38.

10. Altman, William H. F. 2020. "In Defense of Plato's Intermediates." *Plato Journal* no. 20:151–166.

Abstract: "Once we realize that the indivisible and infinitely repeatable One of the arithmetic lesson in *Republic* 7 is generated by διάνοια at *Parmenides* 143a6-9, it becomes possible to revisit the Divided Line's Second Part and see that Aristotle's error was not to claim that Plato placed Intermediates between the Ideas and sensible things but to restrict that class to the mathematical objects Socrates used to explain it. All of the One-Over-Many Forms of *Republic* 10 that Aristotle, following Plato, attacked with the Third Man, are equally dependent on Images and above all on the Hypothesis of the One (*Republic* 510b4-8)."

11. Ambuel, David. 2005. "On What Is Not: Eleatic Paradox in the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Ales and Karfík, Filip, 200–215. Prague: Oikoymenh.

"The following argument undertakes to show one positive thesis implied by the thicket of interrelated contradictions that is the Parmenides. There may well be others. In particular, it is proposed here that, as a consequence of the multiply contradictory conclusions and the methods that lead to them, any analysis of the kind of unity that we find in the world - namely, that of composites, of wholes of parts - demands that being is not a form, but form the principle of being.

To accomplish this, the following thoughts look into parallels linking the Sophist with the Parmenides. Emphasis is directed especially to the concept of not-being as it appears in the second part of Parmenides and in the Sophist, 237a-244d. Both dialogues reveal inadequacies of Parmenides' metaphysics by employing the logic of Eleatic metaphysics to examine form - being is and is intelligible (like the ideas), not-being is its opposite, their opposition is that of simple contradictories, i.e. between being and not-being lies nothing - with the result that the real is either empty, transcendent and inaccessible, or that being, all of reality, is reduced to the manner of existence of sensibles (i.e. having the being of wholes and parts), which, subsequently, upon analysis, leads to contradiction and unintelligibility." (p. 200)

12. Anderson, Daniel E. 1963. "The Paradox of *Parmenides*." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 1:20–29.

"There are a number of difficulties involved in any attempt to regard the Platonic *Parmenides* and the historical Parmenides as mutually illuminating. On the other hand, the most casual glance at the scholarship will indicate that there are still more difficulties involved in an effort to ignore or reject such a relationship. I feel that a case can be built that the Platonic *Parmenides* is, in some rather subtle ways, much closer to the historical Parmenides than most contemporary scholars will admit. (I do not however, mean by this that he is closer to Plato, as Verdenius suggests.⁽¹⁾ In order to clarify this similarity I shall first attempt to set forth, in terms of the dialogue, *Parmenides*, what I believe to be Plato's view of Parmenides.

Then I shall attempt to elicit from the fragments what I believe to be a similar position." (p. 20)

(1) *Parmenides*, W. J. Verdenius, J. B. Wolters, Groningen, Batavia, 1942.

13. Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margareth. 1966. "The New Theory of Forms." *The Monist* no. 50:403–420.

Reprinted in *The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, Volume One: From Parmenides to Wittgenstein*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1981, pp. 21-33.

"I want to suggest that Plato arrived at a revised theory of forms in the later dialogues. Or perhaps I might rather say that he constructed a new underpinning for the theory. This can be discerned, I believe, in the *Sophist*, taken together with certain parts of the dialectic of the *Parmenides* which use the same language as the *Sophist*." (p. 21 of the reprint)

(...)

"This passage [*Sophist* 253d] is obscure and of disputed interpretation. I believe it is usually taken that (i) gives the relation species - individual, (ii) genus - species, (iii) transcendentals - other forms, (iv) perfectly specific forms considered in themselves. This interpretation is indeed rather closer to the text than others; yet I think it does not weigh every word sufficiently, together with the arguments which we have considered as so important in the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*.

I suggest:

(i) and (ii) make the contrast between a form ϕ such that if a lot of things are ϕ each is one single distinct ϕ , and such forms as 'one', 'whole', 'being', which do not function so, and are conceived to contain other forms in an external fashion. (See 250b where rest and motion are said to be comprised by being; and for other relevant verbal and doctrinal echoes, *Parmenides*, 142e, 145c). Thus genera in relation to individuals belong to (i) no less than species do. (iii), on the other hand, appears to me to concern the genus-species division though more obscurely: possibly we get (iii) wherever one could find many wholes gathered together in some sort of unity, as: many species in a genus, or many elements in a complex, i.e. letters in a word or particular characteristics in a man (cf. *Theaetetus*, 109c). (iv) Finally, the many forms that are wholly separate and distinct apparently are so much so as not to provide any sort of one-many contrast like the other three. It appears to me that nothing discussed in the *Sophist* corresponds to this, but something which I have already mentioned from the *Parmenides* does: the series of natural numbers is there treated as a series of such forms." (p. 33 of the reprint)

14. Apolloni, David. 2011. *The Self-Predication Assumption in Plato*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

"The term "Self-Predication" is ours, not Plato's. What Self-Predication precisely is is itself an important issue in Plato scholarship, and is the focus of this book. One way to begin to understand it, however, is to note that this term "Self-Predication" contains the word "predication," another word not contained in Plato's vocabulary. Predication is the function of a predicate in a sentence, and it so functions in conjunction with a subject, which is, in a simple kind of sentence, a name. A name refers, i.e., it stands for, identifies, picks out, indicates, designates, or mentions some object x; and a predicate

describes, characterizes, ascribes, predicates, says something about, attributes a property to x; it says what x is like; it is true of his x." (Introduction, p. X)

"The book is divided into two parts, the first consisting of three chapters, the second part consisting of four. Part I demonstrates what the Self-Predication Assumption in Plato is, and shows that it is philosophically reasonable when correctly understood, but that it leads to no infinite regress.

Part II concerns the *Parmenides* itself. Following a major trend in current scholarship, I argue that the first part of the dialogue misses Plato's own Theory of Forms, but that the second part of the dialogue—*Parmenides*' "Exercise"—does point to considerations Plato raises in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*, even if we take the character *Parmenides* not to have resolved the final contradiction at the end of the dialogue." (Introduction, p. XIX)

15. Araújo, Carolina. 2022. "Ousia and *dunamis* in the greatest aporia (*Prm.* 133b4-135b4)." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 279–286. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The "greatest aporia" results from an argument *Parmenides* presents against Socrates's theory of forms in Plato's *Parmenides* intending to prove that these forms are unknowable. This paper disputes contemporary interpretations that defend it as a sound and serious objection to Socrates. I first indicate (I) that *Parmenides* introduces a concept of *ousia* incompatible with the one proposed by Socrates, and is therefore unable to pose him a real challenge.

Then I show (II) that *Parmenides* actually champions a relativist theory, which he discloses gradually in replacing *ousia* with *dunamis* as a prior explanatory principle. I offer three arguments for the inconsistency of his thesis. I conclude (III) that *Parmenides* is aware of the flaws in his theory and honest in declaring that not to postulate Socratic forms would result in destroying our thought and our capacity for dialogue (135b5-c2). The whole point of the greatest aporia is that a philosopher must refute relativism."

16. Assaturian, Sosseh. 2020. "What the forms are not: Plato on conceptualism in *Parmenides* 132b-c." *Philosophical Studies* no. 177:353–368.

Abstract: "Conceptualism-the view that universals are mental entities without an external, independent, or substantial reality-has enjoyed popularity at various points throughout the history of philosophy. While Plato's Theory of Forms is not a conceptualist theory of universals, we find at *Parmenides* 132b-c the startling conceptualist suggestion from a young Socrates that each Form might be a noema, or a mental entity. This suggestion and *Parmenides*' cryptic objections to it have been overshadowed by their placement directly after the notoriously difficult Third Man Argument (132a-b), and before the Likeness Regress (132c-133a). However, in the background of 132b-c, we find illuminating assumptions behind *Parmenides*' arguments against the Theory of Forms in the first half of the dialogue. We also find in this text a set of implied criteria for Platonic concepthood. While in the Platonic corpus, Forms are explanantia for many of the phenomena explained by concepts in contemporary philosophy, concepts do seem to have an important epistemic role in Plato's philosophy. An account of Platonic concepthood therefore opens the door for new ways of understanding the Platonic corpus as a whole. My focus in this paper is to uncover these assumptions and criteria through a close reading of Socrates' conceptualist suggestion and *Parmenides*' truncated objections to it at *Parmenides* 132b-c."

17. Augustin, Michael J. 2021. "Self-Instantiation and Self-Participation." *Plato Journal* no. 22:11–17.

Abstract: "While each Form is what it is to be F, some Forms also instantiate F (or "self-instantiate"). Here I consider whether the explanation for a Form's instantiating F should be the Form's participating in itself. First, I motivate the need for an explanation of self-instantiation. Second, I consider the advantages and disadvantages of self-participation alongside an alternative explanation—that the Form's being what it is to be F is a sufficient explanation of its instantiation of F. The result is not a conclusive case for self-participation, but only some initial considerations in favor of it."

18. Backman, Jussi. 2007. "All of a Sudden: Heidegger and Plato's *Parmenides*." *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 11:393–408.

Abstract: "The paper studies a transcript of notes from Heidegger's 1930–31 seminar on Plato's *Parmenides*. It shows that in spite of his much-criticized habit of dismissing Plato as the progenitor of "idealist" metaphysics, Heidegger was quite aware of the radical potential of Plato's later dialogues. Through a temporal account of the notion of oneness (*to hen*), the *Parmenides* attempts to reconcile the plurality of beings with the unity of being. In Heidegger's reading, the dialogue culminates in the notion of the "instant" (*to exaiphnes*, *Augenblick*) in which the temporal plurality of presence and nonpresence converges into a unified disclosure."

[N.B. Since the publication of this paper, Heidegger's notes for the winter semester 1930–31 seminar on Plato's *Parmenides* have been published in *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 83: *Seminare: Platon—Aristoteles—Augustinus*, ed. Mark Michalski (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2012), 23–37. However, the *Gesamtausgabe* edition does not incorporate the transcript of seminar notes in the Herbert Marcuse Archive discussed in this paper, and does not even mention its existence; the editor even conjectures that the announced continuation of the seminar in the summer semester of 1931, documented in the transcript, did not take place (see Mark Michalski, editor's epilogue, *GA* 83, 667–68). Apparently, no authorized student protocol of the seminar was made, probably due to the unofficial and "private" character of the seminar.]

19. Ballard, Edward G. 1962. "On parsing the *Parmenides*." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 15:434–449.

"Professor Brumbaugh seeks to avoid the specialist's isolation by uniting the two functions in his *Plato on the One*.^{*} The result is the unusual combination of the soundest and most elaborate work on the text of the second part of the *Parmenides*, so far as I can determine, yet done in this country, and in addition some very imaginative and varied philosophical interpretations. Parts II and IV of his book present a translation with commentary of the second part of this dialogue and a scholarly apparatus which includes the textual variants from about forty-five manuscripts. Parts I and III discuss the context of the hypotheses and their character and value as metaphysics. This interpretative writing, being Platonic, not only allows, but rather invites comment and criticism. The extremely wide variety of topics upon which the author touches forbids anything like a complete set of comments. This study will be confined to setting forth the main line of the argument in parts I and III and adding certain remarks or criticisms; then it will contrast the author's interpretation with another one intended to indicate a direction in which the author's interpretation might be supplemented." (pp. 434-435, a note omitted)

^{*} Robert S. Brumbaugh, *Plato on the One* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960).

20. Barmore, Steven. 2020. "The Silence of Socrates: The One and the Many in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Studia Gilsoniana* no. 9:209–236.

"For still other reasons the *Parmenides* tends to strike nobody as funny. Instead, it tends to strike even seasoned metaphysicians as long-winded and convoluted. Close to the whole truth in some ways, it is far off in others. And, while no serious metaphysician might want publicly to admit that it is boring, it is tedious and technical, yet unequipped with the precise, technical language that we depend upon to make metaphysical distinctions, discussions, and instruction possible. To make matters worse, to those who expected him to put his opponents in their place, Socrates' strange silence is discouraging. Finally, the dozens of dead ends garnishing each of the eight antinomies inspire flashes of remorse at having taken up the challenge of seeing this dialogue all the way through.

In this article, I will take the eight antinomies of Plato's *Parmenides* as though they were eight difficulties raised at the beginning of a Scholastic treatment of a question, and the question—which is the chief question of this paper—is whether reality must be a One (not a Many). To make the case that the difficulties posed by the One and the Many are not solvable without a sound metaphysics, I will rely upon Aristotle and St. Thomas and their progeny to offer inroads to the solution of each of the difficulties." (pp. 210-211)

21. Bartocci, Barbara. 2019. "Plato's *Parmenides* as Serious Game: Contarini and the Renaissance Reception of Proclus." In *Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes Vol. 1: Western Scholarly Networks*

and *Debates*, edited by Calma, Dragos, 466–481. Leiden: Brill.

"Ancient and Renaissance interpreters of the *Parmenides*, engaged themselves in the very laborious and serious game of philosophizing. The Ancient and Renaissance Neoplatonic conceptions of the progressive unveiling of truth in the history of philosophy made perfectly legitimate the theological interpretation of the *Parmenides*. In this unifying historical perspective, Parmenides and Plato were representative of a linear chain of wisdom and Plato was credited to have perfected that which his predecessor Parmenides had begun. Accordingly, Plotinus, Proclus and Ficino were allowed to merge into one coherent picture the historical figure of Parmenides of Elea with the character of the actual dialogue the *Parmenides*." (p. 479)

22. Bechtle, Gerald. 1999. *The Anonymous Commentary on Plato's Parmenides*. Bern: P. Haupt.

"As many before me in similar circumstances have probably experienced, so I, too, became more and more aware of the limits that are set to such a study as the present one. The ends I seek to pursue in this work are thus confined to what seems for the time being reasonable, feasible and, above all, indispensable. intention is to make a contribution to the - quite literal - understanding of the linguistically and philosophically difficult fourteen Greek palimpsest pages that form part of a commentary on Plato's *Parmenides* and that were conserved and unearthed in a Latin evangelistary from a North Italian monastery.

This task seemed to be important since the amount of scholarly criticism devoted to the *Parmenides Commentary* was by no means generous. One (and the only, by the way) milestone in the research on the extant text is contained in P. Hadot's two great and unparalleled volumes on *Porphyre et Victorinus* with which he instigated a new approach to the discussion of the present fragments. Before P. Hadot the only major publication was the serious critical edition of the text with notes by W. Kroll in 1892, twelve years before the destruction of the manuscript. In the intervening years R. Beutler and W. Theiler made reference to the *Parmenides Commentary*. Since P. Hadot in 1968 only dispersed remarks and notes have appeared in several articles. To my knowledge not a single article with the *Parmenides Commentary* as its unique subject has been published in this time. This is all the more astonishing since everybody agrees in general (at least since P. Hadot's far-reaching conclusions) that the text is an important one.

In view of this situation it first of all seemed necessary to attempt to understand the actual text as well as possible and to make it, in spite of its considerable difficulties, accessible to the reader. This is why I give a reading text which is not meant to replace P. Hadot's edition of the text which, for its apparatus criticus, remains indispensable. I feel no necessity for the reproduction of the apparatus - in any case we no longer possess the manuscript. I include a translation of the text whose notes are supposed to be at the same time critical and also explanatory. I preface the translation of each fragment with a succinct summary of its content. My own comments attempt a philosophical understanding of the text's doctrines, their (often chronological) implications and background. And since the Middle Platonic philosophers, with whom it seems most appropriate to compare the anonymous commentator, are, in several respects, not well known, I shall present them in introductory essays insofar as they are relevant to our context. I believe also that a commentator of a commentary should take account of the text of reference since an appreciation or even mere comprehension of a commentary has to explain the essentials of the original text commented on, and all the more so, if this text is as demanding as the Platonic *Parmenides*. In trying to approach the passages of the *Parmenides* relevant for the anonymous commentator I shall be concerned mainly with the uncovering of the logical structure of the dialogue; for the task of an interpretation is attempted by our anonymous author." (*Preface*)

23. ———. 2000. "The Question of Being and the Dating of the Anonymous *Parmenides* Commentary." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 20:393–414.

"This article was originally intended to precede the publication of my book (Bechtle 1999a) devoted to the extant fragments of the anonymous commentary on Plato's *Parmenides*, also known as *Anonymus Taurinensis*.' The aim of this article was then-and it still is now-to make the scholarly world acquainted with some of the main reasons, i.e., my view of 'the question of being', for my novel thesis of a pre-Plotinian date for this *Commentary* which has almost unanimously been ascribed to Porphyry. Since the thesis of the Porphyrian authorship goes back to the great French scholar P. Hadot (see in particular

Hadot 1961, 1965, 1968a, and 1968b), one can say that his thesis has been generally accepted for some thirty years or, at least, it has not been seriously challenged. This fact is easily explained since neither before nor after Hadot has there been a thorough and critical examination of the evidence. Hadot's thesis concerning the identity of the author being the only serious one in more than a century since research on the *Commentary* first started, my idea was that probably a lot of questions had not been answered. Reconsidering all of Hadot's evidence and adding some new elements, I determined that the *Commentary* is very likely of pre-Plotinian date. Additional work on Iamblichus and post-Plotinian Platonism negatively confirms this thesis since one can virtually exclude Iamblichus and any of the major Platonists following him as possible authors of the *Commentary*." (p. 393)

24. ———. 2002. "Speusippus and the anonymous commentary on Plato's *Parmenides*: how can the One be a minimum?" In *Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradizione*, edited by Barbanti, Maria and Romano, Francesco, 281–306. Catania: CUECM.
25. ———. 2010. "Speusippus's Neutral Conception of the One and Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 37–58. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"It is easy to see now why Speusippus's second principle (in its absolute aspect) has often been compared—rightly I think—to the Platonic indefinite dyad. But it has to be said that the *Parmenides* is usually much less discussed in this context than the *Philebus* or Aristotle's testimonies about the Platonic material principle. In contrast, I hope to have shown how the *Parmenides* and the third deduction in particular can reasonably be said to be about the same philosophical topic as Speusippus's $\pi\lambda\eta\theta\omicron\varsigma$ -principle and that therefore a detailed comparison of all the texts relevant to the second principle would make sense.

Of course, such an enterprise would have to take account of much more material than presented here concerning the Old Academy, and of all our evidence on Plato (the dialogues and the indirect testimonies). But for the time being, it may suffice to realize that, according to what has been set forth, on the one hand, the first and the third Parmenidean deduction (about the One in relation to itself and the others in relation to the One, on the hypothesis that the One is), and on the other, Speusippus's theory of principles, are comparable and even concern the same topic. For they explore possibilities of how to conceive of, and render functional, the philosophical items, that is, principles, that are needed to explain the coming about of reality." (p. 58)

26. ———. 2010. "The *Anonymous Commentary on Plato's Parmenides* and Aristotle's *Categories*: Some Preliminary Remarks." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 243–256. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"Despite its inconsistencies, it is Hadot's argument's great merit to spotlight an important aspect of the *Parmenides Commentary*, namely the relation existing between the extant fragments of this text and the exegetical tradition regarding the *Categories*, and therefore eventually also that between Plato's *Parmenides* and Aristotle's *Categories*. Quite independently from Hadot, we must ask ourselves the following questions: first, at which point exactly in the *Categories*-related exegetical tradition can the surviving bits of the *Parmenides Commentary* be situated? Second, can any consequences, in particular chronological ones, be drawn from the *Parmenides Commentary*'s position within this exegetical tradition, on which our sources are much richer than on the *Parmenides*-related tradition? To answer these two questions is a task I cannot even start to tackle in this context. Above all, a full analysis of each of the relevant passages from the *Parmenides Commentary* would be needed, together with a close examination of all the parallels—not only the Porphyrian ones adduced by Hadot—and their context.

Instead I wish to concentrate on something more feasible, i.e., on an important preliminary to these questions. For I merely wish to show that the combination and even intertwining of the two exegetical traditions, i.e., the ones related to the *Categories* and the *Parmenides*, is well established by the end of the second century c.e. In other words, reading the Aristotelian treatise into the *Parmenides*, adducing the *Categories* and its related tradition when dealing with the *Parmenides*, is so standard,

even before Plotinus, that one can find it mentioned almost casually in, among other texts, Alcinous' *Handbook*. This, one may argue, is due precisely to the fact that more detailed exegeses of the *Parmenides* such as our *Parmenides Commentary* have traditionally exploited the connection between Plato's dialogue and this important Aristotelian treatise. We may be astonished that the ancients found Aristotle's categories in Plato's dialogue *Parmenides*. But there are, I hope, some real and not only perceived points of contact between the two texts. In what follows I will first mention these points of contact between Plato and Aristotle, and then comment cursorily on texts that testify to the relatively early existence of a joint *Parmenides/Categories* tradition." (pp. 247-248)

27. ———. 2010. "Metaphysicizing the Aristotelian Categories: Two References to the *Parmenides* in Simplicius's Commentary on the *Categories* (75,6 and 291,2 Kalbfleisch)." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 157–172. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"From a systematic point of view, this paper is situated in the wider context of the metaphysization of the Aristotelian categories. What does it mean to metaphysicize the Aristotelian categories? To cut a very long story short, the treatise *Κατηγορίαι*—an ancient title that may well not be its original title—commonly ascribed to the authorship of Aristotle, covers a complex thematic context between language and reality. The categories are attributions of a predicate to a subject; such predications are for Aristotle attributions of reality (of being/*τὸ ὄν*) to a subject: being is thus attributed to or predicated of a subject in many different ways. But they can be reduced to ten general modes. These are the ten categories. Often they simply correspond to the ten most general classes of being, the genera generalissima. That the theory of categories also implies an ontological classification—a classification of beings—is supported by the realist context of the *Categories*. For Aristotle's reflections start from things/realities, and all else seems secondary." (p. 157)

(...)

"In Simplicius's *Categories* commentary there are two explicit references to Plato's *Parmenides*, namely at *In cat.* 75,6 and 291,2." (p. 160)

(...)

"Hence one may say that there is indeed a *κοινωνία* between the two passages: for there is a strong parallel between the One of the *Parmenides*—which expresses or represents the community and continuity of the genera/categories—and similarity (and dissimilarity)—which is quality's manifestation of *κοινωνία* in the same way that equality is for quantity and identity for substance (and in the case of quality at least it is the *Parmenides* that corroborates the definition of its specific feature [*ἴδιον, ιδιότης*], i.e., similarity).

The *Parmenides*, it seems, is used by the later exegetes in the context of categorial *κοινωνία*, whether this applies to all categories (i.e., vertically), or only to one (i.e., horizontally)." (p. 172)

28. ———. 2013. "'Harmonizing' Aristotle's Categories and Plato's *Parmenides* before the Background of Natural Philosophy." In *Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World: Essays in Honour of John D. Turner*, edited by Corrigan, Kevin, Rasimus, Tuomas, Burns, Dylan M., Jenott, Lance and Mazur, Zeke, 543–568. Leiden: Brill.

"This essay is about the relation between—or harmonization of—two crucial texts, one by Aristotle and one by Plato, respectively the *Categories* and the *Parmenides*, neither of which is normally associated with natural philosophy. Instead, each of these two texts has a strong connection with logic. (1) Natural philosophy, the science of natural things, i.e., *φυσική*, i.e., physic(s) in a more traditional sense, is treated in texts such as Aristotle's *Physics*, *Heavens*, *Generation and Corruption*, *Meteorology*, *Soul*, or Plato's *Sophist*, *Politicus*, or *Timaeus*. Nevertheless, physical science is also relevant with regard to the *Categories* and the *Parmenides*. For physics plays a pivotal role between the logical and the metaphysical sciences—and both the *Parmenides* and the *Categories* can be considered as logical texts. Hence, it is not astonishing that the *Categories* and the *Parmenides* can be read with reference to each other and therefore also be related to each other. For both of them are logical and, as such, require a reference back to physical science.

Furthermore, as generally referring back to real (physical) objects, both texts are at some point developed in a meta-physical direction." (pp. 543-544, two notes omitted)

(1) It should not be forgotten that the *Parmenides* is a logical dialogue according to the Thrasyllan division (Diogenes Laërtius, *Vit. phil.* 3.58 Marcovich: Παρμενίδης ἢ περὶ ἰδεῶν, λογικός), a fact remaining influential ever after.

29. Beck, Maximilian. 1947. "Plato's Problem in the *Parmenides*." *Journal of the History of Ideas* no. 8:232–236.

"The suggestion I wish to make is that Plato set himself the following problem in his dialogue: The theory of Methexis—the assertion that many particular things can partake of one idea—encounters great difficulties, which cease as soon as the difference between an idea and its realization in many species and individuals is no longer considered from the point of view of the numerical differentiation of the one and the many. In other words, ideas not only exist beyond space and time, rest and motion, divisibility and in-divisibility, mental subjectivity and physical objectivity, but they have an existence of their own, an ideal existence, which is also beyond number and even beyond the number one." (p. 233)

(...)

"It is the ambiguity of the word *one* which renders a sober understanding of the dialogue extremely difficult, for Plato uses this word here in different meanings. Although he distinguishes in his thought very clearly between unity and sameness or identity (139), he uses the word *one* in one place to signify the sameness of universals (159), and in another place to signify the singularity of the particular or the "ineffable" individual (142). An opportunity was here given to the Neo-Platonists to outdo the sublimity of the Jewish-Christian monotheism by isolating these phrases from their context and by substituting a metaphysical Being and a theological One for the merely formalistic being and one of the text. In addition, they hypostasized the not of the negative copula in a sentence like "the one is not" into an existing Nothing—and a most violent irrationalism was established." (p. 236)

30. Beets, Muus Gerrit Jan. 1995. *Genesis: A Companion to Plato's Parmenides*. Hilversum.

31. Behuniak, James. 2009. "*Li* in East Asian Buddhism: One Approach from Plato's *Parmenides*." *Asian Philosophy* no. 19:31–49.

Abstract: "In Plato's *Parmenides*, Socrates proposes a 'Day' analogy to express one possible model of part/whole relations. His analogy is swiftly rejected and replaced with another analogy, that of the 'Sail'. In this paper, it is argued that there is a profound difference between these two analogies and that the 'Day' represents a distinct way to think about part/whole relations. This way of thinking, I argue, is the standard way of thinking in East Asian Buddhism. Plato's 'Day' analogy can then be used to illuminate the meaning of an opaque but very important concept in East Asian Buddhism: *li*, which in this paper is developed as a modal concept of 'Wholeness'."

32. Benardete, Seth. 2012. "Plato's *Parmenides*: A Sketch " In *The Archaeology of the Soul: Platonic Readings of Ancient Poetry and Philosophy*, 229–243. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine Press.

"Plato's *Parmenides* divides into two unequal parts: the second is more than twice as long as the first. The first is narrated, the second is not. The first goes back to the beginning of Socrates' philosophic life, the second dispenses with the occasion that initiated it, and runs on to the end without a return to Socrates, for whom it was performed, and who, one might have expected, would express either his gratitude for the favor or bafflement at the riddle of Parmenides' gymnastic. The abruptness of the end recalls the *Statesman*, whose end too one would likewise expect Socrates, to whom the Eleatic Stranger is speaking throughout over the heads of Theaetetus, young Socrates, and Theodorus, to acknowledge the debt he owes him. He might there of of course have been waiting impatiently for the *Philosopher*. The *Sophist* and the *Statesman* end Socrates' philosophic life with Socrates almost completely silent; the *Parmenides* begins Socrates' philosophic life, and it too ends with his silence. Parmenides is the envelope of Socrates' second sailing, with Parmenides himself demolishing the possibility of any turn to the "ideas," and the Stranger pulling apart Socrates' maieutic art into two inconsistent arts, the first

of which can elicit from the soul the speeches appropriate to it, and the second can prove their falseness." (p. 229)

33. Bestor, Thomas Wheaton. 1980. "Plato's Semantics and Plato's "Parmenides"." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 25:38–75.

"Plato's self-criticism in the *Parmenides* has long been a source of perplexity and rage to philosophers.

(...)

The perplexity is a simple one to resolve, I believe, as soon as we pay a bit of attention to Plato's theory of Forms as a *piece of semantics*. In this guise the theory tells us that a general word "f" is predicated of sensible particulars in a distinctively *derivative* way (marked by saying they must be related to the Form F in order to be f) while the Form F itself has "f" predicated of it in a *primary* way (marked by saying that the Forms are directly f, f without reference to anything else). We have two different orders of nominata and corresponding to them we have two different modes of predication." (p. 38)

(...)

"If such is the proper setting for Plato's *Parmenides*, it is clear that he did not mean us to come away from the dialogue abandoning the theory of Forms. Plato himself certainly never abandoned that theory.²¹ And the whole question whether the theory should be abandoned because of the objections there is beside the point if they are expressly due to textbook "wrong admissions" being made. Indeed, if Plato meant us general readers to get anything from the dialogue (which is doubtful in view of his intended audience), it is probably only that we should be wary of making "wrong admissions" about Forms ourselves." (p. 72)

(21) Post-Parmenides references to Forms include: *Soph.* 240a, 247a-b, 248e-249d, 254a, *Tim.* 29b, 48e, 50c-d, 51a, *Pol.* 285e-286a, *Phil.* 15a-b, 59a-c, 61d-62b, *Epist.* VII 342a-d, 343b-c, 344b, *Laws* 859e, 965c-d.

34. Bisbee, Eleanor. 1933. "The *Parmenides* in the Light of the Propositional Function." *The Philosophical Review* no. 42:612–617.

"The propositional function appears to have come to stay. Quite likely it is destined, like the axiom, to change its role very markedly before its course is run. At present, while it still offers the challenge of novelty, there is the temptation to see if it, in turn, cannot shed new light on old problems. Moreover, ever since Plato (or Socrates), dissatisfied with his understanding of "the reason why one or anything else is either generated or destroyed or is at all", confessed in the *Phaedo* (97) that he "had in mind some confused notion of a new method" it has been a temptation to review his problems in the light of any promising new method. In view of this double temptation, I venture to experiment with the propositional function in that dialogue which most completely displays all sides of the major problem of the One and the Many, namely the *Parmenides*." (p. 612)

35. Blachowicz, James. 2012. *Essential Difference: Toward a Metaphysics of Emergence*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Chapter 3: *Plato's Response [to Parmenides]; The Form of Difference*, pp. 41-59.

"In Plato's early and middle dialogues, we find his early view of the Forms, their independent existence, the participation of specific things and properties in them, and the knowledge of them through recollection.

In all this, he sought to provide an idealist alternative to physicalist reductionism. The full story of Plato's attempt to save philosophy from the twin dangers posed by Parmenides and the sophists, however, is played out in two later dialogues, named, appropriately, the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*, where it is idealist reductionism that poses the threat.

The *Theaetetus*, which dates from the same time, also addresses the danger that sophism poses, but is directed more to epistemological than to metaphysical issues.

I offer the following framework as a means for approaching these metaphysical issues." (p. 41, a note omitted)

36. Block, Irving. 1964. "Plato, Parmenides, Ryle and Exemplification." *Mind* no. 73:417–422.

"In 1939, Gilbert Ryle wrote an important article on the *Parmenides*.⁽¹⁾

One of the things he said about the dialogue was that the notion of a particular exemplifying a form is logically vicious and no interpretation could avoid Parmenides' regress arguments against it (pp. 137–140). Ryle's analysis and Parmenides' regress arguments are valid only if the forms are conceived as self-predicating.⁽²⁾ Most of the criticisms of Parmenides and Ryle in recent literature deny that Plato's forms can be characterized in this way and Ryle's analysis and Parmenides' arguments are misplaced. Without attempting to be contentious, I shall try to state reasons why I think Parmenides and Ryle have a true hold on Plato and that it is the criticisms against them that are misplaced." (p. 417)

(1) "Plato's Parmenides", I and II, *Mind*, xlviii (1939), 129–151, 302–326.

(2) « See G. Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument", *Philosophical Review*, liiii (1954), 319 ff.

37. Bluck, Richard Stanley. 1957. "Forms as Standards." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 2:115–127.

"Plato called his Forms παράδειγματα, and he is taken to mean that they were patterns or standards of which objects and acts in the sensible world are copies. But in what sense were they 'standards'?

My purpose is to offer a few remarks on this question." (p. 115)

38. ———. 1959. "Plato's Form of Equal." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 4:5–11.

"In *Phronesis* iii (1958) pp. 40 sq. Mr. K. W. Mills criticizes the view which I expressed in *Phronesis* ii (1957) pp. 117 sq., that Plato is unlikely to have thought of the Form of Equal as consisting of two or more equal things, and I should like to make a brief reply." (p. 5)

References

Mill, K. W. Plato's *Phaedo* 74b7–c6, part 2, *Phronesis*, III, 1958, pp. 40–58.

39. Blyth, Dougal. 2000. "Platonic number in the *Parmenides* and *Metaphysics* 13." *International Journal of Philosophical Studies, England* no. 8:23–45.

Abstract: "I argue here that a properly Platonic theory of the nature of number is still viable today. By properly Platonic, I mean one consistent with Plato's own theory, with appropriate extensions to take into account subsequent developments in mathematics. At *Parmenides* 143a–4a the existence of numbers is proven from our capacity to count, whereby I establish as Plato's the theory that numbers are originally ordinal, a sequence of forms differentiated by position. I defend and interpret Aristotle's report of a Platonic distinction between form and mathematical numbers, arguing that mathematical numbers alone are cardinals, by reference to certain non-technical features of a set-theoretical approach and other considerations in philosophy of mathematics. Finally I respond to the objections that such a conception of number was unavailable in antiquity and that this theory is contradicted by Aristotle's report in *Metaph.* XIII that Platonic numbers are collections of units. I argue that Aristotle reveals his own misinterpretation of the terms in which Plato's theory was expressed."

40. ———. 2022. "Dialectic and Forms in *Prm.* 137c–144e." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 339–345. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "Here a dynamic, dialectical analysis of a sequence within the first and second deductions of Plato's *Parmenides* is presented (rather than a proposal for structural interpretation, or detection of references to his own or other philosophers' systems). I treat the manifest contradictions and paradoxes as evidence of cognitive errors that the reader needs to correct in order to think properly about forms. The focus is on the treatment of the One in relation to Being. By analysing the argumentation, the assumptions it depends upon, and the alternative implications if those assumptions about forms are rejected, I seek to show how Parmenides stimulates Socrates, as a listener, to reflect further on what such forms are and are not. The conclusions reached are that (i) the treatment of the One as a form in the first deduction (as identical exclusively with the meaning of its name, and so conceived solely on a linguistic basis), continues in the first two arguments of the second deduction, despite the admission that the One must somehow join with Being (treated implicitly as another form); (ii) as a result, no adequate account of the natures of, and relations between, the One and Being is achieved in these arguments; (iii) the premises from which the self-contradiction results in each argument (that the One becomes an infinite multitude) are identified and reconsidered, so as to distinguish the alternative possibilities from among which an adequate account of these forms would need to be sought; while (iv) the key insight is into the equiprimordiality of the ontological linkage between these forms with what it is in the nature of each that makes it distinct, and the consequent need, not satisfied in the *Parmenides*, for an account of how this is possible."

41. Booth, N. B. . 1957. "Were Zeno's Arguments a Reply to Attacks upon Parmenides?" *Phronesis*:1–9.

"One of the mysteries about Zeno of Elea's arguments is that, whereas we learn from all the available evidence that Zeno was particularly concerned to defend the One of Parmenides(1), yet we find him, in his arguments about plurality, doing all that he can to refute the "ones" of a plurality.(2) This would be reasonable if we could be sure that his arguments were valid only against the "ones" of a plurality, not against Parmenides's One; but it is by no means certain that this is true, as we shall see in the course of my discussion. The difficulty was already felt by the ancient commentators(3), and perhaps by Plato as well(4) ; it may be a "pseudo-problem", but if so, it is a pseudo-problem of some antiquity." (p. 1)

(1) This is suggested by Plato *Parmenides* 128 c, stated by the ancient commentators, and further proved by Zeno's arguments themselves. As regards "Parmenides's One", it would be more accurate to speak of his "single Being", since he began his deduction from Being rather than from Unity.

(2) See Diels 29 (Zeno) and H. D. P. Lee, *Zeno of Elea* (1936).

(3) See Simplicius *Phys.* 138. 18 ff.

(4) Parmenides 1 28 C; note J. E. Raven's remark on p. 73 *Pythagoreans and Eleatics* (1948), "It seems, incidentally, not impossible that Plato also felt there was something unexplained about Zeno."

42. ———. 1957. "Were Zeno's Arguments Directed against the Pythagoreans?" *Phronesis*:90–103.

"It is not my purpose to examine in detail all the aberrations of predecessors; such a procedure would involve too much diversion from my main subject of inquiry. I hope that some of these errors will be duly corrected as I examine the evidence; but my real aim is, not so much to expose the false views of earlier scholars, as to show, first, that an anti-Pythagorean theory, if it is held at all, must be held within certain very strict limits; and secondly that, although past views may have outrun the evidence, there is still a fairly sound core of evidence for supposing that Zeno's arguments had at least some connection with the Pythagorean theories, even if they were not directed specifically against them. All this labour of past scholars may not have been entirely in vain." (pp. 90-91)

43. Boscarino, Giuseppe. 2017. "An Interpretation of Plato's Ideas and Criticism of Parmenides according to Peano's Ideography." *Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts* no. 5:13–28.

Abstract: "Anyone who studies the Platonic work finds great difficulty in interpreting the precise meaning of his ontological terms, which are most often enveloped in an obscure and mystical language. Aristotle already emphasized the allegorical and poetic meaning of the platonic terms "imitation" and "participation," related to the sensible things, "copies" of the "ideas." I have asked myself then the following question: Is there a rational and logical nucleus within the mystical and

mythological shell of Platonism? Studying the mathematical ideography of Peano, a great logician, mathematician and contemporary linguist, elicited the following question: can we make an ideographic translation of Plato's ontological terms in the same way Peano did for aspects of Euclid's work? We demonstrate a possible valid, rational, and logical nucleus of certain Platonic nomenclature beyond the mists of certain metaphysical interpretation, while also showing Plato's criticism of Parmenides to be invalid in the light of Peano's ideography."

44. Bossi, Beatriz. 2005. "Is Socrates really defending conceptualism in Parmenides 132b3-d4?" In *Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Ales and Karfík, Filip, 58–74. Prague: Oikoymenh.
45. ———. 2022. "Why is the 'greatest' difficulty neither great nor consistent? (*Prm.* 133b-134e)." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 253–259. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "In this paper I attempt to show that the 'greatest difficulty' is inconsistent because, although it assumes that self-subsistence precludes knowability (because, 'being in itself', a Form cannot be 'in other'), it allows an exception, namely, the case of God, who knows the Forms because he would 'have' the Form of Knowledge. This implies that 'being in themselves' does not preclude them from being 'in other'."

46. Bostock, David. 1978. "Plato on Change and Time in the *Parmenides*." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 23:229–242.

"So far as that is concerned the points I have wanted to make by way of preliminary are (i) that Plato's discussion of change and temporal relations in this dialogue is largely independent of any special features of 'the One', and Plato shows that he is himself quite aware of this; and (ii) that in fact the discussion is largely independent of any views one might hold about forms vis-a-vis their relations to particulars, for forms do not enter the discussion at all in any interesting way. The exception to this rather general claim is that the *Parmenides* does in fact contradict the middle-period doctrine that γένεσις excludes οὐσία, but I do not think that this point has much significance. The main thrust of the treatment of change concerns 'whatever is in time', and though Plato may perhaps have held that some things (the forms) were not in time, this has practically no bearing on the interesting puzzle he develops about things that are in time. This puzzle can be summed up as one that relies on these six premises:

- (1) At any one time, x is not both F and not F.
- (2) If at one time x is F, and at another time x is not F, then there must be a time during (or at) which x changes from one to the other.
- (3) While x is changing from being not F to being F, i.e. while x is becoming F, x is not (yet) F.
- (4) While x is changing from being not F to being F, i.e. while x is becoming F, x is not (still) not F.
- (5) At any 'present moment' x is either F or not F.
- (6) If x is in time, x is always at a 'present moment'.

It is almost true to say that these six premises are asserted one after the other in the 'Appendix' on change to the first two movements (i.e. 155 e - 157 b, beginning ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν), and this is our main text. But first let us observe how these six premises - or rather, a judicious selection from them - enter into the other arguments on change and temporal relations." (pp. 230-231)

47. Braga da Silva, André Luiz. 2022. "The "Ideas as thoughts" hypothesis of *Parmenides* 132b-c: a historical approach." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 59–66. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "Using a historical approach, this paper assesses the "Ideas as thoughts" hypothesis of *Parmenides* 132b-c. The investigation focuses on three topics: i) the meaning of the hypothesis within the dialogue; ii) the historicity of the hypothesis, in view of possible identification with existing doctrines; and iii) the validity of the refutation of the hypothesis, with special regards to the role of "participation" in this. The results suggest an extradialogical intention on Plato's part."

48. Brankaer, Johanna. 2010. "Is There a Gnostic "Henological" Speculation?" In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 173–194. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"In the (Neo-) Platonic *Parmenides* reception, the One is a central philosophical theme; it has acquired a status that transcends even Being. Ultimate source of reality, it is placed so far above Being that it has barely any relation to it at all. Whether or not this is a valid interpretation of Plato and *Parmenides*(1) is not directly relevant to the scope of this paper, which is primarily concerned with Gnostic thought. Even though the Gnostics did not necessarily seek to interpret philosophical antecedents, like the *Parmenides*, they were confronted with similar questions. In Gnosticism (and especially in the more Platonizing texts), we find a way of exploring answers to the question of the derivation of multiplicity from initial unity. This unity, however, is only rarely described in the "henological" language of the Neoplatonists—even if it sometimes tends to seem so, especially in English translations where substantivized adjectives are often translated with the indefinite "one." The treatises we deal with rather seem to conceive of the one—which is not necessarily identified with the highest principle—on a purely "ontological" level, being in that way maybe even closer to the historical *Parmenides* and Plato than the philosophical "schools" of later antiquity." (p. 173)

(1) See, e.g., the excellent study by Narbonne (2001). This work presents Plotinus's henological interpretation of Plato more as a deviant interpretation of the *Parmenides*, contrary to thinkers like Origen (the Pagan) and others that were still active at the time of Proclus.

References

Narbonne, J.-M. 2001. The Origin, Significance and Bearing of the ἐπέκεινα Motif in Plotinus and the Neoplatonic Tradition. *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 17:185–97.

49. Brémond, Mathilde. 2022. "Gorgias and Antilogic in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 101–114. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "This paper focuses on the influence of Gorgias and his antilogic method on the second part of the *Parmenides*. I will show that Plato was directly inspired by Gorgias' treatise *On Not-Being*, not only in specific passages but also and more importantly in his whole approach and reasoning. This use of the sophist can shed light, as I will show, on one of the most disputed questions in Platonic studies, namely the aim of the second part of the *Parmenides*. I will finally highlight the similarities between the Gorgian method Plato uses in the *Parmenides* and a practice he otherwise condemns, namely antilogic.."

50. Brisson, Luc. 2002. "'Is the World One?' A New Interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 22:1–20.

Abstract: "Of all Plato's dialogues, the *Parmenides* remains the most fascinating and the most controversial. This twofold characteristic has a lengthy tradition, reaching back to the birth of Neoplatonism, which replaced the Middle Platonist dialogue of reference, the *Timaeus*, with its own, the *Parmenides*. From the third century AD on, this dialogue became the laboratory for the production of a new interpretation of Plato. The reading of the *Parmenides* which is proposed in this paper breaks with the grand tradition that sees the second part of the dialogue as a description of the degrees of being, which flow like divinities from the One. Paradoxically, my rejection of this interpretation is the result of prolonged study of Proclus and Damascius, whose exegetical skills I came to admire; the subtlety and scope of their arguments justify the influence they have had in the history of 'Western thought, particularly through authors such as Marsilio Ficino. The present reading also eschews a

formal interpretation, already evident in antiquity, that considers the *Parmenides* an exercise in logic, aimed at refuting Zeno in his own field, and providing an example of Platonic logic."

51. ———. 2008. "The Reception of the *Parmenides* before Proclus." *Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum* no. 12:99–113.

"As far as the interpretation of the *Parmenides* is concerned, the commentary by Proclus, only a part of which remains, but whose substance can be reconstituted from Damascius, remains a monument that cannot be neglected. Through the intermediary of Marsilio Ficino, this interpretation was the only one known in Europe, practically until the 20th century; even today, any reading of the *Parmenides* must take a stance with regard to it.

Here, I shall attempt to detach myself from this interpretation, and above all to keep my distance from the history of the exegesis of the *Parmenides* which, as part of an appropriative strategy, Proclus recounts at the beginning of the 6th book of his commentary (In Parmenidem VI). My intention is to show that, at the beginning of the first half of the 3rd century CE, the dominant interpretation of this dialogue was an ontological one. It was then challenged by a different interpretation in which the One beyond being plays the primary role, taken up and developed by Plotinus, which was in turn defended and utilized by all Neoplatonists up to Proclus and Damascius. With this goal in view, I will discuss the interpretations of Longinus and Origen the Platonist, both of whom, like Plotinus, attended the School of Ammonius at Alexandria." (p. 99, notes omitted)

52. ———. 2010. "The Fragment of Speusippus in Column I of the Anonymous Commentary on the *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 59–65. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"After a translation of the first column of the *Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides*, where some lines mention a doctrine attributed to Speusippus, I will propose a commentary on these few lines which, following C. Steel, I will try to show to be a later fabrication.(1) If this is right, it means that the commentator is criticizing a Neopythagorizing interpretation of the second part of Plato's *Parmenides*, proposed in the first two centuries C.E." (p. 59)

(1) This article is a critical response to Bechtle 2002.

References

Bechtle, Gerald. 2002. Speusippus and the Anonymous Commentary on Plato's *Parmenides*: How Can the One be a Minimum? Pages 281–306 in *Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradizione. Atti del III Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo*. Università degli Studi di Catania, 31 maggio–4 giugno 2001. Edited by M. Barbanti and F. Romano. Symbolon 24. Catania: CUECM.

Steel, Carlos. 2002. A Neoplatonic Speusippus? Pages 469–76 in *Hénosis kai philía = Unione e amicizia: omaggio a Francesco Romano*. Edited by M. Barbanti, G. R. Giardina and P. Manganaro. Introduced by E. Berti. Catania: CUECM.

53. ———. 2010. "A Criticism of the Chaldaean Oracles and of the Gnostics in Columns IX and X of the *Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 233–241. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"At the beginning of the fourth fragment, which includes columns IX and X, the commentator has apparently just set forth an objection: how can it be said that the One cannot be named, defined, or known, while sacred traditions like the Chaldaean Oracles seem to contradict themselves, because, while saying the Father himself snatched himself away, they reveal to us a positive teaching about him?(1)" (p 233)

(1) This article is intended as a response to the one by Bechtle 2006a, 563–81.

References

Bechtle Gerald. 2006. Neglected Testimonium on the Chaldaean Oracles. *Classical Quarterly* 56: 563–81

54. ———. 2010. "A Criticism of Numenius in the Last Columns (XI–XIV) of the *Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 275–282. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"The fifth fragment (col. XI–XII) comments on the beginning of the second hypothesis of Plato's *Parmenides*: "If the one is, can it be although it does not participate in reality?" (142b5–6). At first sight, this formula seems strange (ἄτοπον) to a Neoplatonist. Indeed, the reasoning of Parmenides (*Parm.* 142b5–6) allows us to suppose that reality (οὐσία) exists prior to the second one, the one-that-is, which participates in it; yet for a Neoplatonist, reality (ἡ οὐσία), considered as being (τὸ ὄν), is on the same level as the second one, which corresponds to the domain of the intellect and the intelligible. To escape this deadlock, the commentator will investigate the meaning of "to participate", " (p. 275)

55. ———. 2010. "The Reception of the *Parmenides* before Proclus." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 49–63. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"As far as the ontological interpretation of the *Parmenides* is concerned, the commentary by Proclus, only a part of which remains, but whose substance can be reconstituted from Damascius,(2) remains a monument that cannot be neglected.

Through the intermediary of Marsilio Ficino, this interpretation was the only one known in Europe, practically until the twentieth century; even today, any reading of the *Parmenides* must take a stance with regard to it. Here, I will attempt to detach myself from this interpretation, and above all to keep my distance from the history of the exegesis of the *Parmenides* which, as part of an appropriative strategy, Proclus recounts at the beginning of the sixth book of his *Commentary* (col. 1051.34–1014.12 = 1051.26–1064.10).(3)" (p. 49)

Translated from the French by Michael Chase and reprinted by permission from *Zeitschrift für antikes Christentum / Journal of ancient Christianity* 12 (2008), 99–113.

(2) On Damascius, see Hoffmann 1994, 541–593.

(3) The text is analyzed by Saffrey and Westerink in their Introduction to Proclus (1968, 1: lxxix–lxxxix). References to Proclus, *In Parm.* are from Cousin² first, then by Steel.

References

Cousin, V. 1864. Pages 617–1244 in *Procli commentarium in Platonis Parmenidem*. Procli Philosophi Platonici. Opera inedita, pars 3. Paris: Durand. Repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1961.

Hoffmann, Philippe. 1994. *Damascius*. Pages 540–93 in *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, 2.

Saffrey, H. D., and L. G. Westerink 1968–1997. *Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne*. Texte établi et traduit par H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink. 6 Vols. Collection des universités de France. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Steel Carlos ed. 2007–2009. *Procli In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3 vols.

56. ———. 2010. "Columns VII–VIII of the *Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides*: Vestiges of a Logical Interpretation." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 111–117. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"The third fragment, dealing with the One in time, may inform us about the form that the interpretation of the *Parmenides* may have assumed before Plotinus. The tenth deduction of the first series is first cited in its entirety (141a5–d6) in column VII. The logical structure of the argumentation is then analyzed (column VIII, 1–21), and the commentary ends with objections to the proposed interpretation (column VIII, 21–35). Columns VII and VIII follow one another, since they are written on the recto and verso of the same folio." (p. 111)

57. ———. 2023. "The Instant (ἐξαίφνης) in Plato's *Parmenides* 155e4–157b5." In *Plato on Time and the World*, edited by Ilievski, Viktor, Vázquez, Daniel and De Bianchi, Silvia, 31–45. Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave Macmillan.

"I would like to show that Parmenides, when referring to the instant (ἐξαίφνης) in Plato's *Parmenides* 155e4–157b5, adopts Zeno's assumption of the divisibility of time, which Aristotle rejects by appealing to the potential infinite, a philosophical position already adopted by Plato in the *Timaeus*. To reach this conclusion, however, one must re-situate oneself within the context of an interpretation of the second part of the *Parmenides* which, until today, I am the only one to propose." (p. 31)

58. ———. 2024. "The ontology of Parmenides according to Plato's *Parmenides*." *Organon* no. 56:53–64.

Abstract: "For Proclus, the subject of Parmenides' hypothesis is the One and the verb to be has an existential meaning. Modern commentators acknowledge the existential function of the verb, but propose different subjects. I try to explain why I give a predicative function to the verb to be, giving the world as its subject, one being the predicate."

"Introduction

In 1994, I published a French translation of Plato's *Parmenides* that was quite different from all other modern interpretations.¹ I argued that Parmenides' character in the *Parmenides* was a fair representation of the historical Parmenides, for whom being in the Poem is the world,⁽²⁾ that is the universe, when grasped either by reason or by the senses. I would like to show here the plausibility of this interpretation." (p. 53)

"Conclusion

The second part of the *Parmenides* remains an enigma. Since the *Commentary* by Proclus the ἔστιν of the hypothesis which is examined in eight series of deductions has been considered as existential. Its subject is different according to the interpreters: the ἔν beyond being for the neoplatonists, the ἔν opposed to the dyad (δυάς) for the supporters of the esoteric doctrines, the unity of the intelligible forms or the form One for the majority of scholars, or the concept one. Some believe that it is a mere dialectical exercise without any philosophical background. All these interpretations turn out to be a dead end. That is why we propose to understand that in the second part of the *Parmenides*, the hypothesis is Parmenides' one, either affirmed or denied: εἴτε τὸ πᾶν ἔν ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔν." (p. 63)

(2) See L. Brisson, *Is the world one? A new interpretation of Plato's Parmenides* in: *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 22, 2002, pp. 1–20.

59. Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud, and Renault, Olivier, eds. 2022. *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Twelfth Symposium Platonicum, Paris, July 15th–20th 2019.

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References 527; Index Locorum 549; Index Rerum 565-568.

60. Brownstein, Donald. 1986. "Parmenides Dilemma and Aristotle's Way Out." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 24:1-7.

"We may, for example, adopt as part of our view on identity the principle that neither individual things nor their qualities may differ in number alone. I will call such a principle the Discernibility of Non-identicals (DNI). It will be enough for two *individual things* to meet the requirements of DNI if they differ in some quality-e.g., if one is square, the other round.

Again, it will be enough for two *qualities* to meet the requirements of DNI if they differ as qualities-e.g., in the way being round (roundness) differs from being square (squareness), or in the way two distinct shades of green may differ (though they are both greens)." (p. 1)

(...)

"Parmenides poses so formidable a threat to Plato precisely because his dilemma seems to involve a clash between DNI and Plato's other principles. Plato sees no easy way to give up either DNI or those other principles. If what I have suggested about Aristotle is right, he gives up DNI, but without providing a way of salvaging what DNI secured. Thus as a response to Parmenides' challenge Aristotle's theory seems inadequate. It is not at all clear how such a theory could be made adequate." (p. 7)

61. Brumbaugh, Robert Sherrick. 1954. "Plato's *Parmenides*, A Report on New Source Material " *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 8:200-203.

"Western philosophy has been continuously influenced by Plato's *Parmenides*, with its extraordinary abstract treatment of the one and the many, though few Western philosophers have claimed that they understood the dialogue, and none have been able to give convincing defence of an asserted understanding of it.

New evidence of this continued influence, and new source material of help in interpretation, is provided by the publication of the final section of Proclus' *Commentary* in vol. iii of the *Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi*. This concluding section of Book vii of the *Commentary* is missing in the Greek Proclus mss., but extant in the Latin text of Moerbeke's medieval translation, which is the basis of the present edition." (p. 200)

62. ———. 1959. "Plato's *Parmenides* and Positive Metaphysics." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 13:271-277.

"Father William Lynch, in his recent commentary, has given us a clearly written and attractive study which construes the hypotheses of Plato's *Parmenides* in a "positive, metaphysical" way.(1) By this he means that, as opposed to rhetoric, myth, or poetry, this Platonic text is to be read as a didactic and literal statement of a metaphysical doctrine.(2) This approach is maintained throughout the study with a single-mindedness which, some readers will feel, tends to overlook a good many "positive metaphysical" values of other frames of reference and possible interpretation." (p 271)

(1) William F. Lynch, S.J., *An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the Parmenides* (Georgetown University Press, 1959).

(2) Ibid., pp. 18-19, n. 48 p. 73, and, p. 73: "Over against perhaps all the other dialogues, the eight hypotheses of the *Parmenides* are pure metaphysics . . . And every myth or mythological tendency in the dialogues must, therefore, be thrown up against the philosophical accuracies of the *Parmenides*. ..."

63. ———. 1960. "A Latin Translation of Plato's *Parmenides*." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 14:91–109.

"When volume III of the *Plato Latinus* series of the *Corpus Platonicum* appeared in 1953, it was evident that this was an important contribution to the history of philosophy.(1)

(...)

The book was also of value for our understanding of Plato's *Parmenides*, I thought, for two rather different reasons: on the side of speculative philosophy, it sharpens our appreciation of the interpretations to which the dialogue had given rise; on the side of textual study, it has some bearing on the question of exactly what Plato's original version of the dialogue had said." p. 91)

(...)

"The end of Proclus' *Commentary*, for example, is an ideal reading for students of the history of philosophy; it seems to me to represent a perfect statement of the culmination of the dialectic of Neo-Platonism." (p. 92, a note omitted)

(1) R. Klibansky, ed., *Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevii, Plato Latinus* vol. III: *Parmenides usque ad finem primae hypothesis, Procli Commentarium in Parmenidem pars ultima adhuc inedita interprete Guillelmo de*

Moerbeka, ed. R. Klibansky and C. Labowsky, London, the Warburg Institute, 1953.

64. ———. 1961. *Plato on the One. The Hypotheses in the Parmenides*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

"What I propose to do in the present study is both to answer some fundamental preliminary questions about the accuracy of our text and its internal organization and to develop a philosophic commentary that takes account of these preliminary results. Assuming that Plato's intention is serious but granting (as the history of interpretations makes us) that his purpose has been controversial, one immediately wonders whether the difficulty is due to the author himself or to inept copyists and editors. 'There is no point in charging Plato with error or obscurity if this might be in fact the contribution of incompetent copyists over two millennia. And a quick look at any detailed apparatus suggests that the tight, repetitive argument makes these hypotheses singularly difficult to copy without error.(34)

One thing that has helped to convince me that the text is in very good shape is its internal coherence. For another inquiry has been the seemingly factual one of the validity of Plato's logic: given the flexibility of twentieth-century formal logic, the issue should be completely decidable. As a result of a literal translation and formalization, I think I have decided it: the logical form is valid, but some very odd concepts are introduced on occasion.

Actually, Plato seems to have been imitating a Pythagorean proof-pattern, marking off his argument into theorems, each closing with a q.e.d., and developing each theorem on the same pattern.(35) My notes on the translation, below, are concerned primarily with this architectonic and with the validity of the argument, though textual points are also treated incidentally." (p. 13)

(34) See below, pp. 240 ff.

(35) See below, pp. 47-53.

65. ———. 1973. "The Text of Plato's *Parmenides*." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 26:140–148.

"I myself became interested in textual work when I began checking the logical rigor of Plato's *Parmenides* hypotheses. To my great surprise, the proof patterns were not simply valid, but as woodenly uniform and rigorous as Euclid's *Elements*.(2) Such rigor was exactly what a Neo-Platonist

like Proclus would have expected, admired, and possibly imposed; it is not paralleled anywhere else in Plato.(3)" (p. 140)

(...)

"My conclusion was that Dies' text, with some fifty changes, gave a text that was excellent, indeed; but my suggested changes had very weak manuscript authority, with a pedigree I could not trace.(10) A re-examination now convinces me that a re-punctuated version of the text I set up in my 1961 study would not only be excellent, but (apart from fourteen conjectural emendations, only four of them significant for the argument) perfect logically and with sound manuscript authority for all but 18 out of its 500 propositions! If this is right, the difficulties presented by the hypotheses are conceptual and metaphysical, not philological, and in almost no case explicable by copyists' errors." (p. 142, a note omitted)

(2) A point explored-and, I think, demonstrated in detail-in my *Plato on the One: The Hypotheses in the Parmenides, and their Interpretation*, New Haven, 1961 (hereafter cited as POTO).

(3) Proclus actually rephrases the first hypothesis as a set of second figure syllogisms in his *Commentary on the Parmenides* (ed. by V. Cousin in *Procli Opera*, Paris 1827). His own idea of proper rigor and formal

proof is illustrated in the *Elements of Theology* (ed. and trans. E. R. Dodds, Oxford, 1933).

(10) 10 POTO, pp. 262-345, n. 5, p. 259.

66. ———. 1976. "Notes on the History of Plato's Text: with the *Parmenides* as a Case Study." *Paideia: Journal of Foundational Studies in Education*:67–79.

67. ———. 1980. "The Purpose of Plato's *Parmenides*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 1:39–47.

"In short, my examination of previous interpretations leads me to an alternative view: that the *Parmenides* is a defense of the theory of forms via a criticism of incorrect interpretations; that it is an indirect defense, rather than a dogmatic statement of revelation; that it offers a constructive logical analysis of "participation" in examining alternative possible mediating categories between instance and form. The second of these points must not be misunderstood.

I am not simply saying that various misinterpretations are rejected; I mean to argue that the proof is meant to hold against any interpretation that identifies dialectic with hypothetical-deductive philosophic method. The final answer seems to point back to the vision of the world of science in the light of a principle of value, developing Anaxagoras' partial insight which so captivated young Socrates according to the *Phaedo*." (p. 46)

68. ———. 1982. "The History and an Interpretation of the Text of Plato's *Parmenides*." *Philosophy Research Archives* no. 8:1–56.

"The present study aims at giving factual support to the thesis that the *Parmenides* is serious in intention, rigorous in logical demonstration, and stylistically meticulous in its original composition. While this consideration may be tedious, still it is useful. Against a past history which has claimed to find the tone hilarious, the logic fallacious, the work inauthentic, the text in need of bracketing by divination, the whole incoherent— against these eccentricities a certain firm sobriety seems called for. I hope that my conclusions find support and persist through fluctuations of philosophic and philological styles." (p. 2)

69. ———. 1987. "Plato's *Parmenides*: The Text of Paris B, Vienna W, and Prague." *Philosophy Research Archives* no. 13:22–42.

"In. 19S3, Robert Brumbaugh published a study of Plato's *Parmenides* in this Archive. His crucial concern was to establish the dialogue's serious intent!on and rigorous deductive logic.

But there are enough gaps, anomalies, and apparent fallacies in our current texts to cast some doubt on such a claim. In addition, the reported variant reading of Bekker and Stallbaum. are a complex maze that defies simple reorganization into an intelligible stemma, as though some unique complications attended the transmission and correction of the second family manuscripts. However, the author claims that a closer second look at the manuscripts in question support his interpretation." (p. 22)

70. Bruss, Jon Steffen. 2004. "Parmenides, Plato's *Symposium*, and the Narrative of Intellectual Activity." *Aevum* no. 4:467–485.
71. Butorac, David D. 2009. "Proclus' Interpretation of the *Parmenides*, Dialectic and the Wandering of the Soul." *Dionysius* no. 27:33–54.

"This paper will have six sections. First, we will outline basic epistemological presuppositions in the Neoplatonic system and some of Proclus' developments of it. Second, we will briefly address Plato's use of the word *planê*. Third, we will discuss in detail the metaphor of *plane* in Proclus' other works and his transformation of it into an important concept within his system. Fourth, we will return to a consideration of the problem of *plane* relative to the problem of dialectic in the *Parmenides* and discuss this in light of our examination.

Fifth, we will discuss problems that arise from Proclus' development. Finally, we will make general conclusions about the role *planê* plays in Proclus' interpretation of the method in the *Parmenides*." (p. 35)

72. ———. 2015. "Ἀντιγραφή in Proclus' « In Parmenidem ». A correction of the Budé edition." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 65:310–320.

"This article will have the following structure. First, we will introduce the issue of how the ἀντιγραφή interpreters account for the Platonic corpus as a whole so as to understand the principles of their interpretation. Second, we will look at the ἀντιγραφή interpretation of the *Parmenides* and evaluate the Budé's interpretation of it. Third, we will show how, in the Budé's interpretation of the Parmenidean ἀντιγραφή, where Parmenides is presented as imitating Zeno's refutation, the method that Parmenides outlines operates in exactly the opposite way that Zeno's does.

Fourth, we will compare the Budé's account of the relation between Zeno and Parmenides with that presented within the ἀντιγραφή interpretation itself. Then we will show that, in Proclus' history, the later interpreters represent the ἀντιγραφή interpretation of the *Parmenides* to be one not of imitation, but of opposition. Fifth, while examining the last account of the ἀντιγραφή interpretation, we will show that the Budé's interpretation and translation of this last report about the ἀντιγραφή interpretation conflicts with their own reconfiguration of the original ἀντιγραφή account.

The Budé editors' account of the later presentation of ἀντιγραφή shows that the Parmenidean ἀντιγραφή is not, in fact, Parmenides' imitation of Zeno and his method, but rather his refutation. Finally, we will make some general observations about their

remarks about the *Parmenides* itself and the difficulties that any interpreter, ancient or modern, must face when reading this dialogue. They seem to treat, and use as evidence of their reading, the ending of the dialogue (somewhat problematically) as adum-

brating a proof that being is one. The result will be that this edition's decision to ignore the manuscript tradition in this instance was wrong and should be corrected." (pp. 311-312)

73. Călian, Florin George. 2013. "'Clarifications' of Obscurity: Conditions for Proclus's Allegorical Reading of Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Obscurity in Medieval Texts*, edited by Dolezalová, Lucie, Rider, Jeffrey and Zironi, Alessandro, 15–31. Krems: Medium Aevum Quotidianum. Gesellschaft zur Erforschung der materiellen Kultur des Mittelalters.

"Proclus used the allegorical method at length in his philosophical commentaries on Plato's dialogues and developed a substantial allegorical technique, even in his commentary on the *Parmenides*, a dialogue which would, at first glance, hardly seem likely to inspire an allegorical reading, given its

technicalities and aridity. His efforts to charge the text with heavy allegorical meaning challenge both the literary critic and the philosopher to clarify what he was doing. Some tenets of Proclus's commentary on Plato's *Parmenides* will thus be scrutinized as a case study in the present article, in an attempt to delineate and to discuss the main suppositions of the Proclean allegorical reading. My hypothesis is that allegory is a philosophical rather than a literary mechanism and bears for Proclus philosophical implications as one of his main methodological devices. The main question addressed here is: Why would someone question allegorically a philosophical text? Or, in other words: What are the prerequisites for using allegory as part of a philosophical inquiry? I wish to focus on why one would read a philosophical text allegorically rather than how such a reading was done (discovered, invented, transmitted through a certain tradition, etc.)" (p. 16)

74. ———. 2014. "One, Two, Three... A Discussion on the Generation of Numbers in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *New Europe College Ștefan Odobleja Program Yearbook 2013-2014*, 49–78. Bucharest: New Europe College.

Abstract: "One of the questions regarding the *Parmenides* is whether Plato was committed to any of the arguments developed in the second part of the dialogue. This paper argues for considering at least one of the arguments from the second part of the *Parmenides*, namely the argument of the generation of numbers, as being platonically genuine. I argue that the argument at 142b-144b, which discusses the generation of numbers, is not deployed for the sake of dialectical argumentation alone, but it rather demonstrates key platonic features, such as the use of the greatest kinds and the generation principle. The connection between the argument for the generation of numbers and Plato's philosophy of mathematics is strengthened by the exploration of a possible reference in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* A6. Taken as a genuine platonic theory, the argument could have significant impact on how we understand Plato's philosophy of mathematics in particular, and the ontology of the late dialogues in general – that numbers can be reduced to more basic entities, i.e the greatest kinds, in a way similar to the role the greatest kinds are assigned in the *Sophist*."

75. Calvert, Brian. 1982. "A Note on Plato's "Parmenides" 128 e 5-130 a 2." *Mnemosyne* no. 35:51–59.

"In this paper, I want to re-examine the *Parmenides* passage, and to offer some new arguments (as well as answer the older objections) in favour of the view that αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοιά does *not* refer to the Form. Unlike earlier accounts, however, I shall not take it for granted that the conclusions I shall be reaching will necessarily have implications for the interpretation of αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα. While I do not wish to deny that there are similarities, I do not think that the similarities are quite so close as have been traditionally assumed." (p. 51)

76. Campbell, Lewis. 1896. "On the Place of the *Parmenides* in the Chronological Order of the Platonic Dialogues." *Classical Philology* no. 10:129–136.

"In what remains of this paper I shall assume the general correctness of that arrangement of the dialogues according to which the Sophistes, Politicus and *Philebus* with the *Timaeus Critias* and *Laws* form the latest group, while the *Phaedrus* and *Theaetetus* belong to the middle period of which the *Republic* was the central work: the rest, with some doubtful and unimportant exceptions, such as the *Menexenus*, being relegated to the earlier time." (p. 130)

(...)

"But, once more, in looking at the *Parmenides* as a whole, while the style is that of Plato's maturity, the dialogue presents more the effect of a first effort in a new region, -that of pure dialectical abstractions, -than the *Theaetetus* with its mellow blending of ethical, psychological, logical and metaphysical elements, and its profound analysis (taken up afterwards in the *Timaeus*) of the nature of perception.

At the same time I am ready to admit that this particular question may be argued in a contrary sense; -that the thorny subtilties of the *Parmenides*, so remote from the spirit of the *Republic*, are only approached towards the end of the *Theaetetus*, that the thorough-going notion of a philosophy which despises nothing however trivial is shared by the *Parmenides* with the later dialogues (*Soph. Phileb.*), and that the ἐλεγκτικός ἀνὴρ of the *Theaetetus* (a contemporary portrait) may have led Plato back to Zeno and through Zeno to the reexamination of 'the great Parmenides.' I have far less of certitude on

this point than I have in maintaining that the *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides* are sister dialogues and that they are intermediate between the *Republic* and the *Sophistes*." (p. 136)

77. Capra, Andrea, and Martinelli Tempesta, Stefano. 2010. "Riding from Elea to Athens (via Syracuse). The *Parmenides* and the Early Reception of Eleatism: Epicharmus, Cratinus, Plato." *Méthexis* no. 24:135–175.

Abstract: "This paper makes the following claims: 1) early playwrights (especially Cratinus and Epicharmus, with a new reading of fr. 23B1-2 DK = 275-276 PCG) were keen on lampooning Eleatism; 2) through literary and linguistic devices that were obvious for Plato's original public, Plato revived this tradition in the *Parmenides*; 3) the *Parmenides* portrays the Eleats as catastrophically counterproductive philosophers.

In sharp contrast with Socratic *logoi*, Eleatism, far from promoting philosophy (protreptic), eventually alienates all possible disciples ('apotreptic'), thus undermining the very notion of Platonic *philosophia*."

78. Carpenter, Amber D. 2022. "Separation Anxieties. *Parmenides* 133a-135c." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 245–252. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The greatest difficulty for the defender of Forms, says Parmenides, is laying to rest the objection that Forms of the kind posited would be unknowable. The objection seems to turn on the supposition that if Forms are separate from sensibles, then sensibles must be likewise separate from Forms – and therefore likewise independent of Forms. But since independence might imply separateness without separateness implying independence, it looks as if the objector commits an obvious fallacy, and so Parmenides' anxiety far outstrips the actual difficulty. Examining the relation between separateness (a symmetrical relation) and independence (a non-symmetrical relation), this paper argues that the task of surmounting the objection is indeed formidable – with respect to sensible objects and forms, and more especially with respect to the relationship between intelligence and intelligibles. To overcome the objection that distinct and independent forms are unknowable, one must give an account of asymmetrical relations which imply symmetrical relations on which each of the relata (of the symmetrical relation) may be differently affected by this relation; and one must give an account of metaphysical dependence and independence which allows that which is depended upon to retain its independence of that which depends on it. One must in particular offer such an account of the relation between intelligence and the intelligible.

For if the intelligible depends for its being intelligible on the nature of intelligence – our intelligence – then realism is threatened in a serious way, and the hypothesis of an intelligible reality can no longer do the work of operating as a shared and objective standard by which to resolve disputes by reason rather than by force."

79. Casper, Dennis J. 1977. "Is There A Third "One and Many" Problem in Plato?" *Apeiron* no. 11:20–26.

"In a recent article (1), M.J. Cresswell points out that the problem of the one and the many "gets a new twist in three of Plato's later dialogues (*Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus*) where we discover not one problem but apparently two." (2) The first problem (I) concerns particulars, things subject to generation and perishing (*Philebus*, 14D-15A); it is "the problem of how the same thing can have many characteristics." (3) The second problem (II) concerns forms, things not subject to generation or perishing; it is the problem how a unitary form can be in many things which come into being (*Philebus*, 15B). The first problem is "childish and easy", the second serious and difficult.

Cresswell points out that the formal structure of (I) does not require that it concern particulars. In a sense, forms have "characteristics" — each is one, the same as itself, and so on. So a parallel one and many problem (III) might be raised: How can the same form have many characteristics? Here Cresswell remarks, "However, when Plato actually sets out the one and many problem about the forms it doesn't have the structure of (I) at all."

Rather, it is (II) above. So Cresswell believes apparently that Plato does not set out (III) in the passages he mentions or elsewhere in the *Philebus*, *Parmenides*, and *Sophist*. I shall argue, however, that Plato does raise (III) in these works and that he takes it as seriously as he does (II). " (p. 20, some notes omitted)

(1) I.M.J. Cresswell, "Is There One or Are There Many One and Many Problems in Plato?", *The Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. XXII (1972), pp. 149-154.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 149.

(3) *Ibid.* In stating (1) in this way, Cresswell takes his cue from *Sophist*, 251A-B. In the *Philebus* and at the opening of the *Parmenides* (127E; 129A-E), the problem concerning particulars is how the same thing can have opposite characteristics.

80. Celarier, James L. 1960. "Note on Plato's *Parmenides* 147c." *Mind*:91.

"I doubt whether anyone would wish to take issue with Mr. Robinson's observation that there are rather " crass sophisms " in the second part of the *Parmenides*.(1) However, in his anxiety to refute Comford, he seems to me to have chosen an unfortunate example of a sophism.(2)

The argument by which *Parmenides* shows that the one is like the others in 147c not only is valid, but points out an interesting logical consequence which Plato could quite well have seen.(3) The argument is simply that the one is different from the others, and likewise the others from the one; thus, since they are different from each other in the same way, they are alike. The only requirement on like objects is that they have a common property (τὸ ταὐτόν που πεπονθὸς ὅμοιον. 139e). *Parmenides* indicates a common property between the one and the others, and concludes that they are alike." (p. 91)

81. Charalabopoulos, Nikos G. 2022. "Road to Academy. The implicit protreptics of Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 25–32. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The *Parmenides* features at least three oddities, three unique features nowhere else to be found in Plato. The first oddity is the demolition of Socrates' favourite philosophical theory and his subsequent silence. The second one pertains to the formal identity of the text: a narrated dialogue suddenly flows quietly into a dramatic one when all textual markers of narration are suddenly and imperceptibly dropped. The third oddity is the content of the text when it turns dramatic. The bulk of the *Parmenides*, then, puzzlingly consists in a head-spinning exercise in dialectics, in which the Eleatic sage produces arguments both in favour and against his own thesis that the reality is unity instead of multiplicity."

82. Chen, Chung-Hwan. 1944. "On the *Parmenides* of Plato." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 38:101–114.

"The reader who has grasped the central problem will also be able to appreciate the dramatic setting of the dialogue. No other historical introduction could be more appropriate than the arguments of Zeno against the pluralists. In the attempt to solve the problems, 'Socrates' is made the mouthpiece of a theory of Ideas which is later to be refuted. But it would be most improper for this refutation to be conducted by anyone other than a great philosopher. Again, if Plato were to assign this task to some Pre-Socratic other than *Parmenides*, this character would have to define his position in regard to Zeno's view also; and that would lead far away from the goal.

Thus, in order to understand the setting of the dialogue, one need look no farther than its main problem; speculation about its occasion can not only afford no help in understanding the dialogue correctly, but will make it harder than ever to appreciate the true sense of this, from an ontological point of view, the most essential of all Plato's writings." (p. 114)

83. Cherniss, Harold. 1932. "Parmenides and the *Parmenides* of Plato." *American Journal of Philology* no. 53:122–138.

Reprinted in: H. Cherniss, *Selected Papers*, edited by Leonardo Tarán, Leiden: Brill 1977 pp. 281-297.

"The antinomies of the *Parmenides* were composed for the purpose of showing that the Eleatic dialectic of Zeno when applied to the monistic Being of Parmenides produces the same paradoxes as when used against pluralism. It is demonstrated that the second part of the dialogue is formally an elaborate parody of the poem of Parmenides and methodically a parody of the logic-chopping of Zeno. By this means the psychological purpose of the dialogue is elucidated, the unity of the dialogue is made evident, and its relationship to the *Sophist* is established." (p. 122)

84. Chroust, Anton Hermann. 1947. "The Problem of Plato's *Parmenides*." *The New Scholasticism* (21):371–418.

85. Chrysakopoulou, Sylvana, and Castelnérac, Benoît. 2014. "Special Issue: Plato's *Parmenides*, Origins and Aporias of a Dialogue on the One. Introduction." *Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 53:381–384.

"The papers collected in this volume were presented in Chania, Greece, at the Plato's *Parmenides* conference, organised by Sylvana Chrysakopoulou and Benoît Castelnérac."

(...)

"In the *Parmenides*, Plato begs to reopen the "case of the One". He devoted enough time and art to complete the "dialectical survey" of one "Form," the One, and this is either saying goodbye to Parmenides or a late testimony of a late (?) inquiry done following Parmenides' structures. So much erudition for the moment, be it Parmenides' One, Plato's own theory of Oneness, a series of problemata on the notion of unity, or a complex embroidery of all the above and more "knots" unknown to us, it would be hard to maintain that all this attention on Elea, a village located in the South West coast of Italy, is contingent or anecdotic. Plato's discussion with his predecessors is a thorny issue for every name in case, but it is always surprising to see how little work has been done to understand the linkage from Parmenides to Plato under the light of the history of "dialectic", to wit "questions about knowledge and argumentation".

Although the above statements are only endorsed by the editors of this volume, we are confident that the following papers share in some way or others in the project of finding out how much of the historical Parmenides is in Plato's rendition, and how far Plato's *Parmenides* is a significant piece in his intellectual production. Here is a short presentation of what the reader will find in this volume." (pp. 382-383)

86. Clark, Dennis. 2018. "The Anonymous Commentary on the « Parmenides »." In *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity*, edited by Tarrant, Harold, Layne, Danielle A., Baltzly, Dirk and Renaud, François. Leiden: Brill.

"For the Middle Platonists, it was the *Timaeus* that held pride of place as the source for most of what was considered Plato's conception of nature, creation, and even theology, although it is possible that some philosophers did not completely ignore the *Parmenides*, such as Moderatus, and it is hardly likely that it did not figure to some extent already in the thought of Speusippus and Xenocrates. But for the period preceding Plotinus' direct reference to it in *Ennead* V.1, there is no strong evidence of a concentrated effort in any surviving text which would indicate that the dialogue was seen as primarily informing Platonism."

(...)

"Thus in this light the *Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides* (hereafter *Comm.*) likely appears as the earliest extant attempt to practice Platonic philosophy via the means of commenting on the content of the dialogue, which was already hundreds of years old to its commentator. To modern readers and scholars, however, the resultant value of the *Comm.*, as for any other ancient commentary on Plato, is of almost entirely historical value, most useful for inferring the doctrine rather of its author. But it ought to be kept in mind that the later Academic philosophers, such as the Neoplatonists, thought of themselves as true followers and inheritors of Plato, not innovators." (p. 351)

87. Cleary, John J. 2002. "Proclus' elaborate defense of Platonic ideas." In *Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradizione*, edited by Barbanti, Maria and Romano, Francesco, 341–353. Catania: CUECM.
88. Cornford, Francis MacDonald. 1939. *Plato and Parmenides. Parmenides' Way of Truth and Plato's Parmenides*. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.

Translated, with an introduction and a running commentary by F. M. Cornford.

Reprinted by Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.

"This book was undertaken with the hope that a close study of the whole chain of argument would bring to light some method of interpretation that would give the dialogue a serious significance, worthy of its author and consistent with its position in the history of Greek thought. I could find not the faintest sign of any theological revelation. On the other hand there were innumerable features whose presence could not be accounted for in a mere parody or light-hearted polemic. The conclusion reached was that the second part of the dialogue is an extremely subtle and masterly analysis, dealing with problems of the sort we call logical, which we know to have been much in Plato's mind in his later period.

The assumptions required to yield this conclusion will be set out in the commentary introducing the dialectical exercise." (*Preface*, p. IX)

89. Corrigan, Kevin. 2000. "Platonism and Gnosticism: the anonymous « Commentary on the Parmenides » : Middle or Neoplatonic? ." In *Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Majercik, Ruth, 141–177. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

"For the past hundred years and more, scholars have supposed that an anonymous commentary on Plato's *Parmenides*, originally published by W. Kroll (1892), must be post-Plotinian. Suggestions for authorship have ranged from Porphyry to Plutarch of Athens and Proclus. The present work argues for the first time that the *Commentary* is pre-Plotinian, quite possibly from the hand of a member of the "school" of Cronius and Numenius, and consequently presents a rather new view of the place of Plotinus in the history of thought and indicates the need for a rethinking of some of the principal features of Middle Platonism and of the relation between the Plotinian circle and Gnosticism." (pp. 141-142, a note omitted)

90. ———. 2010. "The Place of the *Parmenides* in Plato's Thought and in the Subsequent Tradition." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 23–36. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"Here I will take up the questions before us from three different perspectives: first, I will indicate what internal evidence there is from the dialogues about the place of the *Parmenides* and what this may or may not suggest about a supposed train of "thought" from the "middle" to the "later" dialogues; second, I will outline some of the major kinds of interpretation of the *Parmenides* over the past two and a half thousand years in order briefly to suggest some of the strengths and weaknesses of each; and third, more specifically, I will focus briefly upon the earlier tradition, from Speusippus to Proclus, to see if some provisional conclusions might at least be outlined for the larger project."

91. ———. 2010. "Plotinus and the Hypotheses of the Second Part of Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 35–48. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"My overall thesis might be summed up as follows: Plotinus, I believe, had an interpretation, however provisional, of the whole of the *Parmenides*, but he was not directly interested, in his own writings at least, either in spelling out every single detail of what would, in any case, have had to have remained provisional or in allocating a determinative rank to every hypothetical representation in the second part of the *Parmenides*. This is not to say that he did not take Plato seriously.

He obviously did—however much he was also prepared to leave many details to individual interpretation. What is virtually unthinkable, in my view, is the argument from silence: that a dialogue

that either overwhelmed thought or drove it totally crazy, but in either case compelled the reader to think, did not provoke any so-called metaphysical enquiry about its hypotheses for five hundred years or more. Such a failure would not be the tragic-comic outcome of the complex artistic/philosophic and always absent figure of Plato himself, but its entire contradiction. The survival of Plotinus's writings is one of the most unusual accidents of history, and yet his writings give no interpretation of the second part of the *Parmenides*. Plotinus is thus—at least for the most part—a paradigmatic example of the silence of the previous five hundred years. Yet it is absurd to suppose that he, like so many before and after him, was unaware of the importance of the trajectories of Platonic representative discourse as also of the potentially fatal ambiguities in any represented discourse, however well-intentioned such discourse may be." (p, 36)

92. ———. 2010. "The Importance of the *Parmenides* for Trinitarian Theology in the Third and Fourth Centuries C.E." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 237–242. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"On the surface, it seems unlikely that the interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides* might have had anything to do with Christian thought of the fourth century. How could a series of hypotheses about the one and the others have been of interest to Christian theologians? The unspoken consensus then has naturally been that there is little reflection of the *Parmenides* in the Church Fathers. One may argue, however, for a more nuanced view since the *Parmenides* formed an indirect context for the development of Trinitarian theology⁽¹⁾ and its interpretation was even decisive, we may say, for the formulation of Cappadocian Trinitarian thought." (p. 237)

(1) My approach is in substantial agreement with that of Jean Reynard in this volume.

References

Jeab Reynard, Plato's *Parmenides* among the Cappadocian Fathers: The Problem of a Possible Influence or the Meaning of a Lack?, same volume, pp. 217-235.

93. Coxon, Allan H. 1999. *The Philosophy of Forms: An Analytical and Historical Commentary on Plato's Parmenides. With a new English translation*. Assen: Van Gorcum.

"In the ensuing discussion of Plato's *Parmenides* I have largely abstained from consideration of its strange vicissitudes in ancient, mediaeval, renaissance and even modern times, in favour of simple exegesis, and in this have reverted closely to the state of philosophy prior to its composition, when the thought of Parmenides and Socrates was a living influence and the Stagirite unknown. The book is a sequel to my edition of *The Fragments of Parmenides* (Van Gorcum, Assen, 1986) to which I have referred by the initials *FP*. In the use of initial capitals elsewhere I have been more concerned for clarity than for consistency, but have generally written Forms where the word alludes to universals conceived as separate substances, and have generally confined the use of capitals for the names of individual Forms to (the) One and (the) Many. The translation follows Burnet's text except where noted." (From the *Foreword*)

Contents: Introduction: Forms and Predication in the Fifth Century B.C.

I Forms in the pre-Socratic physicists 3; II The philosophy of Socrates. (i) Socrates' philosophical autobiography in Plato's *Phaedo* 7; (ii) Socrates' philosophy in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 10; (iii) Socrates' philosophy according to Aristotle 17; III The linguistic formulation of the theory of Forms: (i) "X" is something" 27; (ii) "What is X?" 29; (iii) "What X is" 31; IV The interpretation of the copula 33;

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94. Cresswell, Max J. 1972. "Is There One or Are There Many One and Many Problems in Plato?" *The Philosophical Quarterly* no. 22:149–154.

"How can one thing be many and many things one? This perennial in Greek philosophy gets a new twist in three of Plato's later dialogues (*Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus*) where we discover not one problem but apparently two. More interestingly, although one of them is a serious and perplexing problem demanding the full insight of the rigorously disciplined philosopher, the other problem is described in the *Philebus* (14d, e) as commonplace and one such that "almost everyone agrees nowadays that there is no need to concern oneself with things like that, feeling that they are childish, obvious and a great nuisance to argument". And in the *Sophist* (251b) it is relegated to providing a banquet for the young and for "late learners of old men" who are "poorly endowed with intelligence and marvel at such things, thinking themselves to have come upon all wisdom".

What is the difference between this trivial form and the serious form of the problem of how one thing can be many? In the *Philebus* (15a) Socrates says that the trivial problem occurs when the one in question is the sort of thing which can come into being and pass away, i.e., is something which belongs to the physical world. The serious problem is when the one is an eternal existent." (p. 149)

95. Curd, Patricia. 1986. "Parmenides 131c-132b: Unity and Participation." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 3:125–136.

"Briefly, my claims are these. The two passages that prove the plurality of the Forms (131c9-e1 and 132a1-b2) are linked: assumptions made in the first are picked up and subjected to further scrutiny in the second. Both arguments have the same goal, for both show that the model of participation

endorsed by Socrates has the consequence that a participated-in Form is many and not one. But why the Forms are twice shown to be many, and why showing this invokes the questions that I have noted above can be explained by an examination of Zeno's treatise and Socrates' response to it that open the main part of the dialogue at 127d-e. In that treatise, Zeno argues against two sorts of pluralities. Parmenides will then show that Socrates' unitary Forms, introduced as an answer to Zeno's argument, are actually pluralities of both sorts. And it is in Parmenides' arguments that we shall find the answers to our questions." (p. 126)

96. ———. 1988. "Parmenidean Clues in the Search for the Sophist." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 5:307–320.

"Does the *Parmenides* hold clues to a proper understanding of the *Sophist*? It seems to me that it does; in this paper I shall explore a number of issues that link the two dialogues, arguing that understanding Plato's treatment of these issues in the *Parmenides* can help us correctly interpret the arguments of the *Sophist*.

Influential interpretations of Plato's later work hold that there are serious confusions about identity and predication in that work. According to these interpretations some of the arguments in the antinomies of Part II of the *Parmenides* exhibit this confusion; further, according to these views, it is not until the *Sophist* that Plato sees his way to distinguish identity and predication adequately, and that it is this that allows him finally to solve the problems of Being and Not Being in that dialogue.(1)

In this paper I want to challenge this view: I shall claim that the arguments of Part II of the *Parmenides* are not infected with an identity/predication (I/P) confusion. Further, I shall argue that in the second part

of the *Parmenides* Plato explores and investigates certain ideas that are crucial to his solution of the problem of Not-Being in the *Sophist* (a solution that does not depend on distinguishing identity and predicative

"senses" or "uses" of the verb "to be"(2). I shall begin with some preliminary remarks about the I/P confusion and the earlier dialogues before turning to the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*." (p. 367)

(1) The interpretations I have in mind are primarily those of G. E. L. Owen (in "Notes on Ryle's Plato," in *Logic, Science and Dialectic*, ed. G. E. L. Owen and M. C. Nussbaum (Ithaca, 1986), pp. 85-103; hereafter NRP; and in "Plato on Not-Being," in LSD pp. 104-137; hereafter PNB); and Malcolm Schofield (in "The Antinomies of Plato's *Parmenides*," *Classical Quarterly*, vol. 21 [1977], pp. 139-158). See also M. Frede, *Prädikation und Existenzaussage* (Gottingen, 1967).

(2) Here I shall follow the interpretation of the arguments of the *Sophist* suggested by Jean Roberts in "The Problem about Being in the *Sophist*," *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, vol. 3 (1986), pp. 229-243 (hereafter PBS). What I shall say here about the *Sophist* is based on an acceptance of Roberts' arguments (which I shall not repeat here) and owes much to her work.

97. ———. 1989. "Some Problems of Unity in the First Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*." *Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 27:347–359.

"In this paper I shall, by looking at some of the arguments of the first hypothesis, explore the suggestion that Plato is concerned to examine carefully the nature and limitations of middle period claims about the unity of Forms. In doing so he both continues and expands the attack on the middle period theory that was begun in Part I of the dialogue." (p. 347)

98. ———. 1990. "Parmenides 142b 5-144e 7: the « unity is many » arguments." *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* no. 28:19–35.

"In the opening passages of the second hypothesis of the *Parmenides* Plato constructs two sets of arguments to show that the One is many. This paper explores the question of why two different arguments for the same conclusion are given, and suggests that consideration of these arguments can help us to understand some of Plato's purposes in the second part of the *Parmenides*.(1) I proceed by

looking at the two arguments in some detail and drawing some conclusions from them; I then conclude with some brief comments on Plato's use of the part-whole relation.

The first hypothesis ends with an expression of dissatisfaction with its results (142a6-8); the second opens with a resolve to go back to the beginning and re-examine the consequences of the assertion that the One is. But despite the fact that in all but two instances the subjects and ordering of the arguments that constitute the two hypotheses are identical, the results are vastly different. The second hypothesis attributes to the One all of the properties and relations that were denied to it by the first." (p. 19, two note omitted)

(1) For a discussion of some of the interpretations of the *Parmenides* that have accumulated over the years, see P.K. Curd, "Some Problems of Unity in the First Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, XXVII no. 3 (1989), pp. 347-359; esp. nl, pp. 356-357.

99. d'Hoine, Pieter. 2021. "Parmenides' First Attack on the Forms. Proclus and the Logical Structure of *Parmenides* 130b–e." *History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis* no. 24:103–121.

Abstract: "This paper provides a case study for the use of syllogistic reconstructions in the commentaries on Plato by the fifth-century commentator Proclus. The paper discusses Proclus' reconstruction of the argument about the range of the Forms in Plato's *Parmenides* (130b–e). In his commentary on this dialogue, Proclus reports a syllogistic reconstruction of the argument proposed by some of his predecessors. In this reconstruction, the argument as a whole is interpreted as a straightforward attack on the existence of Forms, while the different premises of the hypothetical syllogism represent the respective positions of Parmenides and Socrates in the discussion. For Proclus, however, the argument about the range of Forms is not meant to be critical of the Forms, but rather provides a positive instruction about their range of application.

I argue that while Proclus finds the syllogism a useful tool to reconstruct the different positions in the exegetical history of the argument, he does not accept it as an adequate reconstruction on his own account. The argument can be traced back most likely to the so-called 'logical' interpretations of the *Parmenides* that Proclus discusses – and dismisses – in the prologue to his commentary."

100. de Laurentiis, Allegra. 2005. *Subjects in the Ancient and Modern World: On Hegel's Theory of Subjectivity* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chapter 4: Hegel's Reading of Plato's *Parmenides*, pp. 96-112.

"In interpreting Plato's *Parmenides* during the early Jena period, Hegel focuses largely on its methodological value as a radical exercise in negative skepticism—and, as such, as an introduction to proper philosophizing.

In his 'Relation of Skepticism to Philosophy' (1801), for example, Hegel characterizes Plato's dialogue as exhibiting 'the negative side of the knowledge of the absolute [die negative Seite der Erkenntnis des Absoluten].'(1)" (p. 96)

(...)

"In the following development of Hegel's thinking, as attested by his commentaries on this and other Platonic dialogues in the *Greater and Lesser Logic*(6) and in the lectures on ancient philosophy,(7) the *Parmenides* appears to approximate the status of *prima philosophia speculativa*. Hegel sees now in the dialectic of the ideas exhibited in it an embryonic form of authentically speculative thinking.(8) Thus, he reads Plato's text not any more as cathartic training for a future science, but as the first historical incursion into the science of the Absolute itself." (p. 97)

(1) *GW* 4, 207.

(6) For the *Greater Logic*, see *GW* 11 (*Doctrine of Essence*), 311–12/Miller 466; *GW* 12 (*Doctrine of the Concept*), 241–4/Miller 830–2. For the *Lesser Logic*, see E §§ 92 Addition, 95 Remark, 96 Addition, 121 Addition, 142 Addition, and 214.

(7) See *GW* 19, Part One: History of Greek Philosophy.

(8) It has been shown convincingly that Hegel's interpretation (even if considered a projection) is not equivalent to that of the Neoplatonists. See for example K. Duesing's argument in (1983). It cannot be my task here to clarify the distinction between the Neoplatonic and the Hegelian Plato-interpretation, so I presuppose this difference in what follows.

References

GW = Gesammelte Werke. Edited by the Nordrhein-Westphaelische Akademie der Wissenschaften. 22 vols. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1968–.

Duesing, Klaus. *Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ontologie und Dialektik in Antike und Neuzeit*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983.+

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by Arnold V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977

101. ———. 2006. "The *Parmenides* and *De Anima* in Hegel's Perspective." *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain* no. 53:51–68.

"Hegel's mature interpretation of the *Parmenides* is consistent with his general theory of the history of philosophy. Since the logical series of the determinations of the Idea consists of the successive sublation of each in the next, so also does the series of *Grundbegriffe* in the history of philosophy. The principle of Plato's philosophy is the concept of idea. Its defining character consists in its being at once purely intelligible and absolutely real. It is sublated in various principles of medieval and modern systems, including Hegel's. Accordingly, it is reasonable to see in Plato's exposition of dialectical contradiction in the *Parmenides* a study in the concept of idea. Beyond its consistency with Hegel's theory of philosophy, however, a defence of his mature interpretation of the *Parmenides* requires us to show that such an interpretation is both textually legitimate and logically advantageous for the solution of problems that plague traditional readings." (p. 55)

102. de Souza, Saloni. 2024. "Everything in its right place. Zeno's paradox of place in part 2 of the *Parmenides*." *Organon* no. 56:65–87.

Abstract: "Part 2 of the *Parmenides* is an obvious place to examine Plato's reception of Zeno; after all, it is a demonstration apparently based on Zeno's method and one of the main characters of the dialogue is Zeno. Nevertheless, it has received little attention as a source for understanding Plato's engagement with the historical Zeno. Here, I show that Plato engages with Zeno's paradox of place in the first deduction of Part 2 of the *Parmenides*—and in sophisticated and interesting ways.

I begin by addressing some methodological issues. I then examine Eudemus' account of Zeno's paradox of place as reported by Simplicius and Aristotle's account in his *Physics* 4.3 in order to reconstruct it. I proceed to examine the arguments for the one's being nowhere, if it is, in the first deduction of the *Parmenides*. I argue that there are good reasons to suppose that Zeno's paradox of place is at issue there. Finally, I reflect on what these arguments reveal about Plato's engagement with Zeno's paradox of place."

103. de Torres, Olivia. 1995. "The game that looks like work in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Diálogos. Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Puerto Rico* no. 30:33–48.

Abstract: "The past ten years have seen an upsurge of interest in Plato's *Parmenides* among those who study philosophy, and all agree that it is Plato's most riddling dialogue. Chief among the reasons for this enigmatic quality is the exercise which Parmenides calls the "laborious game". And the sorry truth of the matter is that most of the commentaries on the dialogue, some ancient but more modern, are incredibly wearying to read, more than the dialogue itself. As if aware of this, commentators themselves use words like "tedious," "disagreeable," "singularly unappealing" to characterise the game, and simultaneously to apologize for what is to come: much more of the same in their interpretations. But lest there be any misunderstanding, the charge against most modern commentators is not that they

make the student of the dialogue work, but simply that they have failed to keep together the two aspects of Parmenides' "game that looks like work", that is to say, the playful and the serious. They have made the game too much like work."

104. Di Girolamo, Sergio. 2022. "Parmenides' hypothesis behind Plato's *Parmenides*: 'all the things are collectively called ἐν ὅν' (*Sph.* 242d6)." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 173–181. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "This paper has two aims. The first and main one is to explain the philosophical meaning of what at *Prm.* 128d5-6 is presented as Parmenides' hypothesis, and at 128a8-b1 is introduced by means of the sentence ἐν ... εἶναι τὸ πᾶν. In order to understand such a sentence, it is argued that it is necessary to start from a new interpretation of Plato's references to Parmenides at *Sph.* 242c8-245e8, paying careful attention to the passage at 242d6, ἐνὸς ὄντος τῶν πάντων καλουμένων, and the context within which it occurs. Even though, as far as it has been possible to determine, scholars tend to agree on a typical translation of *Sph.* 242d6, such as 'what is called "all things" is one', the paper maintains that many strong contextual reasons lead to the conclusion that the right translation is 'all the things are collectively called ἐν ὅν'. This translation is consistent with a new overall interpretation of *Sph.* 242c8-245e8, according to which the underlying doctrine introduced and examined by the Eleatic Stranger as Parmenides' one uses two names, ἐν and ὅν, with reference to τὰ πάντα, inasmuch as all the things are collectively regarded as a single entity, τὸ πᾶν, which is one in two senses. On the one hand, it is one in the sense of being a unified whole, because τὰ πάντα are encompassed and united within it, so that the doctrine at issue has mereological implications. On the other hand, it is one in the sense of being unique, as it encompasses everything. Once such an explanation is outlined, the second aim of the paper is just to suggest, given the short space allocated to this publication, how the new interpretation suits the *Parmenides*, and can address several questions raised by the dialogue."

105. Dillon, John. 1999. "Plotinus, Speusippus and the Platonic *Parmenides*." *Kairos* no. 15:61–74.

Reprinted as Essay II in J. M. Dillon, *The Platonic Heritage: Further Studies in the History of Platonism and Early Christianity*, Aldershot: Ashgate 2012.

"One of the ways, I think, in which the speculations attributed to Plato's immediate successors in the Academy, Speusippus and Xenocrates, can be most profitably considered is as interpretations (however bizarre or perverse they may sometimes appear) of various of Plato's later dialogues, and in particular the *Timaeus*, *Philebus*, *Sophist* and *Parmenides*.(1) My concern on this occasion is to focus on the possibility that certain key elements of Speusippus' metaphysics are based on an ontological interpretation of the second part of the *Parmenides*. In particular, I am interested in exploring whether he may have based his doctrine of the derivation of number from his first principles of One and Multiplicity on the account of the generation of number at *Parm.* 142D-144A — and whether, if so, these speculations of his may have left some traces in Plotinus' doctrine in his essay *On Numbers* (VI 6 [34]).! (p. 61)

(1) This is not to suggest, of course, that the dialogues were the sole source of inspiration for these men. We must also assume a vigorous tradition of oral debate within the Academy. But interpretation of these dialogues in particular does seem to have been important. (,,)

106. Dillon, John M. 2002. "Iamblichus' identifications of the subject-matters of the hypotheses." In *Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradizione*, edited by Barbanti, Maria and Romano, Francesco, 329–340. Catania: CUECM.

Reprinted as Essay XXI in J. M. Dillon, *The Platonic Heritage: Further Studies in the History of Platonism and Early Christianity*, Aldershot: Ashgate 2012.

"I am concerned in this paper specifically with the identifications of the subject-matters of the hypotheses proposed by Iamblichus, and in particular with his interesting identifications of the subject-matters of the third and fourth hypotheses — though, as we shall see, all his identifications are of interest. To put his identifications in context, however, we must first consider those proposed by Plotinus' senior disciple Amelios.

The intriguing thing about Amelius is his proposal to postulate only eight hypotheses — as would be the consensus of modern scholarship — rather than the nine identified by all of his successors (except the mysterious 'philosopher from Rhodes', who postulated ten!)"

(...)

"It is against the background of the dispositions of his immediate predecessors, then, that the doctrine of Iamblichus must be viewed. The positions which he adopts are certainly bizarre, but they can be seen as arising from the speculations that have gone before, while embodying certain distinctive features of his own philosophy." (pp. 330-331)

107. ———. 2005. "Speusippus and the Ontological Interpretation of the *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Ales and Karfík, Filip, 296–311. Prague: Oikoymenh.
108. ———. 2009. "The architecture of the intelligible universe revealed: Syrianus' exegesis of the second hypothesis of the « Parmenides »." In *Syrianus et la métaphysique de l'Antiquité tardive : actes du colloque international, Université de Genève, 29 septembre-1er octobre 2006*, edited by Longo, Angela, 233–245. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

"Both the origins and the validity of the ontological interpretation of the second half of Plato's *Parmenides* are issues of great obscurity, on which I have had a certain amount to say myself in recent times(1). As regards its origins, the thesis that I am prepared, albeit tentatively, to defend is that this interpretation, in some form, can be discerned as going back all the way to Plato's nephew Speusippus in the Old Academy, but if so, such a version would obviously not involve the whole panoply of the Neoplatonic metaphysical system, but simply an account of how the One, when combined with the Indefinite Dyad (under the guise of «Being») produces, first the whole set of natural numbers, and then, progressively, the various lower levels of reality, Soul, Nature (or the physical world, animate and inanimate), and ultimately Matter." (p. 233)

(1) E.g. in *The Heirs of Plato*, Oxford 2003, pp. 56-59, a propos Speusippus.

109. ———. 2010. "Speusippus and the Ontological Interpretation of the *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 67–78. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"My concern on this occasion is to focus on the possibility that certain key elements of Speusippus's metaphysics are based on an ontological interpretation of the hypotheses propounded in the second part of the *Parmenides*. In particular, I am interested in exploring whether he may have based his doctrine of the derivation of number from his first principles of One and Multiplicity on the account of the generation of number at *Parm.* 142d–144a—and, if so, whether these speculations of his may have left some traces in Plotinus's doctrine in his tractate on numbers (*Enn.* 6.6 [34])." (p. 67)

(...)

"My reconstruction of Speusippus's position is, I must admit, dependent to some extent, though not by any means entirely, on acceptance of a key piece of evidence which is controversial, that is, the contents of ch. 4 of Iamblichus's *De communi mathematica scientia*. That this can (whether directly or indirectly) reflect nothing other than the doctrine of Speusippus is something that I have argued previously (Dillon 1984), in opposition to the scepticism of Leonardo Tarán.(4)" (p. 68)

(4) Expressed most fully in a section of the introduction to ch. 5 ("Speusippus, Aristotle and Iamblichus") of his *Speusippus of Athens* (1981, 86–107).

110. ———. 2010. "Syrianus's Exegesis of the Second Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*: The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe Revealed." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 133–141. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

Reprinted, with permission, from *Syrianus et la métaphysique de l'antiquité tardive*. Edited by Angela Longo. Naples: Bibliopolis (© Istituto per il Lessico Intellettuale Europeo e la Storia delle Idee-CNR, 2009, pp. 233-245.

"Both the origins and the validity of the ontological interpretation of the second half of Plato's Parmenides are obscure, and issues on which I have had a certain amount to say myself in recent times. (1) As regards its origins, the thesis that I am prepared, albeit tentatively, to defend is that this interpretation, in some form, can be discerned as going back all the way to Plato's nephew Speusippus in the Old Academy, but if so, such a version would obviously not involve the whole panoply of the Neoplatonic metaphysical system, but simply an account of how the One, when combined with the Indefinite Dyad (under the guise of "Being") produces, first the whole set of natural numbers, and then, progressively, the various lower levels of reality, Soul, Nature (or the physical world, animate and inanimate), and ultimately Matter." (p. 133)

(...)

"This basic issue is not, however, what I am concerned with on this occasion, but something a good deal more exotic. It is a doctrine, indeed, that arises out of the initial insight that the second hypothesis (142B–155D) provides an account of the generation of the cosmos, or at least of the intelligible level of reality, but it is one that develops this insight in a truly remarkable way." (pp. 133-134)

(1) E.g., *The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy, 347–274 B.C.* Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003, 56–59, à propos Speusippus.

111. Dodds, Eric Robertson. 1928. "The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic 'One'." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 22:129–142.

"Small wonder that Plotinus(2) regarded the Platonic *Parmenides* as a great improvement on his historical prototype; that Iamblichus(3) considered the *Parmenides* and the *Timaeus* as the only Platonic dialogues indispensable to salvation; that Proclus(4) found in the *Parmenides* and there only, the complete system of Platonic theology. Read the second part of the *Parmenides* as Plotinus read it, with the single eye of faith; do not look for satire on the Megarians or on anybody else; and you will find in the first hypothesis a lucid exposition of the famous 'negative theology,' and in the second (especially if you take it in connexion with the fourth) an interesting sketch of the derivation of a universe from the marriage of unity and existence. What you will find in the remaining hypotheses I cannot so easily predict; even within the Neoplatonic

school there were violent differences of opinion about them(5) differences which I must not attempt to discuss here, as they would carry me too far from the main intention of this paper." (pp. 133-134)

(2) V, i. 8 *fin.*

(3) Procl. in *Tim.* I. 13. 15 sq, Diehl; *Proleg. Plat. Phil.* 26.

(4) *Theol. Plat.* I. 7.

(5) See Proclus in *Parm.* 1052-64, Cousin.

112. Dorter, Kenneth. 1989. "The Theory of Forms and *Parmenides* I." In *Essays In Ancient Greek Philosophy III: Plato*, edited by Anton, John P. and Preus, Anthony, 183–202. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Conclusion

On the basis of this examination there seems no reason to conclude that Plato intended these arguments to be a refutation or recantation of the theory of forms, and several reasons to believe that he did not.

1. The arguments are easily answered on the basis of features of the theory which were prominent in the middle dialogues and which could plausibly be omitted here only by portraying Socrates as being

in the early stages of developing the theory.

2. By having Socrates hesitate precisely at the point where such factors can be brought into play to repel Parmenides' attack, Plato seems to hint at the inconclusive nature of the arguments.

3. Not only the answers but the problems themselves were anticipated in the middle dialogues: the problem of giving nonmetaphorical accounts of participation and recollection, and the ambiguity of resemblance and predication with regard to forms and things, are clearly present in the *Phaedo*, where the complete theory was first introduced. Plato evidently recognized these problems from the beginning but felt that the theory was not vitiated by them.

4. The final argument begins and ends with speeches that show Parmenides to be Socrates' ally in the theory,⁽¹³⁾ a devil's advocate rather than nemesis, which would hardly be possible if the arguments were intended as serious refutations. The motive for exhibiting and even exaggerating these problems may have been partly to remind us that the theory of forms can not be regarded as a dogma or perfected doctrine but only as a valuable (perhaps indispensable) although inexact way of interpreting the world." (pp.199-200)

(13) Thus at 133b Parmenides says, "if [the forms] are such as we say they must be." The context suggests that Parmenides is using the first person plural earnestly, and not as a patronizing form of the second person singular.

113. ———. 1994. *Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues: the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

"The four dialogues examined here form a natural group with sequential concerns. Since the aim of the present study is to try to understand the group as a whole, I have sacrificed the advantage of greater detail that book-length commentaries would provide, in order to present a more synoptic picture. But although the treatment of individual dialogues will not be as extensively detailed as in book-length studies, I have tried to pay careful attention both to the conceptual arguments and to the dramatic and literary events, and have tried to ensure that the lessening of detail would not mean a lessening of attentiveness." (*Preface*, p. IX)

(...)

"Conclusion

To put the results of our examination of the second part of the dialogue as succinctly as possible, the distinctions implicit in the first four hypotheses have led to the conclusion that unless there is something by which the limiting One and the unlimited many can stand in relation to each other, meaningful speech and thought will be impossible. The next four illustrate this point negatively by showing what happens if we try to conceive of the many otherwise than in relation to the One.

(...)

The first part of the *Parmenides* casts doubt on our ability to give a nonmetaphorical account of the nature of participation by things in forms (i.e., by "becoming" in "being"), while concluding, however, that unless we nevertheless affirm the existence of forms and participation we will not be able to account for the possibility of thought and discourse (135b-c). The second part of the dialogue has now shown, in its dizzying way, that a similar conclusion follows from a consideration of the relationship between our world of becoming and the One that is beyond being. Once we enter into the "gymnastic" dimension of these arguments and respond to their challenge to draw crucial distinctions, we can distinguish between the arguments that reflect genuine paradoxes, and those that are only formulated in a paradoxical manner but can readily be resolved by means of the distinctions with which Plato supplies us. This has led us to conclude that although the relationship between the temporal (becoming) and the timeless (the One) can be hinted at in terms of the concept of the "instant," a fully elaborated account remains recalcitrant, and the third hypothesis is forced to return to the metaphor of participation. But just as the first part of the dialogue concluded by saying that, despite the problems of conceptualizing the relation of participation, to attempt to do away with that relationship would destroy

the possibility of thought and discourse; here too the fourth hypothesis shows the impossibility of dispensing with the relation of participation. And the final four hypotheses show that it is impossible to avoid the problems of the first four simply by doing away with the concept of the One (whether applied to the specific forms or to the good), for in that case the resulting paradoxes become wholly intolerable." (pp. 66-67)

114. Doull, James A. 2001. "The problem of participation in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Dionysius* no. 19:11–26.

115. ———. 2003. "Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Philosophy and Freedom: The Legacy of James Doull*, edited by Peddle, David G. and Robertson, Neil G., 83–139. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

"It makes a difficulty in reading *Parmenides* that in speaking of the good, Plato uses abstract Eleatic concepts - unity and being. What these concepts signify for him is plain from the context, whether one think of

the transition in *Phaedo* from the intelligence of Anaxagoras which separates extraneously the mixed individuals of a material world to an intelligence which moves 'for the best,' or of the good of *Republic* toward which are ordered alike the divisions of the state and the soul. Zeno's arguments had for their purpose to show that nature or the material world which humans commonly suppose to be there, and themselves to be in it, is, for a thinking which has just begun to know itself, a nullity. How from this abstract beginning 'the one' came to be 'the good' in which is centred in the sensible and ideal totalities Plato treats only elusively.

From his standpoint it is not possible to write such a history of Presocratic philosophy as one has in Aristotle, which supposes that the substantial unity of the ideal and sensible world, toward which Plato's thought

tends, has been discovered, and with it the division of being into primary genera or categories. The history of philosophy can then be regarded as a history of the discovery of the elements of substance." (p. 86)

116. Drecoll, Volker Henning. 2010. "The Greek Text behind the Parallel Sections in Zostrianos and Marius Victorinus." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 195–212. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"What I want to offer however, is a new reconsideration of the postulated common source."

(...)

"Later scholars such as John Turner and Kevin Corrigan developed the hypothesis that the common source is very significant for the history of Platonism, especially the reception of Plato's *Parmenides* (therefore,

Sethian texts like Zostrianos and Allogenes may depend on the *Anonymous Commentary on Parmenides* of the Turin Palimpsest being Pre-Plotinian).(3) Pursuing this strategy of research, I want to analyze the common source." (pp.195-196)

(3) For this, see Turner 2000b, 157–210; 2000, 179–224; Corrigan 2000, 141–77

References

Corrigan, K. 2000. Platonism and Gnosticism: The Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides: Middle or Neoplatonic?" in *Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts*. Edited by J. Turner and R. Majercik. SBLSymS 12. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 141–77.

Turner, J. D. 2000. Commentary. Pages 483–662 in Zostrien (NH VIII,1). BCNH 24. Edited by C. Barry, W.-P. Funk, P.-H. Poirier, and J. D. Turner. Quebec: Presses de l'Université Laval; Louvain: Peeters.

Turner, J. D. 2000b. The Setting of the Platonizing Sethian Treatises in Middle Platonism. Pages 179–224 in *Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts*. Edited by J. D. Turner and R. Majerick. SBLSymS 12. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

117. ———. 2010. "Is Porphyry the Source Used by Marius Victorinus?" In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 65–80. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"In my opinion, we have four hypotheses: (4) a) Victorinus and Zostrianos used a common Greek, perhaps Middle Platonic source (Tardieu and followers); b) Victorinus used Christian material whose Gnostic character he did not recognize as such because in Rome such Gnostics were highly assimilated members of Christian circles (Abramowski 2005); and c) Victorinus perhaps used actual texts known in the school of

Plotinus, perhaps even the Greek original of the Zostrianos directly; or d) a Neoplatonic text that was itself dependent on Zostrianos (these possibilities I would like to maintain in discussion). Anyway, it is clear that these passages of *Adversus Arium* that Hadot ascribed to Porphyry are not Porphyrian, but date back to another, perhaps even pre-Plotinian source. This also raises the question of the origin and provenance of the other passages recognized as Porphyrian by Hadot."

(4) For the details and bibliography see Drecoll, "The Greek Text behind the Parallel Sections in Zostrianos and Marius Victorinus" in vol. 1:195–212 of the present work.

References

Abramowski, L. 2005. Nicänismus und Gnosis im Rom des Bischofs Liberius: Der Fall des Marius Victorinus. *Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum* 8:513–66.

118. Duncombe, Matthew. 2013. "The Greatest Difficulty at *Parmenides* 133c-134e and Plato's Relative Terms." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 45:43–61.

"The first part of Plato's *Parmenides* bombards the theory of Forms with objections. Parmenides singles out one criticism as the 'Greatest Difficulty' (hereafter 'G D') and presents it at *Parmenides* 133 c-134 E. The argument has received some attention, but scholars generally think that it does not pose a threat to the theory of Forms, either because it is not formally valid or, if it is formally valid, because it begs the question against the Platonist. This paper aims to show that the G D is a serious challenge to the theory of Forms, neither invalid, at least for the reasons usually given, nor question-begging." (p. 43)

119. Duque, Mateo. 2022. "'Οὐκ ἔστιν" (141e8): The Performative Contradiction of the First Hypothesis." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 347–354. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "At the end of the first hypothesis, Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that being [οὐσία] must be in time; that is, that being must partake in at least one of the temporal modes: either to have been in the past, to be in the present, or it will be in the future (140e-142a). If this is true, then "the one does not partake in being" (141e7-8), meaning temporal being—to which Aristotle agrees, saying "Apparently not" (141e9). Parmenides then gets Aristotle to agree that "Therefore, 'the one' in no way is" (141e9-10). This, however, contradicts the very first premise that begins Parmenides' entire gymnastic exercise, "if one is" (137c4). The problem with the previous conclusion—that to be is to be in time—is that in professing his assent to it, Aristotle, in fact, gainsays it. He performatively contradicts the very thing he wants to assert. Aristotle answers Parmenides question, "Therefore could something partake of being in anyway other than in one of those ways?" (141e7-8) with a two-word answer in Greek: "οὐκ ἔστιν [It's not possible]." We can, therefore, ask of the very claim Aristotle is making—that it is impossible for something to be and not be in time—when in time does it hold true? At what time is it "not possible [οὐκ ἔστιν]" for something to not partake of temporal being? Is it not possible only in the present moment, in the past, or in the future? If Aristotle's assertion is to have any force it must hold always. It has the same tenselessness as mathematical propositions, like '1+1=2' Forms, like mathematical entities, must necessarily have atemporal existence. Accordingly, in

atemporally maintaining that anything that is must be in time, Aristotle undermines his own assertion. He performatively contradicts the very thing that he wants to affirm."

120. Durrant, Michael. 1975. "Parmenides 127e-130e." *Philosophical Papers* no. 4:105–115.

121. Edwards, Mark. 2010. "Christians and the *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 189–198. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"It may be felt that the present paper achieves too little even for an exercise in negative theology. Not only does it leave a great deal unsaid that was suggested by its title, but it proposes to unsay at least part of what has been said admirably by others. If in addition I seem to be sweeping away with the left hand even the crumbs of positive speculation that are seen falling here and there from my

right—this much, it may be granted, is in the spirit of the *Parmenides*, though my simile may be more Christian than Platonic. Even without this pretext, it is enough to plead that time and knowledge are finite (as Plato recognized, though not in the *Parmenides*) to explain my failure to canvass more than two topics in this paper. The first is the use of a formula, ἄρρητος καὶ ἀκατονόμαστος, which I believe to be not so much of a commonplace in Platonic literature as is generally supposed. The second concerns the provenance of the only text, the *Anonymus Taurinensis* or *Commentary on the Parmenides*, which contains this phrase but does not belong avowedly to that circle for which the Bible is the sole canon of theological speculation. While my proposals may not agree with those advanced by any other scholar at this meeting, it should be evident that I can scarcely be said to disagree with anyone when my principal thesis is that there is barely a conjecture on either topic that can be proved untenable." (p. 189)

122. ———. 2010. "Origen's Platonism: Questions and Caveats." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 199–216. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

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"In the following paper I hope to show first that borrowing and dependence are inadequate terms to characterize the relation between philosophy and theology in Origen, and then that his reflection on Christian axioms in the light of philosophical disputes concerning the provenance of the soul did not (as is often thought) confirm his adherence to Plato, but on the contrary led him at least far from any Greek norm as from the prevailing canons of orthodoxy in the Church." (p. 200)

123. Eustacchi, Francesca. 2024. "The Eleatic elements in the metaphysical reflecton and in the physical mentions of the *Parmenides*." *Organon* no. 56:35–52.

Abstract: "In the *Parmenides*, it is possible to identify affirmations that are clearly of Eleatic origin and which are re-elaborated by Plato who includes them ad hoc when developing his arguments. The dialectical contribution on the question of the multiplicity of entities given to the Parmenidean philosophy by Zeno is discussed not only in the first part of the dialogue (see 127d–128d) but also in the second. In the latter, Parmenides adopts an ontological-metaphysical setting through which Plato gives an example of the various uses of Zenonian dialectic. Here all the hypotheses concerning the One are analysed (see 136a–c)."

124. Evans, David. 1994. "Socrates and Zeno: Plato, Parmenides 129." *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* no. 2:243–255.

"The first part of the work [the *Parmenides*] consists of a critical examination of the theory of Forms; and the opening moves in this exercise consist of a dialectical exchange between Socrates and Zeno. This is my topic. The passage raises issues of all the kinds just mentioned - issues relating to the philosophical content, method and purpose of Plato's work. It is one of the rare passages in which Plato presents, clearly and succinctly, the theory of Forms; and it does so in order to resolve a specific philosophical difficulty. As we reflect on the way the theory is outlined in this passage, questions about Plato's position vis-a-vis the debates over realism and idealism, or monism and pluralism, will very

naturally occur. Our passage also suggests a number of views concerning the form and purpose of the composition of the *Parmenides*.

I shall be aiming to say something, at least, about these larger questions.

But a prior task — and my main one — is to determine what is actually said in this passage. Surprisingly, there has not been much earlier discussion of this matter;¹ and what there is, provides inadequate analysis. So I shall spend most of my time on the passage itself; but towards the end I hope to say something about the larger issues." (p. 243)

125. Farndell, Arthur. 2008. *Evermore Shall Be So. Ficino on Plato's Parmenides*. London: Shephard-Walwyn (Publishers).

English translation of Marsilio Ficino Commentary to Plato's *Parmenides*.

"In all these hypotheses the general intention of Parmenides is to affirm this above all: there is a single principle of all things, and if that is in place everything is in place, but if it be removed everything perishes. Thus in the first five hypotheses he conveys five steps of creation in a single assumed order of creation. However, in the following four hypotheses he examines how many absurdities and errors and evils follow if the One itself be removed.

Of the five earlier hypotheses the first discusses the one supreme God, how He creates and arranges the orders of the divinities that follow. The second discusses the individual orders of the divinities and how they proceed from God Himself. The third discusses divine souls; the fourth discusses those which come into being in the region which surrounds matter and how they are produced by the highest causes.

The fifth discusses primal matter, how it is free from differentiation by its own nature, and how it is dependent on the original One. It should also be noted that when One is mentioned in this dialogue it can, as in the system of the Pythagoreans, indicate any single substance that is totally detached from matter, such as God, mind, and soul. But when the terms other and other things are used, they may be understood both as matter and as those things which come into being within matter.

Having, therefore, stated and heeded these things first, let us move to the dialogue itself." (from the Preface by Marsilio Ficino, p. 5)

126. Ferrari, Franco. 2010. "Parmenides' AntiPlatonism: Some Observations on Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Philosophy and Dialogue: Studies on Plato's Dialogues II*, edited by Bosch-Veciana, Antoni and Monserrat-Molas, Josep, 51–65. Barcelona: Barcelonesa d'Edicions.
127. Fielder, John H. 1978. "Plotinus' reply to the arguments of *Parmenides* 130a-131d." *Apeiron* no. 12:1–5.

"In a well-known passage in the *Parmenides* (130a-132b) Plato presents a series of objections to the Theory of Forms. The youthful Socrates is unable to reply to these objections and nowhere else in the dialogues do we find a refutation of them. Some of these arguments are taken up by Plotinus.⁽¹⁾ His responses have considerable philosophical merit and provide an additional perspective on the philosophical possibilities of the Theory of Forms. In what follows I set out Plotinus' responses to the arguments of Parmenides 130a-131d and show how they meet the objections raised there." (p. 1)

(1) Plotinus does not have anything to say about the 'Third Man' argument (*Parm.* 130a - 132b), and consequently it is omitted from the present discussion. This point is discussed briefly at the end of the article.

128. Finamore, John F. 2010. "Iamblichus's Interpretation of the *Parmenides*' Third Hypothesis." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 119–132. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"In Iamblichus's commentary on the *Parmenides* frg. 2 the philosopher adopts an interpretation of the third hypothesis that no other Platonic philosopher before or after him has done. According to Iamblichus the hypothesis concerned not soul but the so-called superior classes, that is, angels, daemons, and heroes. As Dillon has suggested (Dillon 1973, 389), the reason for this unusual interpretation surely has to do with the importance of these intermediary divinities in Iamblichus's religious system. I wish to examine this Iamblichean doctrine and consider the reasons behind it.

We of course do not possess Iamblichus's commentary to Plato's *Parmenides*.

Syrianus (*In Metaph.* 38.36–39.6 = Iamblichus, *In Parm.* frg. 1) informs us that Iamblichus did write such a commentary, and Damascius refers often to Iamblichus in his own commentary to the *Parmenides*.⁽¹⁾ We can be certain therefore that Iamblichus did write a commentary, and it seems likely that we can find hints of its contents throughout Proclus's and Damascius's commentaries to Plato's work." (p. 119)

(1) See Dillon 1987, xxx–xxxi, where he says that "we have about ten references to" Iamblichus's commentary in Damascius's *In Parm.* See frgs. 3–14. Cf. Dillon 1973, 22–23.

References

Dillon, J. M. 1973a. *Iamblichi Chalcidensis In Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta*. Philosophia antiqua 23. Leiden: Brill.

———. 1973b. *In Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta*. With text, translation and commentary. Philosophia antiqua 23. Leiden: Brill.

———. 1987. Iamblichus of Chalcis (c. 240 – 325 A.D.). *ANRW* 36.2:862–909. Part 2. Berlin: de Gruyter

129. Fine, Gail. 2020. "Knowledge and Truth in the Greatest Difficulty Argument: *Parmenides* 133b4–134b5." *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism* no. 10:209–234.

Abstract: "One of Plato's central tenets is that we can know forms. In *Parmenides* 133b4–134b5, Plato presents an argument whose sceptical conclusion is that we can't know forms.

Although he indicates that the argument doesn't succeed, he also says it's difficult to explain how it fails. Commentators have suggested a variety of flaws. I argue that the argument can be defended against some, though not all, of the alleged flaws. But I also argue that Plato hints at a crucial distinction that hasn't been brought to bear in this context, and that indeed he is sometimes thought not to draw: that between the content and object of knowledge. Once we are clear about this distinction, we can see

that the sceptical argument doesn't imply that we can't know forms."

130. Forcignanò, Filippo. 2022. "Anaxagoras in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 91–99. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "In the following paper I look at two cases that show the relevant presence of Anaxagoras's lexicon and metaphysics in the *Parmenides*. The dialogue suggests us to consider Anaxagoras's philosophy as its theoretical background from the very first lines of the text, where the city of Clazomenae is named three times for no apparent reason. The first case concerns the eponymic relationship between Forms and things. I argue that the opening sentence of column XIX of the *Derveni papyrus* (1-2) could be an Anaxagorean source of Plato's eponymy, since the author of the column asserts that the name of the dominant element in the compound is also the name of the whole compound. Plato's proposal is a response to this way of setting the eponymic relationship. The second case is Plato's re-use of three relevant Anaxagoras's locutions: μοῖραν μετέχειν, ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, and χωρισθῆναι (fr. B6 [D25 LM] and B12 [D27 LM]). I claim that in Plato's opinion if we adopt an Anaxagorean version of participation, we have to assume that the primitive stuffs are literally parts of

the compounds and participation is a kind of mixture. This implies that the stuffs mixed together are all of the same ontological type, viz. they are physical entities. In this ontological framework, it is impossible to share a thing without splitting it. The only way to escape from this is to say that Forms are a different kind of object than physical entities and therefore that it can be in many things simultaneously, as the Day Analogy proposed by Socrates against Parmenides clearly shows."

131. Forrester, James William. 1972. "Plato's Parmenides: The Structure of the First Hypothesis " *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 10:1–14.

"It is my concern in this paper to vindicate the possibility of a positive interpretation of the First Hypothesis. I shall argue that a proper understanding of the final lines of that hypothesis leads one to see those lines as an insuperable obstacle--but an obstacle, not to a Neoplatonist or other positive interpreter, but rather to any commentator who holds that if the First Hypothesis teaches any lesson, it comes by reductio ad absurdum. Such interpretations as those of Cornford, Ryle, and Taylor, which find no positive doctrine straightforwardly expressed in the First Hypothesis, will turn out to be incompatible with a proper understanding of the end of that hypothesis.(7)

I should make it clear at the start that I am not offering an interpretation of the First Hypothesis. To do so, I should have to examine what, if anything, Plato means by 'The One' in that hypothesis. But, so far as my argument in this paper is concerned, the One may be any unity at all (considered as a mere unity), or any of a group of transcendent unities (Forms), a particular important member of such a group (the Form of Unity), or a sole transcendent Neoplatonic principle. All that my argument requires is that Plato believes that the term 'the One' denotes some real entity, some sort of unitary existent. I am thus confining myself in this paper to a prolegomenon to an interpretation of the First Hypothesis: a study of the structure of that hypothesis." (p. 2)

(7) F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd., 1939). G. Ryle, "Plato's Parmenides," *Mind*, n.s. 48 (1939), 129-151, 302-325; reprinted in R. E. Allen, ed., *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics* (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), pp. 97-147. Taylor, *Plato: The Man and His Work* (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1956).

132. ———. 1974. "Arguments and Able Man Could Refute: Parmenides 133b-134e." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 19:233–237.

"How might Parmenides support the conclusion that we cannot know Forms? I can think of two ways: he might use the mastery-slavery example to support a general principle that Forms are related only to Forms; or else he might hold that a Form cannot be an instance of any Form except itself. Neither of these ways is promising," (p. 236)

(...)

"The able man could indeed show that Parmenides' argument is fallacious. But he would have reason to affirm Parmenides' hint at 133 b 4 that the fallacy is by no means a gross one, easily detected by everybody at first sight." (pp. 236-237, a note omitted)

133. Fritz, Kurt von. 1974. "Zeno of Elea in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Serta Turynuana: Studies in Greek Literature and Palaeography in honor of Alexander Turyn*, edited by Heller, John L. and Newman, J. K., 329–341. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

"As Solmsen has correctly pointed out, Parmenides' fundamental concern was different from Plato's. He was concerned with being as being, and what he wanted to prove was that it is impossible for anything that exists to become nothing since the nothing simply does not exist. The logical complement to this is that no thing can arise out of nothing, since the nothing does not exist. The conclusion then is that there can be no real coming to be or passing away, but that what is, is eternal or in a way exempt from time. Yet since this doctrine runs counter to apparent experience and to the common belief based on this experience, Parmenides had to admit the existence of a world of δόξα, of appearance or belief, in which things do come into being or pass away or at least appear to do so. To some extent in the *Theaetetus*,(15) but most thoroughly in the *Sophist* Plato deals with the problem, how false appearance

or false opinion is possible, and comes to the conclusion that it is necessary to distinguish between different modes of being.

Though he says that it is necessary to modify "father" Parmenides doctrine in this respect, he shows at the same time that in his opinion it was the consequence of Parmenides' thought to assume the existence of two different realms of being, one in which coming to be and passing away is possible and does occur, and another one, the realm of ideas, in which this is not the case, because it is not temporal but extratemporal, hence exempt from change which is a change in time." (pp.339-340)

(15) Plato, *Theaetetus* 187 d ff.

(16) Plato, *Sophistes* 236 e ff.

134. Fujisawa, Norio. 1974. "ἔχειν, μετέχειν, and Idioms of 'Paradeigmatism' in Plato's Theory of Forms." *Phronesis* no. 19:30–58.

"In this paper I propose to re-examine Plato's terminology in his theory of Forms and try to focus light upon some aspects of philosophical significance in its development with special reference to such basic problems as the Third-Man argument. Attention will be paid first to the systematic distinction drawn by Plato in his middle dialogues between the use of ἔχειν and that of μετέχειν a distinction the significance of which seems not to have been well brought out by commentators (sections I and II); then, a general development of Plato's conception of the relation between Forms and particulars will be traced and examined (sections III and IV). An observation on the use of ἔχειν and μετέχειν in *Parmenides* 133 B-134 E will serve as an introduction to the inquiry." (p. 30)

135. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1983. "Plato's *Parmenides* and Its Influence." *Dionysius* no. 7:3–16.

Translated from the German by Margaret Kirby-

"The result of our investigation of Plato's *Parmenides* and of the question as to how far it may be considered as preparing the way for Neoplatonism is therefore not confined to the determination of reinterpretations and glosses of Platonic themes. The investigation of the 'Beginnings of Neoplatonism' which was published by Dodds in 1928 and which was carried through by Theiler, Merlan and Kramer brought them close to Plato, but did not really add anything to the *Parmenides*. At this point, it seems to me, my investigation goes further. Although they have been transplanted into a new medium, the impulses which are to be found in a more developed form in Plotinus, are nevertheless truly Platonic. One thing is certainly remarkable, however, and that is, that Plotinus obviously completely repressed the dialectical climax which is implicit in the essence of sudden change. Even the notion of sudden change plays no part for him. Herein lies an important indication of what is really peculiar and new to Plotinus. Whoever speaks of sudden change, no matter how much hidden truth he attributes to the timeless wonder of the 'instant', nevertheless holds fast to the concept of being which Parmenides formulated: being is that which does not change. Plotinus' concept of the soul on the other hand, has completely transformed the concept of being into the concept of a self-related power; a *dynamis* which thinks itself. With this he has for the first time given priority to reflection in the field of ontological questions. He stands at the threshold of a new age. This compels us to think. We too today stand at the threshold of a new age which we only see emerging gradually. It points in the opposite direction, towards a reformation of the sovereign self-consciousness of modernity and its grounding of all knowledge in subjectivity. Thus Plato might at times seem closer to us today than the modern subjective way of thinking and perhaps even closer than the Platonism of later antiquity, which inclines towards the Christian age of inwardness." (pp. 15-16)

136. Gardner, Darren. 2018. "The Ambiguity of the 'One' in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Méthexis* no. 30:36–59.

Abstract: "This paper examines how the exercises offered to the young Socrates in the *Parmenides* can be understood as an educational practice, or a gymnastic that is prior to and instrumental for defining forms. To this end, I argue that the subject of the exercises given to Socrates can be understood as an open and indeterminate 'one', rather than a form per se. I show that the description of the gymnastic exercises, the demonstration of the hypotheses themselves, and the language concerning the 'one', are consistent with an indeterminate subject 'one'.

137. ———. 2019. "The Argumentative Unity of Plato's *Parmenides*." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 34:33–40.

Abstract: "This commentary examines several key points in David Horan's paper "The Argumentative Unity of Plato's *Parmenides*." First, I discuss the general view of the paper, which engages with the first two hypotheses and in particular, the thought experiment passage in hypothesis 2 that is seen as a key to resolving the dilemma of participation. I consider the proposed view that hypothesis 1 takes up from its premise a strictly unitary, or non-multiple "one," and hypothesis 2 takes up from its premise a one that admits of multiplicity, not a non-multiple "one." I argue for an alternative reading whereby the premise of hypothesis 1 is not "if one is one" and hypothesis 2 is "if one is not one," but rather that both hypotheses fall under the premise "if one is."

138. ———. 2019. "Commentary on Horan." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 34:33–40.

Abstract: "This commentary examines several key points in David Horan's paper "The Argumentative Unity of Plato's *Parmenides*." First, I discuss the general view of the paper, which engages with the first two hypotheses and in particular, the thought experiment passage in hypothesis 2 that is seen as a key to resolving the dilemma of participation.

I consider the proposed view that hypothesis 1 takes up from its premise a strictly unitary, or non-multiple "one," and hypothesis 2 takes up from its premise a one that admits of multiplicity, not a non-multiple "one." I argue for an alternative reading whereby the premise of hypothesis 1 is not "if one is one" and hypothesis 2 is "if one is not one," but rather that both hypotheses fall under the premise "if one is"."

139. ———. 2019. "Plato's *Parmenides* and The Knowable Many: Cosmos as Discursive Order in Hypothesis 3." *Études platoniciennes* no. 15:1–22.

Abstract: "In this paper, I argue that hypothesis 3 of Plato's *Parmenides* presents a kind of cosmological lesson that shows why the "one" needs to be understood as an essential principle of order when examining what the "others" to the "one" would be like. At face value, the "others" are defined as opposite to the "one," and so they cannot be "one." Nevertheless, Parmenides claims that the "others" must not be entirely devoid of the "one." This is because the kind of "one" in question, a form-like principle rather than a unit, is responsible for the "others" to be a discursive "many" which is required for them to be considered as "others" in the first place. I argue against the view that pairing of hypothesis 3 and 4 is merely aporetic, and propose that the lessons of hypothesis 3 can be sustained in light of hypothesis 4. The benefit of this reading is that Parmenides' claim that denying forms would destroy the power of dialogue at 135c2 can be seen as upheld. And it contributes to the task of learning to think through the relationship of forms and participants by examining the way that discursive "others" are different from, but essentially dependent upon on a form-like principle of order."

140. ———. 2022. "Thought Experiments: Διάνοια as Propaedeutic Reasoning in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Philodorema: Essays in Greek and Roman Philosophy in Honor of Phillip Mitsis*, edited by Konstan, David and Sider, David, 85–98. Fonte Aretusa: Parnassos Press.

"Plato's *Parmenides* offers a host of challenges, not the least of which is understanding the hypotheses that populate the second half of the dialogue. If we are to take Parmenides at his word, the hypotheses, which are described as "gymnastic exercises" (135c8), are intended to help the youthful Socrates to strengthen his thinking about forms.(2) In particular, Socrates is uncertain of how to disarm Parmenides's critical assessment of his underdeveloped view of forms (13a8-135b1). Socrates does not yet understand, for instance, whether there are forms for all things (130e1); whether forms remain undivided when they inform multiple participants (131b1); if things participate in forms through likeness (132a-ff); and, whether knowledge of forms is possible if they are wholly separate from us (133b4). Nevertheless, Parmenides is quite clear when he tells Socrates that despite the formidable challenges, forms are not only necessary for dialectic, but also for philosophy (135b5). The need to reconsider the nature of a form is therefore an essential task in the *Parmenides*, if Socrates is to learn how philosophy is to be saved. To do so, Parmenides informs Socrates that he must train through a

gymnastic exercise that will help him to resolve these and other challenges to prepare him to rightly consider forms." (p. 85)

(2) πρὸ γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὀρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστων τῶν εἰδῶν.

141. Gerson, Lloyd P. 1981. "Dialectic and Forms in Part One of Plato's *Parmenides*." *Apeiron* no. 15:19–28.

"In this paper I should like to consider all four of the objections or dilemmas Parmenides raises against Socrates' theory. I do not believe that any of these can be understood properly in isolation from the rest. I shall argue that they are to be understood as links in a dialectical chain of argument which taken together comprises a super dilemma concerning participation and the separation of Forms. Thus, none of the arguments stand on their own. This assertion, if true, would cast a very different light on the way the arguments are normally treated. I shall also suggest that the super dilemma of part one provides the key to the interpretation of the desperately convoluted second part of the dialogue." (p. 19)

142. ———. 2002. "Plato's Development and the Development of the Theory of Forms." In *Plato's Forms: Varieties of Interpretation*, edited by Welton, William, 85–110. Lanham: Lexington Books.

"I propose to set aside for now questions of Plato's development. Rather, I shall focus on the development of the theory of Forms, using the word "development" in a distinct sense. By "development" in the present context I mean, roughly, logical development, in the sense in which, for example, Aquinas' *Summa contra gentiles* contains a logical development of a theological position or a calculus textbook might contain a logical development of calculus from geometry. This sense of development is close to but not identical with an expository development. I am not here suggesting that there is one way to approach the theory of Forms or that Plato had one way of explaining it. Therefore, I am not directly interested in finding the "correct" expository order of the dialogues as were so many early Platonists. What I am suggesting is that the theory of Forms shares with other scientific theories that posit explanatory entities a basic logic. The logic follows the explanatory exigencies. For example, quantum mechanics posits certain explanatory entities and from that follows certain questions. These questions do not necessarily have a strict order, but they do arise from the exigencies of the explanatory model. And the answers to these questions comprise in part the development of the theory.

Detaching the study of the logic of the theory of Forms from the historical development of its author might well mean that they can never be reattached. So be it. In the last section of the chapter 1 shall return to this issue and ask whether the consensus about the main lines of chronology together with the results about logical development enable us to draw any substantive conclusions about Plato's development." (pp. 86-87)

143. ———. 2004. "Plato on Identity, Sameness, and Difference." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 58:305–332.

"Among the concepts central to Plato's metaphysical vision are those of identity, sameness, and difference."

(...)

"In this paper, I propose to explore some of the systematic connections between these concepts.

Translators have sometimes obscured the fact that there are such connections. The Greek terms ταὐτόν, ἕτερον, and ὅμοιον (ἀνόμοιον) are variously rendered, often in ways that obscure the metaphysics. For example, ταὐτόν is most commonly rendered in English as "same," which, predictably, leads ὅμοιον to be translated as "like" or "similar." This has suggested to some that if two things are "like" or "similar," then they are not "the same." But "like" and "similar" are not, as I shall show, well-formed or perspicuous metaphysical concepts. There is no justification for foisting them on Plato; rendering the terms thus often leads scholars to miss the force of Plato's arguments.

In addition, translating τὸ αὐτὸν as "same" threatens to trivialize a fundamental concept in Plato, leading to complaints that to say that something is "the same as itself" is to say nothing at all." (p. 305)

144. ———. 2016. "The « Neoplatonic » interpretation of Plato's « Parmenides »." *The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* no. 10:65–94.

Abstract: "In his highly influential 1928 article 'The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic "One",' E.R. Dodds argued, inter alia, that among the so-called Neoplatonists Plotinus was the first to interpret Plato's *Parmenides* in terms of the distinctive three 'hypostases', One, Intellect, and Soul. Dodds argued that this interpretation was embraced and extensively developed by Proclus, among others. In this paper, I argue that although Plotinus took Parmenides to contain a sort of outline of the true metaphysical principles, he understood the One of the first hypothesis of the second part of the dialogue in a way importantly different from the way that Proclus understood it.

The characterization of this One, especially its identity with the Idea of the Good of Republic, has significant ramification for Plotinus' philosophy that set it apart from Proclus' philosophy in ways hitherto infrequently noted. The widely accepted reasons for rejecting Proclus' interpretation do not apply to the interpretation of Plotinus. The two different interpretations help explain why Proclus' notorious proliferation of entities in the intelligible realm is not found in Plotinus."

145. ———. 2022. "Plotinus and *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 491–499. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "In this paper, I consider and defend Plotinus' interpretation of the second part of Plato's *Parmenides*. According to this interpretation, the first three hypotheses of the second part refer to the three fundamental principles of Platonic metaphysics: the One, Intellect, and Soul. I argue that Plotinus understands Plato throughout the second part to be speaking "logically" about oneness, making what we would call "conceptual" distinctions among various senses of "one". Making these distinctions is essential to being able to provide solutions to the problems raised for the theory of Forms in the first part of the dialogue."

146. Gill, Mary Louise. 2002. "Plato on Being a Not-Being: The Text of *Parmenides* 162a-b." In *Noctes Atticae: 34 articles on Graeco-Roman Antiquity and Its Nachleben. Studies Presented to Joergen Mejer on His Sixtieth Birthday*, edited by Amden, Bettina, Flensted-Jensen, Pernilla, Heine Nielsen, Thomas, Schwartz, Adam and Gorm Tortzen, Chr., 121–129. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.
147. ———. 2006. "Problems for Forms." In *A Companion to Plato*, edited by Benson, Hugh H., 184–198. Malden: Blackwell.

"In this chapter we shall focus on the main problems for Forms raised in the first part of the *Parmenides*. My own view, which I cannot defend in detail here, is that the *Parmenides* as a whole, including the philosophical exercise, has a single overall purpose: to show that there must be Forms, or intelligible objects of some sort, if we are to explain the world at all.(1) Thus the objections to Forms raised in the first part of the dialogue are to be taken very seriously. The presentation of Forms and their relations to sensible things in the late dialogues is therefore likely to differ in some important respects from that in dialogues such as the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. This chapter will focus, not on those further developments, but on singling out the main problems for Forms Plato thought he needed to address."

(1) Gill 1996. This chapter is an adaptation of parts of the first half of that longer work. All translations of the *Parmenides* come from the translations by Gill and Ryan 1996, reprinted in J. M. Cooper (ed.) *Plato: Complete Works* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). Translations from works other than the *Parmenides* are my own.

References

Gill, M. L. (1996). Introduction. In M. L. Gill and P. Ryan (eds.) *Plato: Parmenides* (pp. 1–109). Indianapolis: Hackett.

148. ———. 2012. *Philosophos: Plato's Missing Dialogue*. New York: Oxford University Press.

"In my view the *Parmenides* holds the key to Plato's strategy in our series of dialogues and to the question about its missing member. In the first part of the dialogue a youthful Socrates presents and Parmenides criticizes Plato's theory of forms—the view that there are eternal, unchanging objects, grasped by the intellect and not by the senses, which explain selected features of things in the changing world around us—and Socrates proves unable to rescue the theory.(9) At the end of the critique Parmenides claims that Socrates has posited forms too soon, before he has been properly trained, and the second part of the dialogue demonstrates the sort of training he has in mind.(10)

In the transitional section leading up to the demonstration, Parmenides recommends that once Socrates has completed the upcoming exercise he should start again, repeating it with variations. Whereas the demonstration in the *Parmenides* concerns the form of oneness, Socrates should perform similar exercises taking as his subject likeness, unlikeness, change, rest, being, not-being, and similar entities (Prm. 136b1–c5). Parmenides' recommendation suggests that new rounds of the exercise will bear some resemblance to the exercise in the second part of the *Parmenides*. I argue below that Plato presents a second round of the exercise repeating the dialectical pattern of argument in the *Parmenides* and that this second round is especially relevant to the missing *Philosopher*. At the end of this Introduction I set out this dialectical pattern, since it provides the backbone of my book.(11)" (p. 3)

(9) Our topic in Chapter 1 below.

(10) Our topic in Chapter 2.

(11) In Chapters 2, 3, and 7.

149. ———. 2014. "Design of the Exercise in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 53:495–520.

Abstract: "In Part I of *Parmenides*, Socrates introduces a Theory of Forms to explain opposites compresent in ordinary things, and claims that Forms cannot have opposite features. In Part II, Parmenides relies on Socrates' claim and derives unacceptable consequences—that the Form of Oneness does not exist, and if that is so, then nothing exists: a clearly false conclusion. To avoid it, Socrates must give up his thesis in Part I and find a way to preserve the explanatory role of Forms. This paper aims to articulate the structure of the exercise in Part II."

150. ———. 2022. "Exercise on Being: The ἀγών of Heraclitus and Parmenides." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 149–162. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "At the end of the first part of Plato's *Parmenides*, after Socrates has failed to rescue his theory of forms from objections, Parmenides urges him to get more philosophical training, stressing that without proper training the truth will escape him. Among his recommendations, Parmenides advises Socrates that, once he completes the upcoming exercise on oneness, he should repeat it taking other kinds as his focus: likeness, unlikeness, change, rest, generation, destruction, being, and not-being. This paper argues that new rounds will not repeat the exercise on oneness in the second part of the *Parmenides*, since different kinds raise different problems. Instead, each exercise will explore the problems special to the kind at issue. In this paper I examine a second round of the exercise, the exercise on being.

Central to this exercise is the nature of being: is it changing (as Heraclitus thought) or resting (as Parmenides thought)? That is the contest (ἀγών) of Heraclitus and Parmenides. I argue that the general strategy used in treating the positive hypothesis in the *Parmenides* in four steps recurs in the second exercise and takes place across parts of the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*.

The first two steps present opposite extremes. Step 1: being is changing (Heraclitus); step 2: being is resting (Parmenides). Step 3 proposes a middle path between the extremes: being is both changing and resting. Step 4 then undermines the solution: being is neither changing nor resting. Each exercise challenges the student to find a way back to step 3, a constructive reconciliation of the extremes."

151. ———. 2024. "Knowledge and Forms in Plato's *Parmenides* and *Sophist*." In *Platonism: Proceedings of the 43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium*, edited by Hrachovec, Herbert and Mácha, Jakub, 9–30. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Abstract: "Platonic forms explain certain features of perceptible things and equip us to know them. This paper examines three passages: the Greatest Difficulty in the *Parmenides* shows that Socrates' failure to explain participation, the relation between sensible things and forms, renders forms unknowable to us. The Battle of Gods and Giants in the *Sophist* treats forms as immutable, but their immutability apparently rules out their intelligibility. The Stranger offers a path forward by defining being as power, a solution then undermined in the Aporia about Being, which reveals that the form of being is neither immutable nor intelligible. This paper shows where the Aporia goes wrong and opens a way back to the constructive proposal in the Battle of Gods and Giants. The paper finally considers how forms are affected in being known and gestures toward Plato's solution to the problem of participation."

152. Giovannetti, Lorenzo. 2022. "Structure and sense of the seventh deduction in *Prm.* 164b5-165e1." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 431–438. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The paper first analyses the seventh series of deductions (D7) in the second part of the *Parmenides*. The starting-point of D7 is that without the One, the others differ from one another. The reciprocal differentiation between the many others produces masses. These masses are indeterminate because of the absence of the One. This means at least two things: a) there is no end in dividing a mass; b) masses appear to be different at different times. The text goes on to explain the way masses appear to be different at different times.

Parmenides does not disambiguate whether the argument is about quantities or qualities, thereby suggesting it is about both of them. Thereafter, the paper summarises philosophically relevant arguments that can be drawn from the text. First, reciprocal differentiation is the ontological basis of the notion of appearance in such a way that self-differentiation, indeterminacy and appearance are conceptually connected. Second, masses resemble concrete particulars, which without the One lose every proper determination. Third, one can never find intelligible unity in physically dividing concrete particulars in space and time. Fourth, the overall argument suggests that the One is what the others are different from as well as what provides them with unity. Finally, it seems that D7 deduces the consequences for the many in absence of the One with regard to the other, i.e. the One."

153. Gjørup, Ivar. 2011. "Plato's *Parmenides* 127 e." *Classica et Mediaevalia*:33–37.

154. Glasner, Ruth. 1992. "The Problem of Beginning, Middle and End in Proclus' Commentary on Plato's *Parmenides* 137d." *Hermes* no. 120:194–204.

"The problem of the distinction between parts and boundaries, particularly with respect to the concepts of beginning, middle and end, is important to the understanding of Proclus' conception of the basic definitions of geometry, as well as to that of his hierarchical world picture. Dillon, in his introduction to the sixth book of the commentary, rightly describes Proclus' treatment of the subject as «less than clear» (p. 397). I think also that the fact that Proclus endeavors to defend Plato against his critics requires explanation, since Proclus is aware of the distinction between part and boundary and its significance. Let us, hence, follow Proclus' defense of Plato in the commentary on the 'Parmenides', taking also into account other relevant passages in his writings.

Proclus offers two replies, the first in 1111.35-1112.23 the second from 1112.23 to 1113.29. I shall take Proclus second reply first, because it involves the clarification of the concept part, and then deal with his first." (p. 195)

References

G. R. Morrow and J. M. Dillon *Proclus Commentary on Plato's Parmenides* (Princeton, 1987).

155. Gonzalez, Francisco J. 2008. "Plato's question of truth (versus Heidegger's doctrines)." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy* no. 23:83–119.

Abstract: "Heidegger's thesis that truth underwent in Plato a fateful transformation from unconcealment to correctness is well-known because defended in an essay that Heidegger published during his lifetime and that has been widely read since: *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*. One goal of the present paper, however, is to show how Heidegger's interpretation of the *Republic's* Cave Analogy in the 1931 course from which the essay is supposedly derived, as well as his interpretation of the Myth of Er in the *Parmenides* course delivered shortly after the essay's composition, are in tension with, and even undermine, the essay's thesis. The other, and more important, goal of my paper is to show that this richer interpretation offers a fruitful approach to the question of truth in Plato that is missed by both Heidegger's detractors and his defenders."

156. ———. 2019. "Shattering Presence: Being as Change, Time as the Sudden Instant in Heidegger's 1930–31 Seminar on Plato's *Parmenides*." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 57:313–338.

Abstract "The importance of Plato for Martin Heidegger's interpretation of the history of metaphysics is now well known and documented. However, what is arguably his most radical interpretation of a Platonic dialogue, a 1930–31 seminar on the *Parmenides*, remains largely unknown and for two reasons. First, while Heidegger's notes were published in 2012 as part of the *Gesamtausgabe* (vol. 83), they are brief, cryptic, and cover barely half the seminar. We know this because a detailed and complete transcript is preserved in the Marcuse Archive in Frankfurt am Main, a transcript ignored by the editor of GA83 and not previously explored in significant detail. Second, Heidegger preserved a puzzling silence elsewhere about the seminar's findings (which undermine his narrative about the history of metaphysics).

The present paper seeks to reconstruct the argument of the seminar both for its insight into the special role played by the 'third' hypothesis in the deductions of the second half of the *Parmenides* and for the light it sheds on Heidegger's unfinished *Auseinandersetzung* with Plato."

157. ———. 2022. "'Let us say the third': The Meaning of τὸ τρίτον in the Deductions of Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 378–391. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "Among the many sections of argument concerning the One in the second half of Plato's *Parmenides*, only one is explicitly numbered: the third (*to triton*, 155e4). This suggests, on the face of it, that it is to be counted both after and among the first two deductions (or 'hypotheses'), as one of them. Yet one rare area of consensus today, met with only a few dissenting voices, is that it is not to be counted as a third deduction at all and can even be ignored in interpreting the genuine deductions: the only argument explicitly counted is the one that does not count. Here I propose counting it, not by treating it as simply one deduction among others, but by recognizing Plato's use of the phrase *to triton* elsewhere to refer to what is neither one of two opposed things because it encompasses both. The 'third' argument of the *Parmenides* enables us to affirm both of the opposed deductions that preceded it, the first attributing to the One neither one characteristic nor its opposite and the second attributing to it both each characteristic and its opposite. It furthermore does so in a way that suggests it could mediate all of the opposed pairs of both/and, neither/nor deductions that constitute the dialectical exercise. In this case the 'third' stands outside of the four sets of opposed deductions because it represents the mediation that makes them all possible and equally acceptable."

158. Gordon, Jill. 2010. "Erotic Desire and Courage in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 40:261–287.

159. Graeser, Andreas. 2000. "Parmenides in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter* no. 5:1–14.

Abstract: "This essay examines the role of Parmenides in Plato's dialogue of the same name. Over against the widely held view that this literary figure exemplifies the philosopher par excellence of an all-encompassing systematic of Eleatic provenience, it is maintained that Parmenides represents a particular frame of mind about certain philosophical matters, namely one which regards forms in a

reified manner. It is suggested that by means of the literary figure of Parmenides, Plato is addressing in his dialogue inner-Academic debates about the theory of forms, especially Speusippus' conception of Unity, which betrays a kind of naive metaphysics of things, as can be seen especially in the first three deductions of the second half of the dialogue."

160. ———. 2010. "Plato's *Parmenides*." In *The Fog Dispelled: Two Studies in Plato's Later Thought*, 15–78. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

Originally published in German as *Platons Parmenides*, Stuttgart: F. Steiner 2003; translation by Ann M. Hentschel.

161. Granieri, Roberto. 2024. "Plato on the Power of Dialectic and the Necessity of Forms." *Rhizomata* no. 12:51–78.

Abstract: "In the *Parmenides* Plato claims that by relinquishing Forms one would entirely destroy *tên tou dialegesthai dunamin*. I argue that this peculiar phrase does not indicate, as often suggested, the power or possibility of all discourse or thought, but the power of dialectic, i. e. the highest science; and that its preservation is, for Plato, a decisive reason for the necessity of the Forms."

162. Gurtler, Gary M. 1992. "Plotinus and the Platonic *Parmenides*." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 32:443–457.

163. Haas, Andrea. 2021. "One One, or the Unity of Being in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 26:69–87.

Abstract: "Being can no longer be thought, for Plato, in accordance with *Parmenides*' either/or; rather, it is both/and, both present in and absent from things, which is how they can come-to-presence and go-out-into-absence. But as the *Parmenides* demonstrates, Greek grammar hints at a fundamental ontological truth: the expression, "one one," ἓν ἓν, shows that being can be implied, neither present nor absent—for being is an implication. But then participating must be rethought in terms of implying: being is implied in everything that is and is one, which is how it is present in beings and absent therefrom. But this understanding of participation—as Aristotle insists—is contradictory. Luckily, there is another way: implication qua belonging—being no longer participates-in, but belongs-to things, which is how it is one with them, distinct but inseparable. But this too, betrays implication, fails to grasp being's way of being, and the meaning of being qua implied, and so cannot illuminate how being and beings are and are one—for as the suspension of presence and/or absence, implying is irreducible to participating or belonging. Rather, if being is implied, it is because implication is suspension, which is why it is so suspenseful."

164. Halper, Edward. 1990. "A Note on the Unity of the 'Parmenides'." *Hermes* no. 118:31–42.

"Despite a mass of recent work on Plato's 'Parmenides', there remain persistent doubts about the unity of the dialogue's two parts'. In the first part (126a-the title figure directs criticisms against what is usually recognized as the forms that Plato espouses in his middle dialogues. The second part (136c-166b) consists of a sketch and an application of a method of philosophical exercise. Doubts about the unity of the dialogue stem from the apparent failure of the second part to answer the criticisms of the first part. The purpose of this note is to present what I regard as decisive evidence for the unity of the dialogue." (p. 31)

(,,)

"These remarks on the overall aim of the dialogue belong to the realm of speculation, as all such analyses are likely to do. I can plead that my remarks fare no worse than other interpretations, and indeed a good deal better if my topical analysis is correct. One reason that the 'Parmenides' continues to fascinate scholars is that the dialogue says too little to determine what its aim really is. But even this reticence tends to support my contention that the second part is intended to be an exposition of metaphysical topics in a way that avoids making the assumptions implicit in Socrates' account of forms, and an exposition that shows the dire consequences of denying the forms entirely. Since I am unable to argue this interpretation, I content myself with concluding that, whatever we are to make of

the overall aim of the dialogue, the second part expounds more fully the topics employed in the first part and the two parts thus form a unity," (p. 42)

165. ———. 2003. "Positive and Negative Dialectics: Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik* and Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Platonismus im Idealismus: Die platonische Tradition in der klassischen deutschen Philosophie*, edited by Mojsisch, Burkhard and Summerell, Orrin, 211–246. Berlin: B. G. Teubner.

"There is a substantial body of literature on Hegel's understanding of the *Parmenides*. There are three main issues: 1. how Hegel developed from his Jenaer notion that the *Parmenides* makes a case for skepticism,(9) 2. whether or not he correctly understood Plato(10) and 3. whether or, rather, how his dialectic differs from Plato's.(11) The first issue has been adequately treated. Hegel's discussion of skepticism belongs to the period when he still thought of logic as a propaedeutic to metaphysics, before he identified the two. Addressing the second issue requires a solid understanding of the *Parmenides*, but despite the large literature on this dialogue, there is no consensus even on basic issues. Although Hegel is surely mistaken on some points of detail, it is important to allow for the possibility that his method, his choice of problems or his unstated systematic assumptions could arise from this dialogue and even, perhaps, reflect a deep understanding of it. But the problems here are too large and difficult to tackle directly all at once. So let me set aside, for now, the second issue.

The focus of my attention will, then, be the third issue, how Hegel's dialectic differs from Plato's. I shall begin from Hegel's claim that Plato's dialectic is negative, and my guiding questions are: 1. whether, how and why Plato's dialectic is negative; 2. why Hegel understands it to be negative and what he does to make dialectic positive." (pp. 212-213)

(10) See H.-G. Gadamer, *Hegel und die antike Dialektik*, in: id., *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 3, Tübingen 1987, 20. Gadamer thinks that Hegel misunderstood the literal meaning of Plato's dialectic, but grasped, at least in the *Sophistes*, its deeper truth as a foundation for the hermeneutical understanding of speech.(...)

(11) G. Maluschke, *Kritik und absolute Methode in Hegels Dialektik*, Bonn 1974, 54, sees the decisive difference to lie in Hegel's reconstruction of the categories into a system. K. Düsing, *Formen der Dialektik bei Plato und Hegel*, in: *Hegel und die antike Dialektik*, hrsg. von M. Riedel, Frankfurt a. M. 1990, 190-191, notes, among other differences, that the meaning of the forms remains unaltered in Platonic dialectic, whereas the categories are altered and enriched in Hegelian dialectic. M. Gessman, *Skepsis und Dialektik. Hegel und der Platonische Parmenides*, in: *Skeptizismus und spekulatives Denken in der Philosophie Hegels*, hrsg. von H. F. Fulda, R.-P. Horstmann, Stuttgart 1996, 51, contrasts the inconclusive flux of Platonic dialectic with Hegel's systematic, scientific method that purports to arrive at knowledge.

166. Harte, Verity. 2002. *Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"This book is an examination of Plato's treatment of the relation between a whole and its parts. It is focused on discussion of relevant passages from a group of Plato's later works: (in roughly the order of my discussion) *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Philebus*, and *Timaeus*. By 'later' I mean no more than after the *Republic*, which I take to be uncontroversial, if anything is uncontroversial as regards Platonic chronology. Of the works I shall consider, there is—or has been—considerable controversy surrounding the dating of the *Timaeus* within the post-Republic period.(1) I myself find it more natural to take the *Timaeus* together with the *Philebus*, in some order or other, and to take them both to post-date the *Parmenides*.(2) However, since I am not proposing a developmental story about Plato's views of part and whole (on which, see further below), nothing in what I say depends on any particular chronology for the works I discuss." (Introduction, 1)

(1) Compare Owen (1953) with Cherniss (1957).

(2) But: contrast Waterfield (1980).

References

Cherniss, H. (1957), 'The Relation of the *Timaeus* to Plato's Later Dialogues', *American Journal of Philology*, 78: 225–66.

Owen, G. E. L. (1953), 'The Place of the *Timaeus* in Plato's Dialogues', *Classical Quarterly*, ns 3: 79–95; repr. in Owen (1986: 65–84).

—— (1986), *Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy*, G. E. L. Owen, ed. Martha Nussbaum (London: Duckworth).

Waterfield, R. A. H. (1980), 'The Place of the *Philebus* in Plato's Dialogues', *Phronesis*, 25: 270–305.

167. ———. 2018. "Aporia in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Karamanolis, George and Politis, Vasilis, 67–90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"'The *Parmenides*', says Richard Robinson, 'comes nearest of all Plato's works to being wholly methodological' (1942: 178). Robinson seems to me right to be struck by the extent of the *Parmenides*' focus on method and, more particularly, by the way in which this focus unifies the dialogue (1942: 176). Indeed, I would go further than Robinson in seeing this unity of focus extend back to the opening conversation of the dialogue proper, the conversation between Socrates and Zeno, all too often treated merely as a convenient excuse for Socrates' introduction of forms.⁽¹⁾ Attention to this unity across the (reported) dialogue and the careful structure it reveals involving the three reported conversations and their relations to one another is one pay off, I shall argue, of attention to the dialogue's use of 'aporia' and its cognates." (p. 67)

(1) Allen 1997: 75 is one notable exception, dividing the dialogue into not two, but three unevenly sized parts.

References

Allen, R. E. (1997) *Plato's Parmenides*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Robinson, R. (1942) 'Plato's *Parmenides* II', *Classical Philology* 37: 159–86.

168. Havlíček, Ales, and Karfík, Filip, eds. 2005. *Plato's Parmenides: Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense*. Prague: Oikoymenh.

Contents: Preface 7; Constance C. Meinwald: Literary elements and dialogue form in Plato's *Parmenides* 9; Dimitri El Murr: La critique de la participation en *Parménide*, 131a-132b: unité, unicité et le paradoxe de Zenon 21; Béatriz Bossi: Is Socrates really defending conceptualism in *Parmenides*, 132b3-d4? 58; Karel Thein: The second "Third Man Argument": what difference does the likeness make? 75; Francesco Fronterotta: *Methexis* et *Korismos* dans l'interprétation du *Parménide* de Platon 88; Kenneth Sayre: The method revisited: *Parmenides*, 135e9-136c6 125; Filip Karfík: Par rapport a soi-meme et par rapport aux autres. Une distinction clef dans le *Parménide* de Platon 141; Samuel Scolnicov: The conditions of knowledge in Plato's *Parmenides* 165; Stepán Spinka: Relation, Sein und Zeit 181; David Ambuel: On what is not: Eleatic paradox in the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist* 200; Luc Brisson: Les quatre dernières series de deductions dans la seconde partie du *Parménide* de Platon 216; Denis O'Brien: Le *Parménide* historique et le *Parménide* de Platon 234; Luc Brisson: Réponse a Denis O'Brien 257; Monique Dixsaut: Les hypothèses du *Parménide*: construire des mondes conceptuels possibles 263; John Dillon: Speusippus and the ontological interpretation of the *Parmenides* 296; Index locorum 313-323.

169. Heckel, Marta. 2021. "Parmenides's Love of Honor and Lessons about How (Not) to Do Philosophy from Plato's *Parmenides*." *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 26:47–68.

Abstract: "In this paper, I show that the *Parmenides* provides important insight into how to properly engage in philosophical discussion—or, more accurately, how not to engage in it. From references to age, love-of-winning and love-of-honor, and a parallel to the *Phaedo*, I show that Parmenides is ruled by the spirited part of his soul in a way that compromises his ability to philosophize, and that the *Parmenides* is a warning about doing philosophy from a love of honor. Ideally, we should do

philosophy from a love of wisdom. When we are honor-loving, we are not only motivated by the wrong kind of thing, but our love of honor can also blind us to the specific ways in which we might be falling short of ideal philosophical engagement, such as missing the potential dangers of engaging in philosophy with certain kinds of interlocutors."

170. Heiser, John H. 1991. "Plotinus and the *Apeiron* of Plato's *Parmenides*." *The Thomist* no. 55:53–81.

"In my view, the only way to appreciate Plotinus's achievement, and to learn from him, is to take these difficulties with great seriousness and to struggle through them with Plotinus.

Another point most commentators overlook is something I take to be both a fruit and a clue to much of what Plotinus says about the Infinite Source of the universe. This is that, in explaining why the One should be called "infinite," Plotinus is presenting his exegesis of a perplexing passage in Plato's *Parmenides*.⁽²⁾ Rather than following his own line of thought to the conclusion that the One must be infinite, we see Plotinus casting about for some meaning he can assign to a term he is confronted with. I happen to think that his exegesis of Plato is mistaken. This raises the interesting possibility that Plotinus's breakthrough, if it is a breakthrough and not an aberration, resulted by accident from a mistake." (p. 54)

(2) Most commentators simply ignore the point, but Professor Armstrong, who is usually so alert to sources, makes the surprising statement that "there is no clear evidence that Plato ever thought or spoke of the One or Good as in any sense *apeiron*" ("Doctrine of the Infinite," p. 48). Professor Rist goes further and claims that "the 'beyond Being' of Plato must mean a finite Being in some way beyond other finite beings" (*Road to Reality*, p. 24). But Rist appears to assume he and his readers share a common understanding of what it means to be "infinite," one that goes without saying. I am unable to make out what that is.

References

A. H. Armstrong, "Plotinus' Doctrine of the Infinite and its Significance for Christian Thought," *Downside Review* 73 (1955) : 47-58.

John M. Rist. *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, Cambridge University Press 1977.

171. Helmig, Christoph. 2007. "Plato's Arguments against Conceptualism: *Parmenides* 132 B3-C11 Reconsidered." *Elenchos* no. 28:303–336.

"With the suggestion that Forms are thoughts, young Socrates introduces ἀπορία three, and the text makes it clear that he is addressing problems raised in ἀπορία one and two. If the Forms are thoughts, Socrates maintains, they no longer face the difficulties mentioned in the first two ἀπορίαι, because as thoughts each of them is one⁽⁴⁾. Hence, we have to keep in mind that with his conceptualist thesis Socrates wants primarily to safeguard the unity of the Forms. In his twofold reply, Parmenides will not question this unity, but demonstrates that a Form is rather an object of thought (νοούμενον) and not a thought (νόημα), that is, a thought-process.

The argument is based on the assumption that every thought has an object, is a thought of something. As we shall see, the main problem with Socrates' suggestion lies in the fact that he does not specify how a νόημα comes to be (ἐγγίγνεσθαι) in the soul, that is, from where or how it originates and what its object is. But before we enter into a discussion about the argument itself, let us say some words about Socrates' proposal as such." (p. 305)

172. ———. 2022. "Interpreting Parmenides of Elea in Antiquity: From Plato's *Parmenides* to Simplicius' *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*." In *Received Opinions: Doxography in Antiquity and the Islamic World*, edited by Lammer, Andreas and Las, Mareike, 175–206. Leiden: Brill.

"Parmenides and Heraclitus are probably the most successful Presocratics as far as their scholarly reception is concerned.⁽¹⁾" (p.175)

(...)

"Because of its eminent role in the transmission and interpretation of Parmenides, it is worthwhile looking a bit closer at how Simplicius dealt with the material he quotes from the poem. Since our volume has a special focus on doxography, I shall, in what follows, try to situate Simplicius in the broader doxographical context of Parmenides' philosophy and raise the question as to how the Parmenidean doxographical tradition can best be characterised and delineated. What is the role of Simplicius within the doxographical tradition of Parmenides and how can he be characterised compared to his predecessors (esp. Plato and the Platonic tradition after him)?" (p. 178)

(1) On the history of the interpretation of the Presocratic Parmenides of Elea, see Tarán, *Parmenides*, 269–295 and Kraus, "Parmenides," 496–501. Stamatellos, *Plotinus and the Presocratics* (esp. 19–89) studies Plotinus' interpretation of Parmenides (and other Presocratics), while Abbate, *Parmenide e i neoplatonici* focusses on Plotinus, Proclus, and Damascius. On Simplicius' reading of Parmenides, see Bormann, "The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius"; Cordero, "Simplicius et l'«École» Éléate"; Drews, "intelligibles = sinnliches?"; and the two more recent comprehensive monographs by Licciardi, *Parmenide tràdito* and *Critica dell'apparente e critica apparente*; cf. esp. the summary the useful overview in Licciardi, *Parmenide tràdito*, 27–88.

References

Abbate, M. *Parmenide e i neoplatonici, Dall'Essere all'Uno e al di là dell'Uno*. Alessandria: Edizioni dell'Orso, 2010 [reprint with corrections in 2014].

Bormann, K. "The Interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius." In: *The Monist* 62 (1979), 30–42.

Cordero, N.-L. "Simplicius et l'«École» Éléate." In: *Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie. Actes du colloque international de Paris (28. Sept.–1er Oct. 1985)*. Ed. by I. Hadot. *Peripatoi* 15. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1987, 166–182.

Drews, F. "intelligibles = sinnliches? Simplicios' differenzierter Umgang mit Aristoteles' Parmenides-Kritik." In: *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 155 (2012), 389–412.

Kraus, M. "Parmenides." In: *Die Philosophie der Antike. Vol. 1: Frühgriechische Philosophie*. Ed. by H. Flashar, D. Bremer, and G. Rechenauer. Basel: Schwabe, 2013, 441–530.

Licciardi, I.A. *Critica dell'apparente e critica apparente, Simplicio interprete di Parmenide nel commentario al De Caelo di Aristotele*. Symbolon 44. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2017.

Licciardi, I.A. *Parmenide tràdito, Parmenide tradito nel Commentario di Simplicio alla Fisica di Aristotele*, Saggio introduttivo, Raccolta dei testi in greco, Traduzione e Commentario. Symbolon 42. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2016.

Stamatellos, G. *Plotinus and the Presocratics. A Philosophical Study of Presocratic Influences in Plotinus' Enneads*. New York: suny Press, 2007.

Tarán, L. *Parmenides. A Text with Translation, Commentary and Critical Essays*. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press, 1965 [includes Chapter iv: "Parmenides in the Ancient Philosophical Tradition," 269–295].

173. Hermann, Arnold. 2011. "Parricide or Heir? Plato's Uncertain Relationship to Parmenides." In *Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)*, edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 147–165. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

Summary: "Most scholars view Plato's critique of Parmenides in the *Sophist*, particularly the observations surrounding the "parricide" remark, as quite apt and justified. The theory is that Parmenides deserves to be rebuked for failing to recognize that "What Is Not" can be understood in more ways than one, namely, not only in an existential sense, but also predicatively or, in the language of the *Sophist*, as indicating "difference." I aim to show, nevertheless, that Plato's indictment of

Parmenides misses the mark in significant ways, allowing Parmenides to escape the so-called threat of parricide not once but twice.

For example, Parmenides' abundant use of alpha-privatives (e.g., ἀγένητον)—as well as the negative οὐ (or οὐκ) when there is no a-privative form available—indicates that he was well aware of the difference between indicating “is not” predicatively versus existentially. Moreover, the Poem nowhere suggests that his strictures regarding the use of What Is Not are to be taken in the broadest possible sense, disallowing, in effect, the discrimination between the existential and the predicative case. Only when sought after as a “way of inquiry” does What Is Not—in contrast to the Way of What Is—fail to provide us with a graspable, expressible object. After all, the “Way of What Is Not,” lacks any sort of *sēmata*, or signs, that can be used to navigate it. As a “way of inquiry for thinking” (B2), it leads nowhere, lacking any sort of expressible or knowable object or goal. The complete absence of an object or result, however, does not hinder us from making statements to this effect, nor from uttering the words “What Is Not” or “Not Being.” Yet this fine distinction is lost to many who have criticized Parmenides for being inconsistent, careless, or simply ignorant. The move from the intellectual unavailability of an object that marks a defunct way of inquiry, to the claim that to even speak of such a “way” is both illegitimate and impossible—all the while insisting that Parmenides himself is to be blamed for such a monstrous fallacy—seems an egregious gloss-over, even if the perpetrator is someone of Plato's stature. If my arguments prove sound, then Parmenides should be absolved of the charges leveled against him."

174. ———. 2012. "Plato's Eleatic Challenge and the Problem of Self-predication in the *Parmenides*." In *Presocratics and Plato: Festschrift at Delphi in Honor of Charles Kahn*, edited by Patterson, Richard, Karasmanis, Vassilis and Hermann, Arnold, 205–231. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

"To summarize the direction of my exposition, I aim to show how Plato's attempt to distinguish a Form “itself-by-itself” (as demonstrated by Argument I of the *Parmenides*) precludes any possibility for self-predication by the Form. Above all, Plato's rigorous distinction between being the property versus having properties is crucial to our grasping the difference between the Form as itself, and the Form in relation to other Forms. Moreover, the effort to think of a Form just by itself is self-defeating, because thinking of it in any way at all involves some connection between it and a predicate.

Thinking anything about a Form must involve more than grasping the bare Form, in and of itself, in mind, since the bare Form, in and of itself, is unintelligible. All thinking or saying, including even so-called “self-predication,” involves some sort of copulative link to a predicate, some *symplokê* (in the language of the *Sophist*). Thus, when the hypothetical One “by itself” is finally attained at the end of Argument I, what is lost is not only intelligibility, but also the possibility of self-predication." (p. 206)

175. Hestir, Blake E. 2016. *Plato on the Metaphysical Foundation of Meaning and Truth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 5: The foundation exposed: *Parmenides* 135bc, pp. 84-104.

"Since Plato's conception of truth is tied to his conception of meaning, I approach the above project first by a detailed examination of the foundation of Plato's semantic views. I argue that Plato employs a style of argument to establish the ontological, cognitive, and semantic conditions of stability and combination,(26) each of which is necessary for meaningful discourse and truth.

The direct expression of this argument occurs during an exchange at *Parmenides* 135bc." (p. 7)

(26) Here broadly construed to include separation since for Plato the mechanism of separation also involves a combination of kinds, most significantly *being* and *difference*.

"Parmenides informs Socrates in an exchange at *Parmenides* 135bc that without forms the capacity (*dunamis*) for *dialegesthai* will be destroyed in every way (*pantapasi diaphtherai*).⁽¹⁾ This remark is particularly unsettling because it arrives on the heels of what are taken to be some fairly damning objections to the theory of Forms – after all, if Plato thinks the Forms are the bedrock of practically everything, including *dialegesthai*, and the theory of Forms is shown to be problematic, then Plato's project in the *Parmenides* looks paradoxical.

Parmenides 135bc contains the most obvious appeal to the Grounding Argument, this time expressly for the claim that forms are necessary for the possibility of *dialegesthai* and *dianoia*, with the implication that forms must exist. In this chapter, I reconstruct the view expressed at 135bc, and argue that (a) by “forms” Parmenides need mean nothing more than entities that are one and always the same in at least one respect, and (b) “*dialegesthai*” should be understood more broadly as “discourse” rather than exclusively as “dialectic” as some scholars at least back to Proclus have supposed.”

(1) I use the infinitive throughout since that is the word Socrates uses.

176. Horan, David. 2019. "The Argumentative Unity of Plato's *Parmenides*." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 34:1–32.

Abstract: "This paper argues that the resolution of the dilemma of participation presented in the first part of Plato's *Parmenides* is a central purpose of the arguments of the first hypothesis and the beginning of the second hypothesis in the second part of the dialogue. I maintain that the training demonstrated by Parmenides in the first and second hypotheses, by shifting the consideration away from sense objects to intelligible objects and away from forms to the one, enables Parmenides to develop an understanding of what it means for anything to be one. This understanding shows that multiplicity is not inimical to the one remaining one when participated in. It argues for an intelligible one that is divisible and still remains one when divided. The model of participation in the second part of the dialogue differs from that in the first part where the dilemma of participation initially arises, insofar as there is a strong ontological connection in part two between the one and whatever participates in the one, a connection that is not present in part one, where sense objects participate in intelligible forms. I conclude by taking stock of how far the resolution of the dilemma of participation has been progressed to resolution by 144e7 and what problems still remain to be analysed and resolved."

177. ———. 2021. "The Introduction to Plato's *Parmenides*: What Does It Introduce and to Whom?" In *Framing the Dialogues: How to Read Openings and Closures in Plato*, edited by Kaklamanou, Eleni, Pavlou, Maria and Tsakmakis, Antonis, 243–262. Leiden: Brill.

"The *Parmenides* is usually divided into two parts, the exchange between Socrates and Parmenides followed by the lengthy and elaborate discussion between Parmenides and Aristoteles.

(...)

Apart from its possible role in emphasising and enhancing the final part, I believe that the introduction also has a part to play in indicating how the reader should use, engage with and understand the final two thirds of the dialogue.(3) There is a marked lack of agreement among scholars about the content and function of the final part of the *Parmenides*. Accordingly, we might expect that study of the introduction could do little to help clear up such great controversy. However, I do believe that the introduction, like all the other material leading up to the final part, 'is directed toward emphasizing and enhancing its importance'.(4) I would now like to suggest a number of ways in which it does this, and perhaps more." (pp- 243-244)

(3) 3 For a similar claim, see Brumbaugh (1961) 26.

(4) Allen (1997) 75.

References

Allen (1997): Allen, R.E., *Plato's Parmenides*, translated with Comment, rev. ed., New Haven and London.

Brumbaugh (1961): Brumbaugh, R.S., *Plato on the One. The Hypotheses in the Parmenides*, New Haven (repr. Port Washington, NY and London 1973).

178. House, Dennis. 2003. "Commentary: The Criticism of Plato's Doctrine of Participation in *Parmenides*: A Propaedeutic to the Platonic Dialectic." In *Philosophy and Freedom: The Legacy of James Doull*,

edited by Peddle, David G. and Robertson, Neil G., 140–166. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Commentary to the essay by James Doull in the same volume.

"(hereafter [*Parmenides*] 126a-137c3 will be referred to as P1 and the remainder of the dialogue as P2)." (p. 141)

"I will examine the following points of interpretation where Doull stands alone or with the very few in his reading of P1:

1 The problem *Parmenides* addresses is indicated by the audience to the dialogue - the Clazomenian philosophers who have come to Athens.

How is Anaxagoras's *Nous* as pure and unmixed related to the finite as a mixture?

2 Zeno and Socrates are to be understood as holding opposed positions and the unification of this opposition occupies the remainder of the dialogue.

3 The order and structure of the *aporiai* follows the fourfold division of the line in *Republic*.

4 When Socrates introduces the 'day image,' the reader is to understand this as the 'light image' of the *Republic*.

5 131c-132b is not a separate *aporia* but is to be taken together with 132b-132c as forming one *aporia*.

6 Although Plato uses the abstract Eleatic concepts of Being and Unity, the reader is to understand by the terms the Good of *Phaedo* and *Republic*.

7 There is one point of difference between Doull and most other commentators concerning P2 which must come into view in considering P1: that 155e-156b, rather than being a corollary or appendix of H2 (hereafter the hypotheses will be referred to as H1, H2, H3, etc.), is the Third Hypothesis.

The reader of *Parmenides* should put himself in the place of the Clazomenian philosophers who came to Athens to hear the great argument of Socrates with Zeno and *Parmenides*.(2)" (pp. 141-142)

(2) Doull, chapter 2 [*Plato's Parmenides*] above, 93.

179. Hrachovec, Herbert. 2011. "'... goaded perhaps by *Parmenides*' – Preliminaries to a Platonic Problem." *Conceptus: Zeitschrift für Philosophie* no. 40:53–69.

Summary: "Donald Davidson, in his *Truth and Predication*, suggests that Plato's concern with "gluing together" subject and predicate in assertive sentences might be traced back to *Parmenides*. Taking his lead this paper discusses the connection, proceeding in three steps. A short overview of the literature on *Parmenides*' fragment B2 will be given and a Davidsonian move to reduce the complexity of the hermeneutical situation will be proposed. Secondly, given this reduction, a *Parmenidean* tableaux will be put forward and compared to our present understanding of elementary propositional and predicate logic. This will provide the basis for the concluding discussion of Plato's characteristic transformation of *Parmenides*' dictum into the bundle of arguments that give rise to the problem of the unity of propositions."

180. Hubler, J. Noel. 2010. "Moderatus, E. R. Dodds, and the Development of Neoplatonist Emanation." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 115–128. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"In 1928, E. R. Dodds rewrote the history of Greek Philosophy by arguing that Moderatus, an obscure Neopythagorean philosopher of the first century, had anticipated the celebrated emanation system of Plotinus by two centuries (1928, 129–42)."

(...)

"Unfortunately, Dodds' claims rest on the thinnest textual evidence, a single passage from the sixth-century commentator, Simplicius (*In phys.* 9:230–231 Diels). A close examination of the thin textual evidence does not support Dodds' claims about Moderatus's anticipation of Plotinus's theory of emanation. For Dodds failed to take into account Simplicius's methods of interpretation and the potential for Simplicius's own supplementation of the textual tradition. He failed to take into account further textual evidence about Moderatus's teachings from sources earlier than Simplicius, including references in Porphyry, Stobaeus, and

Syrianus. Finally, he failed to take into account the historical context of Moderatus's first-century Neopythagoreanism. Once we take into account Simplicius's methods, further textual evidence from Moderatus, and other Neopythagoreans, a different reading of Simplicius's account of Moderatus's teachings emerges—one that places Moderatus squarely within the tradition of Neopythagoreanism. Then the Neoplatonist anticipations that Dodds attributes to Moderatus are much more plausibly viewed as Simplicius's own transformation of his source through his own hermeneutical methods, which are less than historically reliable and compromise Simplicius as a historically reliable witness." (pp. 115–116)

References

Dodds, E. R. 1928. The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic "One." *Classical Quarterly* 22:129–42.

181. Inwood, Michael. 2015–2016. "The Greatest Difficulty: Can we Know the Forms?" *Ariadne* no. 22:107–126.

"I therefore propose to consider what Plato's own solution might have been to the 'greatest' difficulty raised by Parmenides, namely the supposed unknowability of the Forms; I argue that a solution can be found in the *Sophist*, where, in the course of his criticism of the 'friends of the Forms', the Eleatic stranger produces another difficulty for the knowability of Forms and proposes a modification of the doctrine in order to meet it." (pp. 107–108)

182. Ionescu, Cristina. 2019. *On the Good Life: Thinking through the Intermediaries in Plato's Philebus*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Appendix: The *Philebus*'s Response to the *Aporiai* of Participation from the *Parmenides*, pp. 145–156.

"As indicated already in chapter I, there is some overlap between the concerns raised in the three puzzles of the *Philebus* 15b–c and the *aporiai* of participation spelled out in the first part of the *Parmenides*. Just as I suggested in the closing of that chapter that the *Philebus* implicitly addresses the three puzzles regarding the intelligible monads, I want now to suggest that the *Philebus* addresses also implicitly the *aporiai* regarding participation that are mentioned in *Parmenides* 128e–130a. A comprehensive treatment of either the *aporiai* of participation themselves or of the ways in which the *Philebus* implicitly addresses them is beyond the boundaries of this Appendix. I only aim to sketch here some hints for the direction that a study dedicated to these issues could take. In what follows, I discuss briefly each one of the six *aporiai* and then suggest what I envision to be the direction of a response based on the *Philebus*." (p. 145)

183. Jackson, Belford Darrell. 1967. "Plotinus and the *Parmenides*." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 5:316–327.

"In 1928 E. R. Dodds argued that the first two hypotheses of Plato's *Parmenides* are the primary source of Plotinus' doctrines of the One and of Nous.(1) Dodds' main evidence was a list of parallels between the *Parmenides* and the *Enneads*.(2) He argued further that the Neoplatonic interpretation of the *Parmenides* as positive metaphysics was neo-Pythagorean in origin." (p. 315)

(;;)

"In this article I shall re-examine Dodds' position. I believe the case for Plotinus' dependence upon the *Parmenides* can be strengthened. I shall try to do this by examining the systematic relation of Plotinus'

thought to the *Parmenides*. Dodds considered only parallel terminology. I shall in addition look at parallel argumentation and conclusions. Furthermore, since Dodds accounts only for Plotinus' first two hypostases, I shall consider the relation of the third hypostasis (soul) to the *Parmenides*.

(...)

In the following pages I shall attempt to show three things: (1) how Plotinus explicitly interprets the *Parmenides*, (2) to what extent he draws upon the language of the *Parmenides*, and (3) to what extent Plotinus' system may be understood by its relation to the *Parmenides*." (pp. 315-316)

184. Jeng, I-Kai. 2022. "Nonbeing and the Final Four Deductions in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 453–466. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The historical Parmenides famously prohibited nonbeing, or what is not, from philosophical inquiry. Plato, on the other hand, makes the titular character of his *Parmenides* announce a method of philosophical training that does not seem to prohibit nonbeing at all, as he urges us to investigate the consequences of both "if some Form is" and "if some Form is not." This paper argues that the contradiction between the historical and the Platonic Parmenides is only apparent; once the method is carried out, it ends up honoring Parmenides' prohibition. The argument proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, it selectively summarizes certain current approaches to the second half of the *Parmenides* to motivate my approach. Based on a reading of the refrain πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς / ἐπὶ ἀρχήν, I argue that the last four deductions, all of which begin with the hypothesis "if one is not," should be read together as a single argument. In the second stage I carry out my reading of the final four deductions and show how key moves made by Parmenides correspond to parts of the poem.

This leads to the conclusion that the four deductions together are meant to portray the unthinkability of the nonbeing of the one. Plato furthers his own agenda in the *Parmenides* while remaining faithful to the historical Parmenides' thought."

185. Johansen, Karsten Friis. 1957. "The one and the many. Some remarks concerning Plato's *Parmenides* and the method of collection and division." *Classica et Mediaevalia* no. 18:1–35.

186. Kahn, Asadullah. 2023. "τὸ ἐξαίφνης and Time in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 62:553–567.

Abstract: "I argue, through Heidegger, that the notion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης in the *Parmenides* does not signify eternity, or a trace of eternity in time, but rather implies a primordial conception of time. In deduction two, the relationship between stasis and kinesis becomes problematic due to the notion of τὸ νῦν. This leads Parmenides, in deduction three, to posit the notion of τὸ ἐξαίφνης to solve this problematic relationship, implying a primordial conception of time."

187. Karasmanis, Vassilis. 2012. "Dialectic and the Second Part of Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Presocratics and Plato: Festschrift at Delphi in Honor of Charles Kahn*, edited by Patterson, Richard, Karasmanis, Vassilis and Hermann, Arnold, 183–203. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.

"The Platonic dialogue *Parmenides* has certain important and distinctive features that have long puzzled scholars. What is its aim, what philosophical problems does it posit, what answers does it provide, why does it have the structure it has—extraordinary for a Platonic dialogue—and how are its two main parts related, which can at first seem unconnected? How is it related to other Platonic dialogues and what is the role of the hypothesis of the "One," and the method of its examination? This short essay will try to give an answer to the last three questions, without, however, avoiding the other ones when they relate to my main subject." (p. 183)

188. Karuzis, Joseph. 2005. "Some Problems of the One over Many in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Annals of the Philosophical Society of Hokkaido University* no. 41:1–24.

Abstract: "Western philosophy erupted in Greece in the 4th century BC. The most influential of all the Greek philosophers was Plato, (427 BC- 347 BC) who was a student of Socrates, the teacher of

Aristotle and a prolific writer who started the Academy. The style of Plato's writings is that of dialogues. In Plato's early dialogues, Socrates plays a lively role and participates in an exchange of questions and answers with other characters in the dialogue. The earlier dialogues present Socrates' views on ethical matters such as justice and virtue. In the middle dialogues, Plato expresses his own philosophy through the character of Socrates. In the latter dialogues Socrates doesn't speak very much, he may be present, but he remains silent. The Parmenides, one of the last of the middle dialogues, has challenged scholars as to its meaning for over 2000 years. There are nine characters in the dialogue. Among them, there is the young Socrates, and he engages in a philosophical discussion with two other philosophers, Zeno and Parmenides, who are from Elea. Eleatic philosophy started with Parmenides in the 6th century BC, and is distinguished by its doctrine of an unchanging, indivisible reality. "All is one" is what the Eleatics professed. At the beginning of the dialogue, Zeno reads his treatise, which is a defense of Parmenides' monism. This defense is aimed at those who believe in plurality and say that Parmenides' one results in absurdity and contradiction. Zeno states that if there is a plurality, then things that are like will be unlike, which is impossible because opposites cannot be the same. Socrates does well in his reply to Zeno by positing the Forms. There are sensibles that we perceive to be a multiplicity, and there is also a separate realm of the Forms. The Forms are what all things participate in, that is, an act is just because it has a certain relationship to the unchanging and incorporeal Form of Justice. Because of the Forms, a man can be both a plurality and a unity. He may have many parts, but these parts make up a complete whole. This is due to participating in the Forms of Unity, Plurality, Likeness and Unlikeness. In the remainder of the dialogue, Parmenides continues as the interlocutor. The Form of Unity is analyzed by Parmenides in a barrage of arguments. Throughout these arguments several points are raised that show Plato's Theory of Forms to be problematic. There is no clear conclusion at the end of the dialogue, and we left wondering what Plato thought about the problems posited in the dialogue. In this paper I propose that Plato took these problems seriously, yet they were not damaging to his Theory of Forms. Surely, Plato would not have published this dialogue if he believed the objections in it destroyed his Theory of Forms. The Forms are central to Plato's philosophy and metaphysics. By analyzing Unity, I believe that Plato wanted to show that there are two different types of predication. One type of predication is things in relation to themselves. The other type of predication is things in relation to others. Unity is analyzed, and by doing so, Plato answers the problems that were raised in the early part of the dialogue, such as the Third Man Argument. By using the dialogue and presenting his philosophy in a dramatic act, Plato compels the reader to draw his own conclusions. The dialogue must be seen as a unity because only then can we see Plato's intention in writing it. The Forms for Plato did exist, yet he was aware of the problems that arise with his theory. By writing the Parmenides, Plato wanted to show us that the objections to the Forms were not insurmountable."

189. Kirwan, Christopher. 1974. "Plato and relativity." *Philosophia* no. 19:112–129.

"Conclusion. Plato's classical exposition of the theory of forms in the *Phaedo* and *Republic* relies almost entirely on examples which are contraries in the wide sense of *prima facie* incompatibles, but which owing to their relativity are actually compatible - exceptions to the principle forbidding compresence of contraries. It is tempting to presume that Plato recognized their exceptional status, and even that he traded on it in arguing for the theory. But the evidence goes against this presumption. We find the possibility of compresence conceded at *Republic* 436-9, but neither exploited there nor even apparently fully recognized. We find compresence of comparative contraries conceded at *Phaedo* 102, but without extension to the wider class of relatives; and even the limited concession may be jeopardized by *Theaetetus* 154-5. At *Republic* 479 Plato seems to be on the brink of acknowledging the special status of relatives, but he steps back from the brink, covering his hesitation as at *Phaedo* 74 by the word 'appear'. At *Republic* 523-4 and 580-7 he definitely overlooks the relative/non-relative distinction in contexts where it matters. So we cannot be sure that he put himself in a position to employ the Academic 'argument establishing ideas of relatives' until *Parmenides* 129 - the very dialogue in whose second part that argument seems to come under attack." (pp. 128-129)

190. Klein, Sherwin. 1991. "Plato's *Parmenides* and St. Thomas's Analysis of God as One and Trinity." *The Thomist* no. 55:229–244.

"I intend to establish, in the first and main part of this article, the logical agreement between the Platonic and Thomistic analyses of an absolutely simple unity. The argument at *Parmenides* 137b-

142a, Plato's analysis of the absolute one, provides a basis for determining what God, as an absolutely simple unity, is not. By applying this 'argument in the *Parmenides* to St. Thomas's discussion of God as one, I shall show that what appears to be " as dry and prosaic as a textbook on algebra " has, contrary to Cornford, " religious significance." [*]

In the second part of this article, I shall use the arguments at *Parmenides* 157b-159b and 159b-160b to determine what can be predicated of God, if St. Thomas's analysis of the Trinity is to accord with the articles of faith (God as an absolutely simple unity as well as a Trinity). Once again, we shall see the "religious significance" of Plato's analysis and the irony of Cornford's suggestion about the meaninglessness of applying

Plato's analysis to " a trinity of unknown gods." (pp. 229-230)

[*] *Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides' Way of Truth and Plato's Parmenides*, trans. with introduction and commentary by Francis MacDonald Cornford (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1939), p. 131.

191. Klibansky, Raymond. 1943. *Plato's Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. A Chapter in the History of Platonic Studies*. London: The Warburg Institute.

"The scantiness of the information available about the dialogue was thus wholly disproportionate to the importance evidently ascribed to it by Chalcidius. The higher the expectations raised by the commentator's allusion to the esoteric doctrine enshrined in the work, the more tantalizing must have been the scarcity of clues to its contents." (p. 3)

(...)

"This situation was radically changed when, some time before his death in 1286, the Dominican friar William of Moerbeke translated Proclus' *Commentary on the Parmenides*. Embedded in this work, but clearly distinguished from the text of Proclus' exposition, the Platonic dialogue, up to the end of the first hypothesis, became accessible to the Latin world.(3)" (p. 4)

(...)

"It was in the same year (1463) in which Nicholas of Cusa composed the *De venationem sapientiae* that Marsilio Ficino, "in his passion for Plato Bessarion's heir", undertook, at the request of Cosimo de Medici, to translate the whole of Plato's works. In Cosimo's lifetime, i.e. before August 1464, he completed his rendering of ten dialogues which included the *Parmenides* preceded by the *Euthyphron* and followed by the *Philebus*." (pp. 32-33, notes omitted)

(...)

"Marsilio had not only been the first to translate the whole of Plato's works; his translation was the first to appear in print.(1) preceded the *editio princeps* of the Greek text, the Aldine of 1513, by about thirty years."(p. 43)

(1) Printed in Florence, 'per Laurentium Venetum', s. a. (1484). The Commentary to the dialogues was first printed in Florence in 1496.

192. ———. 1981. *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages*. München: Kraus International Publications.

With a new preface and four supplementary chapters together with Plato's *Parmenides* in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance with a new introductory preface.

"This essay is intended to indicate the materials which constitute the body of the Platonic tradition in the Middle Ages and to show the main lines in which this tradition developed. It should thus serve as the framework for a history of mediaeval Platonism and its bearing on the philosophy of the Renaissance. This larger work requires a collection of the relevant texts in a 'Corpus Platonicum Medii Aevi' which will reveal a neglected link in the history of thought.

The programme which we outline here having been accepted by the British Academy, the Corpus Platonicum is to be published under its auspices, and those of the Union Academique Internationale, with the assistance of the Warburg Institute of London, which under its present director, as under its founder, Aby Warburg, has always sponsored research on Platonism." (*Preface*, p. IX)

193. Kutschera, Franz von. 1998. "Parts of Forms: An Essay concerning Plato's Parmenides." *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* no. 1:57–74.

German version: "Teile von Ideen: zu Platons *Parmenides*" in: F. von Kutschera, *Ausgewählte Aufsätze*, paderborn: Mentis Verlag 2004, pp. 273-291.

Abstract: "The *Parmenides* is, especially with respect to its second part, one of Plato's most difficult dialogues. The paper sketches an interpretation which is characterized by the following main points: The interpretation is neither rejectionistic nor compatibilistic, that is, according to it, neither should none of the statements of the 2nd part be taken seriously as an assertion meant to be true, nor are all statements of the 2nd part acceptable as true if correctly interpreted. In the 2nd part of the *Parmenides*, Plato develops a logical theory - a theory of predication, participation and of the community of ideal forms in general - on mereological foundations; in doing this, he advances far beyond elementary mereological principles. This forces us to revise our views concerning the beginnings of logic. It is due to the incomparably high rank which Plato accorded to the active working-out of insights that Plato presents his results not in an expository manner, but as a web of contradictions. The readers are challenged to find the truth for themselves."

194. Lampert, Laurence. 2018. "Reading Benardete: A New *Parmenides*." *Interpretation. A Journal of Political Philosophy* no. 44:403–423.

!In this article I concentrate on the four and a half compacted pages that end his late essay "Plato's *Parmenides*: A Sketch."(1) Its particular reward is access to a hitherto unsuspected yet wholly persuasive understanding of an especially resistant Platonic dialogue. That gain opens a window on two further rewards: *Parmenides*, the author of the philosophic poem that exists for us only in fragments, takes on a depth and shape that befit the singular praise Socrates lavished on him at the end of his life; and the whole history of philosophy back to Homer begins to show itself as genuinely philosophic in the radicality of its discoveries and in the restrictions it placed on sharing them. Without ever explicitly saying so, Benardete shows how hidden Greek wisdom believed it had to be in order to maintain a presence in the world and sustain its future, how inaccessible to all but the most driven, most gifted "lucky hits," as Nietzsche called them. And he shows primarily what that hidden wisdom was, genuine knowledge of the human and through the human of the world." (p. 403)

(1) Seth Benardete, "Plato's *Parmenides*: A Sketch," in *The Archaeology of the Soul: Platonic Readings of Ancient Poetry and Philosophy*, ed. Ronna Burger and Michael Davis (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's, 2012), 229–43. In the list of works the editors append to this collection, the *Parmenides* essay seems to be the last one Benardete completed before his death on November 14, 2001; see also their preface, 1 n. 1. References to Benardete's essay will be to paragraph numbers in the text.

195. ———. 2021. *How Socrates became Socrates: A Study of Plato's Phaedo, Parmenides, and Symposium*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Chapter 2: *Parmenides*: The Second Stage of Socrates' Philosophic Education, pp. 89-151.

"Among the three dialogues that report the stages of Socrates' philosophic education, the *Phaedo* and *Symposium* each have Socrates himself report the stage of his philosophic advance, framing it each time to fit their very different settings and audiences. The stage recorded in the *Parmenides*, however, the central stage, is not reported by Socrates: he is dead when the great event was recovered by nameless foreigners bent on hearing it— "men of Clazomenae" said to be "very much philosophers," residents of the Greek city in Asia Minor in which essential advances in natural philosophy had been made. And the whole of it is narrated not by one of those philosophers but by their countryman, Cephalus, who led them to the Athenian who they hoped might be able to remember what had been said when a young Socrates met old *Parmenides* and his associate *Zeno* some sixty years earlier.(2) Cephalus narrates it at a later unknown time to an unidentified audience: the *Parmenides* is unique as

the only Platonic dialogue whose actual narration lacks a specified setting, date, and audience. And it is unique among the three dialogues that record the stages of Socrates' philosophic education in being the only one not reported by Socrates himself." (p. 90)

(2) Christopher Planeaux (pers. comm.) sets the dramatic date of the frame of the *Parmenides* in 394/3 based on the political relations of Athens and Clazomenae and on the ages of the Athenian participants in the frame.

196. Larivée, Annie. 2024. "What Socrates Learned from Parmenides. Part 1. Parmenides' *Gymnasia* and Socrates' Intellectual Virtues." *Organon* no. 56:89–117.

Abstract: "This is the first of two studies in which I examine Plato's account of Parmenides' contribution to Socrates' education. This account suggests, I argue, that Socrates became a virtuoso of the *elenchos* and the embodiment of fundamental intellectual virtues thanks to the *gymnasia* depicted in the *Parmenides*. I show how Parmenides' eightfold routine is not a method of philosophical investigation strictly speaking; rather, it is a skill-building exercise that relies on memory and whose virtue is partly defensive. My demonstration is based on three sets of distinctions required to do justice to the preparatory character of Parmenides' *gymnasia*. The first differentiates three types of intellectual virtues, the second two kinds of training methods, and the third, three telic modes."

197. ———. 2024. "What Socrates Learned from Parmenides. Part 2. Hypothesis, Antilogy, and Philosophical Self-Defense in the *Phaedo*." *Organon* no. 56:119–138.

Abstract: "My first study identified the cognitive abilities and argumentative skills developed by the *gymnasia* presented in Plato's *Parmenides*. Since the correspondence with the intellectual virtues Socrates displays in other dialogues is too remarkable to be a coincidence, I concluded that Socrates must have trained with Parmenides' *eightfold routine* in his youth. My second study supports this conclusion by drawing attention to textual evidence found in the *Phaedo*. The autobiographical account Socrates shares in that dialogue indicates how the *gymnasia* impacted his intellectual development, mostly through the action of hypothesizing. This strategic move used by the Eleatics transformed the originally sectarian way Socrates related to Forms and enabled him to protect his theory from attacks in a secure yet non-dogmatic way."

198. Larsen, Jens Kristian. 2019. "Eleaticism and Socratic Dialectic: On Ontology, Philosophical Inquiry, and Estimations of Worth in Plato's *Parmenides*, *Sophist* and *Statesman*." *Études platoniciennes* no. 15:1–24.

Abstract: "The *Parmenides* poses the question for what entities there are Forms, and the criticism of Forms it contains is commonly supposed to document an ontological reorientation in Plato. According to this reading, Forms no longer express the excellence of a given entity and a Socratic, ethical perspective on life, but come to resemble concepts, or what concepts designate, and are meant to explain nature as a whole. Plato's conception of dialectic, it is further suggested, consequently changes into a value-neutral method directed at tracing the interrelation of such Forms, an outlook supposedly documented in certain passages on method from the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* as well.

The article urges that this reading is untenable. For in the *Parmenides* the question for what entities one should posit Forms is left open, and the passages on method from the *Sophist* and *Statesman* neither encourage a non-normative ontology nor a value-neutral method of inquiry. What the three dialogues encourage us to do is rather to set common opinions about the relative worth and value of things aside when conducting ontological inquiries; and this attitude, the article concludes, demonstrates a close kinship, rather than a significant difference, between Plato's Socrates and his Eleatic philosophers."

199. ———. 2022. "On common forms and dialectical inquiry in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 183–191. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "It is a matter of controversy what message Plato's *Parmenides* is meant to convey to its readers as regards the questions what ontological status forms have and for what things we should assume forms. In this article I argue that Parmenides is urging Socrates to posit forms first and

foremost for things such as likeness, unity, beauty, and goodness, things that correspond to the forms that Socrates in the *Theaetetus* designate as common. I further argue that Parmenides encourages Socrates to investigate the interrelation between such forms through the hypothetical method used by Zeno and to use this method to address the question how certain forms are related to other forms, but not the questions for what things there are forms and how sense-perceptible things and forms are related."

200. Lee, David. 2014. "Zeno's Puzzle in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 34:255–273.

201. Lernould, Alain. 2010. "Negative Theology and Radical Conceptual Purification in the *Anonymous Commentary on Plato's Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 257–274. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

£If this reading can be accepted, then our author is closer to Damascius than to an author like Proclus. It is indeed Damascius's work that, for the purpose of a "radical purification" of our concepts, clearly expresses the idea that the only way of getting close to the One is "to keep quiet, remaining in the secret sanctuary (ἀδύτῳ) of the soul and not leaving it.(65)" (p. 274)

(65) 65. Damascius, Princ. 1:22,14–15 Westerink-Combès. (...)

202. Lewis, Frank A. 1979. "Parmenides on Separation and the Knowability of the Forms: Plato *Parmenides* 133a ff." *Philosophical Studies* no. 35:105–127.

"At *Parmenides* 133a ff., Parmenides presents the last of his arguments critical of the theory of forms. He is careful to emphasize that the argument holds good against the view that forms are separate from sensibles; indeed, he says that his argument presents the greatest of the difficulties that await such a view. Now Parmenides has already called our attention to separation as a crucial feature of the theory of forms (129d, 130b), but his previous arguments pay more attention to other assumptions of the theory, whose relation to separation he neglects to explain (in the immediately preceding argument, for example, he repeats the reference to separation [133a8-10], but in virtually the same breath tells us he is attacking the doctrine that things participate in forms by a principle of likeness [a5-7]). But it will be worthwhile not to ignore his suggestion here that his present argument focusses especially on separation: there is, I will suggest, some plausibility to thinking that separation is the key theme that runs throughout the argument." (p. 105, a note omitted)

203. Liu, Kezhou. 2022. "The Problem of Separation in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 287–293. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "In Part I of Plato's *Parmenides*, Socrates introduces the theory of separately existing Forms, but this doctrine is severely attacked by Parmenides. In this paper I will argue firstly that Socrates' thesis of separation is not the same as that which Parmenides paraphrases at the beginning of his speech; secondly, I will show that Plato does not endorse Parmenides' symmetrical account of separation but would side with the asymmetrical account which stresses the ontological dependence of sensibles on Forms; finally, I will contend that difficulties derived from the symmetrical separation thesis in Part I cannot be thoroughly solved in Part II, for the mechanism of participation needs an efficient cause to bring the formal order to the realm of Becoming."

204. Liu, Xin. 2024. "How Do the Eight Hypotheses in Plato's *Parmenides* Come to Light? Chiasmus as a Method of Division." *Journal of Ancient Philosophy*, no. 18:37–66.

Abstract: "In this paper, I aim to explore the structure of the exercise in the second part of the *Parmenides*. In analyzing the transitional section, I claim that in addition to diairesis, there is another method of division, namely, cross-division, which Porphyry terms chiasmus. On this basis, I explain how Plato uses chiasmus to divide the exercise into eight hypotheses, in which the subjects of the paired hypotheses (I–VI, II–V, III–VII, and IV–VIII) are the same and those of the nonpaired hypotheses differ.

In closing, I reconstruct the universal scheme of the exercise on the basis of Plato's use of chiasmus."

205. Livingston, Paul M. 2024. "Unity and Predication in Plato's *Parmenides* and Nāgārjuna's *Root Verses*." In *Crossing the Stream, Leaving the Cave: Buddhist-Platonist Philosophical Inquiries*, edited by Carpenter, Amber D and Harter, Pierre-Julien, 96–116. New York: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: "This chapter considers in parallel some main argumentative strategies of Nāgārjuna's *Root Verses* and the "dialectical exercise" of Plato's *Parmenides*. It argues that both can be seen as critically targeting the unity that is attributed to entities as coherent and individual subjects of predication. In particular, both show that it is incoherent to suppose any such subject either has the relevant kind of unity or (lacking such a unity) does not exist at all. This suggests that we may reject familiar analyses of the contradictory or paradoxical conclusions of both arguments as pointing either toward a superior and consistent structure of logical categories or toward a transcendent insight into the ineffable. Instead, we may see both as pointing, rather, to a possible overcoming of the "habit" of reifying conceptualization that is deep-seated in ordinary language and practice, and thereby to the potential soteriological benefits of such an overcoming."

206. Livov, Gabriel. 2008. "Parmenicide. Political reasons for a platonic crime." *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* no. 26:39–73.

"Since it is a topic so widely discussed, it seems necessary to specify the meaning and reach of parricide. What is the philosophical point of this crime hinted at under cover of the image of murdering a father? We suggest understanding the Platonic parricide as a complex act which is made up of three closely related moments: the *transgression of a precept*, the *negation of a concept* and the *reformulation of a method*." (p. 40)

207. Luchetti, Chiara. 2011. "Nicolai Hartmann's Plato. A Tribute to the "Power of Dialectics" (*Parmenides*, 135c 2)." In *The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann*, edited by Poli, Roberto, Scognamiglio, Carlo and Tremblay, Frederic 221–235. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"This contribution is just the beginning of a wider range inquiry into Hartmann's Platonism and is chiefly aimed at providing a concise overview of Hartmann's first hermeneutical approach to Plato. Hopefully, it is successful at least insofar as it shows how strongly Hartmann believed in the centrality of dialectics as the privileged way to understand Plato's thought in general." (pp. 233-234)

208. Lynch, William. 1959. *An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the Parmenides*. Washington: Georgetown University Press.

Second edition: Westport, Greenwood Press 1969.

"According to the interpretation of the following pages, Plato in the *Parmenides* is giving a skeletonized and ordered summary of his views on the essence of the Idea Doctrine, on the basic structure of sensibles and numbers, on the nature of unity, the indeterminate, the relation of the contraries, time, the unmeasurable "instant" in time, motion, the Other, the different forms of non-being, his theory of communication, of participation, the nature of identity, the nature of difference, the possibility and source of predication, the way of opinion versus scientific knowledge, the character of limit and the unlimited, the nature of articulation in any unity, the discrete and the continuous, the possibility of real unity in any one many, the logic of change and transition, of otherness, of relation. Nor are these pieces thrown at us helter-skelter, though some of them are treated indirectly. There are great unifying, ordering, and "enabling" concepts, and I have paid special attention to two of them. They are: (1) Plato's theory of participation (it is not easy, in the light of this dialogue, to see how Aristotle could ever have regarded it as a passing, ineffective metaphor); and (2) his constant and complicated success in mediating the original Parmenidean dichotomy between being and non-being.

One could say many more things about the content of the *Parmenides* — but this is only a preface." (*Preface*, pp. VIII-IX)

209. MacIsaac, D. Gregory. 2022. "Plato's Account of Eleaticism: A New Interpretation of *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc,

Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 67–74. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "I propose a new interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*. I avoid the assumption of Developmentalism, that Plato is criticising his own 'middle' theory of forms. Instead, I read the dialogue as Plato's serious presentation of the Eleatic position. He shows that Eleatics' counterintuitive thesis follows from the fundamental assumption of qualitative monism. The animating idea of the dialogue is indicated by Zeno. Whereas Parmenides' critics said many laughable things followed from his thesis of the One, Zeno's book showed that what follows from the many is more laughable. The dialogue is a step-by-step elimination of the many, so that its readers have no choice but to accept the sole One. Against other interpreters, I argue that the first step in the argument isn't a survey of the levels of Forms, but a demonstration that Socrates cannot explain how the many material things could possess contradictory characters. I argue that the five problems of participation are not a criticism of Forms, but of participation itself, and are solved by eliminating participants. I argue that the eight hypotheses are meant to show that a One without any characteristics is less laughable than a One with a totality of contradictory characteristics, and that only an intelligible world with a single One would yield this more plausible result. The first part of the dialogue, consequently, eliminates the material world and the second part eliminates all Forms but the One. Parmenides, consequently, is not a *reductio* of Eleaticism, but a presentation of Eleaticism from the inside, as a serious philosophical position. However, having made the best case he can for Eleaticism in *Parmenides*, Plato will diagnose its mistaken assumption, in *Sophist*, as the idea that things are 'one in formula' and propose the mixing of Forms as its remedy."

210. Mackenzie [McCabe], Mary Margaret. 1982. "Parmenides' Dilemma." *Phronesis* no. 27:1–12.

Published under the name 'Mary Margaret Mackenzie'.

Reprinted in M. M. McCabe, *Platonic Conversations*, New York: Oxford University Press 2015, pp. 73–82.

"Parmenides the Eleatic wrote a treatise that intrigued, puzzled, and confounded the later philosophical tradition. In it, he argued for a strong monism: what there is is eternal, complete, immovable, and unvarying, one and homogeneous (DK 28B 8.3–6).²) All the rest, the world of perceptible things, is contradictory—or an illusion.

Strong monism is frighteningly radical. So Parmenides left a series of problems in his wake, some of which have proved so recalcitrant as to be dismissed with that counsel of despair 'it's a dialectical device'.³) This chapter addresses two of those problems, and recasts the dialectical device in a mood of optimism." (p. 73, a note omitted)

(2) All references to Diels and Kranz (1968) (DK).

(3) Cf. Owen (1975), 54.

References

Diels, H. and Kranz, W. (1968) eds. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 6th edition (Zurich: Wiedmann)

Owen, G. E. L. (1975) 'Eleatic Questions', in R. E. Allen and D. Furley, eds., *Studies in Presocratic philosophy* vol. 2 (London: Routledge) 48–81.

211. Makridis, Odysseus. 2016. "The Confusion of Logical Types in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Philosophical Inquiry* no. 40:13–29.

"Copious ink has been spilled on the problems, puzzles, and attempted refutations that populate the Platonic dialogue entitled *Parmenides*." (p. 13)

(...)

"My subject in what follows is to continue this relatively recent tradition of scrutinizing the dialogue's key claims by bringing advanced logical analysis to bear.

Although a lot has been written on this dialogue over the last century, most of the scholarship applied standard logical apparatus to assess the dialogue's claims and arguments for such basic features as consistency and validity. The thrust of the case I make is that non-classical logics must be added to the mix if the analysis is to reach sufficient depth." (pp.13-14)

212. Malatesta, Michele. 1997. "One Instance of *Modus Tollendo Tollens* in Plato's *Parmenides* 127 e 1-7?" *Metalogicon* no. 10:33–40.

"Plato quotes an inference of Zeno of Elea in these terms:

«if the beings are many, they must be both like and unlike; but this is impossible [...] it is impossible that beings are many too». Plat. *Parm.* 127 e 1-7." (pp. 36-37)

"It is impressive to see that in Plato we find quoted not only an instance of *Modus Tollendo Tollens*, but, what is even more interesting, such an inference is expressed at the level of the modalized dyadic predicate logic of first order more than two millennia before the birth of De Morgan, the father of modern logic of relations, and that of Lewis, the father of modern modal logic." (p. 38)

213. Marion, Florian. 2025. "Plato on Coming-to-Be: A Midway Path between Eleaticism and Creationism." *Plato Journal* no. 26:1–25.

Abstract: "The *Parmenides* is the locus of Plato's *theoria motus abstracti* (that is, abstract kinematics) for it is here that Plato gives a mereological and locational analysis of motion (First Deduction: 138b7-139b3) and discusses the famous puzzle of the instant of change (Second Deduction: 156c1-157b5). But there is another scholarly very neglected text from this dialogue that provides us with great insights about Plato's theory of change: the Fifth Deduction (160b3-163b6) and its answer to the Eleatic argument against coming-to-be."

214. Mársico, Claudia. 2022. "Intra-Socratic polemics. The *Parmenides* as an element of an anti-Megaric program." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 133–146. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "This paper seeks to show that the consideration of the intra-Socratic discussions between Plato and the Megaric line shed light on the *Parmenides* regarding three main points. First, as Parmenides constitutes a central figure for the group initiated by Euclid, his influence explains some features of the Platonic recreation in the *Parmenides*. Then, it will be relevant to dwell on the impact of Eleatism on the Megaric line and its role in the link with Platonism. Second, this approach will identify Megaric elements in the arguments of the first part of the dialogue and their function within the work. Finally, based on the change of attitude of Parmenides' character, we will suggest an interpretation of the hypotheses of the second section as part of a critical response to the Megaric thesis of the Good-One regarding its method, the nature of the principle, and the relationship between the intelligible and sensible levels. As a result, it will be possible to reach an integral view about the dialogue and its structure."

215. Matoso, Renato. 2020. "Parmenides' first and second hypotheses, αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια, and Socrates' astonishment." *Filosofia Unisinos. Unisinos Journal of Philosophy* no. 21:163–167.

Abstract: "In this paper, I propose a new interpretation for two of the most debated passages of Plato's *Parmenides*: Socrates' long speech (128e5–130a2) and Parmenides' first antinomy (137c-155e). My aim is to demonstrate: 1) that Socrates' speech can only make sense if we understand αὐτὰ τὰ ὅμοια as a third kind of entity, the immanent property sensibles have by participating in the form of Likeness; 2) that the first two hypothesis of the second part of the dialogue (137c-155e), together with Parmenides' criticism in the first part of the dialogue (130b-134e), is an answer to Socrates' challenge (128e-130a). Parmenides' arguments aim to show that, according to Socrates' own premises, it is not possible for forms or immanent properties to be the kind of unity Socrates wants them to be. Finally, 3) I will use these results to suggest an innovative answer to the vexed question about the relation

between the first and second parts of the *Parmenides*. According to my interpretation, the exercise of the second part of the dialogue does not provide the solution to Parmenides' criticism of the theory of forms, despite what the majority think today. Rather, it radicalizes this criticism by pointing to a fundamental miscomprehension on Socrates' conception of what it is to be a unity."

216. McCabe, Mary Margaret. 1996. "Unity in the *Parmenides*: the Unity of the *Parmenides*." In *Form and Argument in Late Plato*, edited by Gill, Christopher and McCabe, Mary Margaret, 5–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reprinted in M. M. McCabe, *Platonic Conversations*, New York Oxford University Press 2015, pp. 138-169.

"In what follows, I shall suggest that the reader is put in a specially dialectical position in this dialogue so that the open frame of this dialogue is particularly telling.

The dialogue progresses, I shall argue, from the discussion of views that are particular to the protagonists to a discussion that is entirely general; and it does so in three stages—the Socratic debate of the first part, the discussion of the first hypothesis, 'if one is', and the discussion of the second hypothesis, 'if one is not'. Each stage reflects on the theoretical conditions of its predecessor; each stage of the dialogue is of a higher order of abstraction than its predecessor. Just as the story is narrated by one person who is reporting what was said by another, and he by another, so the arguments of the dialogue are ordered, each reflecting on its predecessor; the frame provides an analogy for the structure of the arguments. The dialogue is then unified by its topic: the whole discussion is an investigation of what there is, demonstrating that any ontology, any account of what there is, counts individuals. The discussion of individuals, of ones, unifies the *Parmenides*." (p. 140 of the reprint)

217. McPherran, Mark L. 1983. "Plato's *Parmenides* Theory of Relations." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 13:149–164.

"Hector-Neri Castañeda has argued that in the *Phaedo* we can find a logically viable Platonic theory of relations.(1) I am in agreement with this view. Furthermore, I find there to be a clarification of Plato's theory in the 'worst difficulty' argument of the *Parmenides* (133a-135a)." (p. 149)

(...)

"1. The Parmenides Theory of Relations

In the course of advancing a general sceptical argument against the classical theory of Forms Parmenides gets Socrates to agree to a number of general principles:

A. Forms are (categorically) just by themselves (κατ' αὐτό; 133a9), and because of this no Form is in us or among us (ἐν ἡμῖν; 133c2-5), nor do we [particulars] possess (ἔχειν) them (134b3-4).

B. There is a certain class of Forms which 'are what they are with respect to one another' and which 'have their being in such references among themselves' (133c8-9).

C. The things in us (ἐν ἡμῖν) which bear the same names as the Forms are related among themselves, not to Forms (133d1-4). This means that, for instance, a particular master cannot master Slavery, nor can Mastery be in reference to a particular slave (133d7-e2).

With this we have the makings of a theory of relations. We then need to see whether it is the theory of the *Phaedo*." (p. 151)

(1) See H-N. Castañeda, (a) 'Plato's Relations, Not Essences or Accidents, at *Phaedo* 102b2-d2,' *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 8 (1978) 39-53; (b) 'Plato's *Phaedo* Theory of Relations,' *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 1 (1972) 467-80; (c) 'El análisis de Platón de las relaciones y de los hechos relacionales,' *Crítica*, 14 (1971) 3-18.

218. ———. 1986. "Plato's Reply to the 'Worst Difficulty' Argument of the *Parmenides*: *Sophist* 248a - 249d." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 68:233–252.

"In a previous paper I have argued that the theory of relations Hector-Neri Castañeda has discovered in the *Phaedo* is clarified and extended in the *Parmenides*. In particular, the paper contains an Interpretation of the 'worst difficulty' argument (*Parm.* 133a —135a), an argument purporting to establish that human knowledge of the Forms is impossible² My Interpretation showed the argument to utilize the extended theory of relations in its premises. I also showed, contrary to previous interpretations, how Plato's argument was logically valid.

One consideration in favor of the Interpretation I offered is that it allows the argument at last to live up to its description as the most formidable challenge to the early theory of Forms (in a long *series* of tough arguments), requiring a "long and remote train of argument" by "a man of wide experience and natural ability" for its unsoundness to be exposed (*Parm.* 133b4 c1).

Unfortunately, the *Parmenides* does not contain such a reply, even though the text at 133b seems to hint that Plato had already formulated one. Did he ever entertain and record a reply, and if so, could that reply rescue some version of the theory of Forms from the devastating consequences of the 'worst difficulty'? In the following, I present my previous reconstruction of that argument and the most plausible lines of response open to a defender of a theory of Forms. In the second section I argue that Plato gives clear recognition to one of those replies in the *Sophist*, and I show how that reply would save the theory of Forms. Finally, I will contend that this reply is Plato's best line of response, and I will discuss the problem of actually attributing the adoption of this solution to him." (pp. 233-234, notes omitted)

219. ———. 1999. "An Argument 'Too Strange': Parmenides 134c4-e8." *Apeiron. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* no. 32:55–71.

"Here, then, I offer an assessment of the second half of the Greatest Aporia that focuses on its unique contribution to the *Parmenides*' critique of the Theory of Forms.

This account shows, I trust, that this portion of the argument is designed to force on even those students 'of natural ability' who might have found a solution to the Aporia's first half, the recognition of a potential problem latent in both the metaphysics and epistemology of the Theory of Forms." (p. 57)

220. Meinwald, Constance C.: 1991. *Plato's Parmenides*. New York: Oxford University Press.

"In my own interpretation of the exercise, which constitutes the heart of this study, I approach the arguments systematically and read them in the light of Parmenides' methodological remarks. What results is a positive and crucial innovation—a distinction between two kinds of predication— whose application enables us to recognize that the exercise consists of good arguments whose conclusions are not contradictory after all.

Since the point of the exercise is, in large part, to enable us to deal with the problems of the first part of the dialogue, I have placed my analysis of the second part of the *Parmenides* in its natural context: I precede it with a preliminary discussion of the famous problems, and I return, once I have the results of the second part of the dialogue in hand, to consider how they bear on the problems. By this point, I will have accumulated a body of evidence for my characterization of Plato's position at the moment of writing the *Parmenides*. An epilogue sets the results of my study in a larger context, namely, our understanding of Plato's development." (p. 4)

221. Meinwald, Constance C. 2005. "Literary Elements and Dialogue Form in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Ales and Karfík, Filip, 9–20. Prague: Oikoymenh.

222. ———. 2014. "How Does Plato's Exercise Work?" *Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 53:465–494.

Abstract: "I analyse the *pros ta alla* / *pros heauto* distinction in Plato's *Parmenides* as a contrast between ordinary predication (corresponding to an individual's display of a feature or, more technically, instantiation) and tree predication (based on a nature X being involved in a nature Y). I engage with my critics and argue that this interpretation vindicates Plato's methodological remarks and maximizes his argumentative success.

My interpretation shows how the *Parmenides* bridges the gap between Plato's Middle Dialogues and the outstanding technical developments of the Late Dialogues."

223. Meister, Samuel. 2022. "Gunk in the Third Deduction of Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 393–400. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The third deduction in Plato's *Parmenides* is often given a constructive reading on which Plato's *Parmenides*, or even Plato himself, presents us with a positive account of the relation between parts and wholes. However, I am going to argue that there is a hitch in the third deduction which threatens to undermine the mereology of the third deduction by the lights of the dialogue. Roughly, even if the Others partake of the One, the account of the third deduction leads to an ontology of gunk, that is, an ontology on which there are no mereological atoms (except for the One). Hence, it is unclear whether the participation relation between the Others and the One is sufficient to impose the sort of structure on the Others which, in the context of this deduction, *Parmenides* (or Plato) seems to hope for.

Instead of the constructive reading of the third deduction, I will therefore offer an aporetic reading on which the third deduction raises further difficulties for the participation relation at the heart of young Socrates' theory of Forms.."

224. Mesyats, Svetlana. 2012. "Iamblichus' exegesis of *Parmenides* hypotheses and his doctrine of divine henads " In *Iamblichus and the Foundations of Late Platonism*, edited by Afonasin, Eugene V., Dillon, John M. and Finamore, John F., 151–175. Leiden: Brill.

"The doctrine of divine henads was developed in late Neoplatonism in the course of efforts to solve a problem of a transcendent First Principle. In the classical form of this doctrine, which it received from Syrianus and Proclus, henads were thought to be supra-essential unities, proceeding directly from the One and differing from it only by their connection with Being. Due to the connection with something other than themselves henads could not be as much transcendent as the primal One; they came in some relationship with the world and therefore played the role of intermediary substances between the absolutely unparticipated Principle and the plurality of its effects. It seems probable that this theory appeared as a result of exegesis of Plato's *Parmenides* and in particular of the idea to consider predicates of the One in the first two hypotheses as the characteristics of the different classes of henads. We suppose that the author of this idea could be Iamblichus, because he was the first to mention divine henads in connection with *Parmenides*, and to conceive the predicates denied of the One in the 1st hypothesis to be also denied of henads. We have tried to reconstruct Iamblichus' doctrine of henads, since some previous attempts at reconstruction, where henads were identified with monads of forms and idea-numbers, seem to be unsatisfactory." (p. 173)

225. Migliori, Maurizio. 2022. "The many meanings of the One in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 299–307. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The present argument is too complex to be adequately addressed in a few pages. Therefore, this short text only lists the different meanings that Plato conceals behind the word "One". Plato's strange behaviour is justified by recalling his very particular conception of philosophical writing. Plato tries to keep the "maieutic" attitude of Socrates in the written text and describes it as an important "game", because philosophy must be practiced, not passively learned. On this basis it is shown that *Parmenides* does not respect the proposed argumentation scheme, because he contrasts the One not with the Many but with the Other/the Others. Besides, the first thesis (the One in relation to itself) presents many references to the Others; similarly the second thesis (the One in relation to the Other / the Others) presents a series of characteristics of the One-that-is in relation to itself. Finally, Plato

proposes in the first two theses two different ideas of the One, making Parmenides' scheme – based on a single concept – untenable. The first thesis talks about the One-one that refuses any predicate because it would become two. On the contrary, the One-that-is of the second thesis possesses countless predicates: indeed, it is dual by its very composition (One and Being). Then they are analysed 1) the one-many reality, best expressed by the connection between the One-whole and the One-part, 2) the One that appears only one, regardless of the participation with Being, based on a purely mental operation, 3) the One-number and 4) the One as Principle. The text concludes by showing the coherence of Plato's dialectical vision and stressing that it expresses a multifocal vision of reality (and requires an analogous attitude of the reader)."

226. Mignucci, Mario. 2020. "Relatives in Plato." In *Ancient Logic, Language, and Metaphysics: Selected Essays by Mario Mignucci*, edited by Falcon, Andrea and Giarretta, Pierdaniele, 279–299. New York: Routledge.

"Talking about relations with reference to the ancient world is vaguely provocative. It is enough to peruse any modern manual of the history of logic to find the affirmation that classical antiquity did not work out a theory of relationships. This claim is certainly true if it means that there is no calculus of relations analogous or comparable to what was elaborated by Gottlob Frege in antiquity. But it is false if it means that it is not possible to find a body of reflections, sometimes stimulating and acute, that gives rise to an embryonic theory of relations. Although these reflections are certainly not an alternative to the logic of relations elaborated by Frege, they are of great interest because they allow us to clarify certain philosophical assumptions that are at the root of our modern understanding of the nature of relations. Reflecting on them can help, therefore, to highlight the prerequisites of the Fregean position - prerequisites that are not universally perceived, let alone clearly articulated, by the logicians who have concerned themselves with the theory of relations. In Plato we find, for the first time in the history of Western thought, many of the ideas that will not only constitute the starting point of the subsequent debates on the nature of relations in Greek philosophy but also the main ideas that will be further elaborated in the medieval tradition and in at least a part of the modern one. In this chapter, I will focus on a few texts from the *Phaedo*, the *Symposium*, and the *Parmenides* that can help outline certain aspects of Plato's conception of relations.

Without any pretension of being exhaustive, I set for myself the task of casting some light upon the main lines of Plato's conception of relatives. Needless to say, to fully grasp the complexity of Plato's position a more extensive, and indeed more in-depth, study of the Platonic corpus would be needed." (p. 279?)

227. Miller, Mitchell H. 1986. *Plato's Parmenides: The Conversion of the Soul*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

"Put simply, the project of the present study is to read the *Parmenides* with unwavering attention to its dramatic wholeness.

Close attention to the dialogical features of the *Parmenides* will make possible a determinate interpretation of its otherwise indeterminate and riddling content. In particular, it will reveal both the definite range of Parmenides' obscure One and the precise function of his hypotheses, and this, in turn, will permit the intended philosophical significance of the dialogue as a whole to emerge." (p. 6, a note omitted)

(...)

"My orienting question will be: what is the test and provocation Plato intends in devising his hypotheses, and what is the response he seeks to occasion in his hearers? Part One justifies and prepares the question itself. Chapter I discusses the narrative framing, dramatic context, and *dramatis personae* of the *Parmenides*, and Chapter II analyzes the elicitive and refutative arguments with which Zeno and Parmenides confront Socrates. A main project in these reflections will be to identify the sort of hearer Plato aims, most of all, to reach(27) and to specify what Plato sees as this hearer's predicament and task. If these reflections succeed, we will have set the stage for the central project of Part Two: the reconstruction of the subsurface significance that Plato intends such a hearer, provoked to a critical rethinking, to find in the hypotheses." (p. 10, a note omitted)

228. ———. 1987. "Aporia and Conversion: A Critical Discussion of R. E. Allen's "Plato's *Parmenides*"." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 41:355–368.

"Every student of the *Parmenides* will be struck by the substantive richness and close orchestration Allen reveals in *Parmenides*' criticisms of Socrates' theory of forms and by the sheer elegance of the plan he finds in the hypotheses.

In addition, there are a number of gifts along the way, most notably several illuminating discussions of Greek mathematics and the concept of the infinite, a sustained comparison of Platonic and Aristotelian ontology by way of numerous, surprisingly apt quotations from the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, and a compelling excursus on existence and quantificational logic; all of this expands the context of the hypotheses and allows the specificity and implications of many particular arguments to become evident. In spite of these great merits, however, there are also important limitations to Allen's reading. In part because he does not fully exploit several of his own insights, in part because the remarkable internal coherence of the Platonic plan he sees sometimes distracts him from actualities and possibilities of the text, he stops short of recognizing a still deeper reading that the *Parmenides* invites." (pp. 369-360)

229. ———. 1995. "'Unwritten Teachings' in the *Parmenides*." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 48:591–633.

"Our path of inquiry shall be as follows. In Parts A and B we will lay out, quite independently of one another, the "unwritten teachings" that Aristotle reports in *Metaphysics* A6 and the core of the subsurface

argument offered by the *Parmenides*. In Part C we shall take the first step in bringing these together by noting in the hypotheses the major appearances of the key notions in Aristotle's report, "the One" and "the Great and the Small." But it is not so much in these explicit appearances that the "unwritten teachings" present themselves as it is, rather, in the interplay of "the One" and the dyad that is implied by another passage altogether, the account of participation in hypothesis IIL We must therefore interpret this account and explicate its implications—these will be the projects of Parts D and E, respectively. The result, if these reflections are well taken, will be fresh, mutually supportive interpretations both of the "unwritten teachings" and of parts of the *Parmenides*. We will also have uncovered the need for several fresh inquiries, which I will title in closing." (p. 594)

230. ———. 2022. "*Parmenides* 143d–144a and the Pebble-Arithmetical Representation of Number." In *Knowing and Being in Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Bloom, Daniel, Bloom, Laurence and Byrd, Miriam, 149–165. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Abstract: "The purpose of this short reflection is to draw on a largely ignored, if not forgotten, ancient resource in order to suggest a fresh reading of a problematic passage in Plato's *Parmenides*, *Parmenides*' proof for the being of number at 143d–144a. I shall first translate the passage (Sect. 9.1), then note the key problems and explain why I think we should be unsatisfied with the best of the responses that, to my knowledge, have been offered in the secondary literature (Sect. 9.2), and then offer the fresh reading (Sect. 9.3). I shall close with an aside on the possible fit of our passage, under this reading, with one of the otherwise obscure teachings that Aristotle credits to Plato in his report of various unwritten teachings in *Metaphysics* A6 (Sect. 9.4)."

231. Moravcsik, Julius. 1982. "Forms and Dialectic in the Second Half of the *Parmenides*." In *Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen*, edited by Schofield, Malcolm and Nussbaum, Martha, 135–153. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The second half of the *Parmenides* has been a source of puzzlement to generations of scholars, inspiring a wide variety of interpretations. Thanks to the groundbreaking work of Ryle and Owen, one can see this material today as offering serious reflections of conceptual and metaphysical nature. In this chapter I wish to locate the key conceptual problems that Plato addresses in this passage, and argue that Plato is here also defending and revising his theory of Forms." (p. 135, a note omitted)

232. ———. 1992. *Plato and Platonism: Plato's Conception of Appearance and Reality in Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics, and Its Modern Echoes*.

See the Chapter 4: The *Parmenides*: Forms and Participation reconsidered pp. 129-167.

"The interpretation to be presented revolves around three key claims.

First, the key elements of the fundamental realm are the Forms. The conception of these undergoes change in the dialogues, but they remain the basic explanatory entities. Their order is mirrored by whatever else in the world is in some way orderly, and their nature never corresponds to such modern ontological categories as properties or universals. Second, the key Platonic epistemological notions are those of insight and understanding, rather than propositional knowledge. Third, Platonic ethics revolves around the choice of an adequate ideal for individual and communal life. This ideal consists of a worthwhile overall aim for life and a character structure that fits the aim selected." (*Preface*, pp. VI-VII)

"Many questions can be, and have been, raised about the *Parmenides*. Here we shall confine ourselves to the following issues: What, if any, conception of the Forms emerges in this dialogue? Does it require changes in the conception examined in chapter 2 [*The Forms: Plato's Discovery*]? Does the notion of partaking as presented in the *Phaedo* require modifications? How do these clarifications help us to assess the explanatory power of the theory of Forms?

Addressing these questions is a formidable task. Thus many other questions — for example, the consequences of the arguments of this dialogue for geometry, the analysis of time, and cosmology — will not be treated, although they have been discussed repeatedly throughout the centuries and in our own time." (p. 132, a note omitted)

233. Mouroutsou, Georgia. 2022. "A Diagnosis of Dialectic in *Parmenides* 142b1-144e7." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 193–200. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "In my analysis of the two arguments in *Prm.* 142b1-144e7, I will follow and modify Owen when he says that Plato introduces the special, as he calls them, syncategorematic terms that will emerge in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*. Though I find this true, I think there is something wrong with both arguments that show that the One that is is an unlimited plurality. My hypothesis is that what goes wrong is twofold: (i) The one and the being are not treated as special vowel-connectives and bonds, according to the *Sophist's* picture, but like anything whatsoever that is and is one. They are considered component properties (property parts) of one another as any other properties would be in the first argument.

Though the "Anaxagorean holistic model", as Scolnicov dubs it, might remind us of the complete permeation of being, otherness and sameness in the *Sophist*, it is problematic in the above respect. (ii) Although the kind of beings that *Parmenides* alludes to go beyond numbers in the second argument that focuses on instance parts and not property parts instead, we have no question asked about and no theory constructed of a general ontology as formulated in the *Sophist*. Without such a theory, we are wrong to speak of wholeness and everything in the case of being and the one, given our definition of the whole with which we have operated since the first deduction as what does not lack any part."

234. Mouzala, Melina G.: 2022. "Proclus on the Forms as Paradigms in Plato's *Parmenides*. The Neoplatonic Response to Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias' Criticisms." *Journal of Ancient Philosophy* no. 16:115–163.

Abstract: "This paper sets out to analyze Proclus' exegesis of Socrates' suggestion in *Parmenides* 132d1-3 that Forms stand fixed as patterns (*παράδειγματα*), as it were, in the nature, with the other things being images and likenesses of them. Proclus' analysis of the notion of being pattern reveals the impact of the Aristotelian conception of the form as paradigm on his views, as we can infer from Alexander of Aphrodisias' and Simplicius' explanation of the paradigmatic character of the Aristotelian form. Whereas Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias refute the efficient causality of the Platonic Forms and support that μέθεξις is just a metaphor, Syrianus, Proclus and Asclepius defend the Platonic

theory, and specifically Proclus, who brings to the fore the multilateral role of the Forms as patterns with regard to the secondary things of this realm."

235. ———. 2022. "Forms as paradigms in Plato's *Parmenides* 132c-d. Proclus' response to Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias' attacks on the Forms considered as patterns." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 501–508. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The aim of this paper is threefold. Firstly, to analyze Proclus' interpretation of Socrates' suggestion that "Forms stand fixed as patterns, as it were, in the nature; the other things are made in their image and are likenesses" (Pl. *Prm.* 132d). This analysis will focus especially on Proclus' explanation of the quality of being a pattern (*paradeigmatikon idiōma*) and on his interpretation of the role of Forms as paradigmatic causes. Secondly, to clarify the main point of Aristotle's criticism of the Forms as paradigms in his *Metaphysics* (where he seems to discuss the problems of *methexis* in the order in which they are posed in *Parmenides*), by investigating Alexander of Aphrodisias' exegesis of the Aristotelian objections. We will analyze how Alexander explains on the one hand the Platonic Forms as paradigms and on the other the Aristotelian *eidos* considered as paradigm, both in his Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* as well as in his lost Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, according to the testimony of Simplicius. Thirdly, to examine in general the Neoplatonic response to the attacks by Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Forms considered as patterns, by comparing the interpretations of Proclus, Syrianus and Asclepius of Tralles of Forms as paradigms (since the latter's Commentary is highly dependent on the lectures of Ammonius, we can assume that it can be traced within it Ammonius' view of the notion of *paradeigma*)."

236. Mueller, Ian. 1983. "*Parmenides* 133a-134e. Some Suggestions." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 3:3–7.

237. Mulhern, John J. 1971. "Plato, *Parmenides* 130D3-4 " *Apeiron* no. 5:17–22.

"It is thought by many scholars that the first part of the *Parmenides* offers important clues for tracing the development of Plato's Theory of Ideas. This commonly held belief draws support from the fact that three crucial problems for the Theory of Ideas are put forward here: (1) the problem of determining what items the Theory covers--the population of the World of Ideas (130A3-E4); (2) the problem of meeting certain paradoxes connected with the doctrine of participation (130E4-133A7); and (3) the problem of showing that Ideas, if there were such, should fall within the purview of human knowledge (133A8-134~E8).

In recent years, the second of these problems has taken the lion's share of attention. The present note, however, is devoted to the first problem.

I wish to suggest that, although little seems to have been made of this matter to date, scholars interpret the discussion of the population of the World of Ideas in two fundamentally incompatible ways." (p. 17)

238. Murphy, N. R. 1937. "Plato, *Parmenides* 129 and *Republic* 475–480." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 31:71–78.

Abstract: "The reply which Socrates makes to Zeno in the *Parmenides* and that which he makes to the φιλοθμονς in the *Republic* are perhaps connected chiefly by the fact that a false interpretation of either might prejudice the other, but it seems convenient to take them together for that reason even if they have not much actual connection in themselves. Both are controversial, and in the case of Socrates' reply to Zeno, no re-statement of it could be secure which did not take account of Parmenides' reply to Socrates. For if Parmenides, as is maintained by some, is not attacking the doctrine of forms as such, but only Socratic theories of their relation with particulars, it would be natural to think that these theories about 'participation' had been the substance of Socrates' answer to Zeno. So it is impossible to avoid some discussion of the later passage, however cursory, as a preliminary."

239. Nehamas, Alexander. 1979. "Self-Predication and Plato's Theory of Forms." *American Philosophical Quarterly* no. 16:93–103.

Reprinted in: A. Nehamas, *Virtues of Authenticity. Essays on Plato and Socrates*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999, pp. 176-195.

240. ———. 2019. "The Academy at Work: The Target of Dialectic in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* no. 57:121–152.

Abstract: "Zeno's argument against plurality in the *Parmenides* does not support the view that there is only one object in the world—only the view that every object in the world is one. Socrates counters that every sensible object can be many by participating in Forms, but none of the Forms can be many. Parmenides retorts that participation is not consistent with the Forms' unity. The dialectic Parmenides offers derives a series of contradictions from supposing either that each Form is one or that it is many (that is, qualified by any other feature). The implicit solution is that participation must allow the Forms to participate in one another without losing their essential unity. The net result, central to the Academy's educational programme, is to articulate, for the first time, the concept of predication as we understand it today. Its results are summarized in the *Sophist*'s discussion of 'Greatest Kinds'."

241. Notomi, Noburu. 2022. "Homonymy and Similarity in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 21–219. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "In this paper, I examine 'similarity' (ὁμοιον) as a key to interpret the *Parmenides*. First, I focus on the backgrounds of the problem and show that, while the earlier thinkers, particularly the Eleatics, used the word 'ὁμοιον' in the sense of 'the same', Plato was the first philosopher who clearly distinguished between 'similar' (ὁμοιον) and 'the same' (ταυτό).

Next, in the theory of transcendent Forms, the relation between Forms and sensible things is explained in terms of 'similar' and 'homonymous' (ὁμώνυμον). It is worth noting that the concept of 'the same' plays a crucial role in introducing Forms, for Forms are grasped by focusing on the same form over many sensible things. The *Parmenides* introduces the concept of similarity in Zeno's argument (128e-129b). Against his argument, Socrates suggests that positing the Forms of Similarity and Dissimilarity will solve the difficulty. But the fourth argument of Part 1 (132c–133a) produces an infinite regress in examining the concept of similarity that represents the relation between Forms and sensibles as between models and copies (I follow the interpretation of Schofield 1996). This indicates that the initial introduction of Form of Similarity has raised difficulties. In Part 2 of the *Parmenides*, similarity is discussed as one feature to examine in relation to the One. There, the concept of similarity is analysed as 'what is affected in the same way (ταυτόν που πεπονθός)' (139e) and is thus defined in terms of Sameness. This seems a crucial step from the vague use of 'similarity' towards a new understanding of it in terms of 'sameness': the latter is counted among the five Greatest Kinds in the *Sophist*, whereas the Form of Similarity no longer appeared in the *Sophist* and later dialogues. This suggests how Plato sorted out the difficulties concerning 'similarity'."

References

- Schofield, M. 1996. 'Likeness and Likenesses in the *Parmenides*'. In *Form and Argument in Late Plato*, edited by C. Gill and M. M. McCabe, 49-77. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
242. O'Brien, Denis. 2013. "Forms and Concepts." In *Plato, Poet and Philosopher: In Memory Of Ioannis N. Theodoropoulos. Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference of Philosophy, Magoula-Sparta, 26-29 May 2011*, edited by Moutsopolos, E. and Protapas-Marneli, M., 193–244. Athens: Academy of Athens.

Summary: "Are Plato's forms all so many concepts? The question, on the face of it, is a simple one. But even to attempt an answer, we have to tackle two related issues that have been the cause of much misunderstanding in recent scholarly literature, firstly the «existential» use of the verb *einai* in ancient Greek, and secondly the relation between thought and its object in Plato and his predecessors. Only with at least a preliminary understanding of those two issues can we hope to take the measure of young Socrates' suggestion, in the *Parmenides*, that «each of the forms» might be no more than «the thought of these things» (132 b3-4), that the form of largeness, for example, might be no more than the thought of all the many things that we group together as large. Does Plato's portrayal of young Socrates'

suggestion and of Parmenides' reply allow us to decide whether, at the time of writing, Plato did, or did not, intend his readers to conclude that the forms are all so many concepts?"

243. Otto, K. Darcy. 2003. "Solving the Second Horn of the Dilemma of Participation." *Apeiron* no. 36:25–42.

"The Second Horn of the Dilemma of Participation(1) has caused commentators of the past century a good deal of grief, on two points in particular: first, it is difficult to account for the structure of the argument; and second, it is difficult to provide a consistent interpretation of the paradoxes involving the Large, the Equal and the Small. The main goal of my paper is to solve these two difficulties by offering a new interpretation of the passage. To this end, I shall begin by discussing the argument itself, and then I shall present my interpretation." (p. 25)

(...)

"Conclusion

It should be clear at this point that my interpretation solves both difficulties set out at the beginning of this paper. First, by taking the 'γὰρ' at c12 as referring back to Socrates' denial of the Forms being one, I can explain how the Paradoxes are integrated into the structure of the Second Horn. Second, the two-level interpretation allows me to account for Paradoxes consistently: I account for the generality of Parmenides' conclusion (e4-6), while neither supposing that Plato is confused about relations nor orphaning the Third Paradox.

The upshot of this interpretation is that we can read the Second Horn of the Dilemma as a *reductio*, which means that the Dilemma itself is destructive: participation takes place neither by the whole of the Form being present in the particular, nor by part of the Form being present in the particular. But the argument, as we have construed it, depends upon a number of assumptions; and so Socrates does have a few options. The homoeomereity of a divided Form is difficult to avoid (particularly with respect to function), but he could try to escape the force of the Paradoxes by denying that Forms are divisible: if Forms are indivisible unities, there is no problem with their being one. Nevertheless, such a move would be unproductive unless we have in hand a solution to the First Horn. In any case, it is clear that if Socrates is to give a viable account of participation, he should not begin with the assumption that a part of the Form is present in the particular." (pp. 39-40, a note omitted)

(1) 1 'Dilemma of Participation' is the name R.E. Allen gives to *Parmenides* 131a9-c3 (1997, 8). I borrow the name, but apply it to 131a9-e8. The Second Horn runs from 131c5-e3.

The translation and line numbers for the Parmenides follow Dies' text (1974). All translations from the Greek are my own unless otherwise noted.

References

Allen, R.E. 1997. *Commentary to Plato's Parmenides*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Plato. 1974. *Parménide* [Parmenides]. *CEuvres complètes*. Ed. Auguste Dies. Tome VIE, Ire Partie. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

244. ———. 2009. "The logic of the first horn of the dilemma of participation." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 29:89–105.

245. ———. 2017. "Resemblance and the Regress." *Apeiron* no. 50:81–101.

Abstract: "This paper examines the second regress argument of the Parmenides (132c12–133a7), and focusses on the question: why is the argument effective?

There is widespread disagreement about how this question should be answered.

Broadly speaking, recent commentators have given three explanations: (i) the regress contradicts the uniqueness of Forms. That is, each Form is unique, and an infinite regress contradicts this uniqueness.

(ii) The regress demonstrates that Forms cannot account for why particulars have the characters they do, since the regress prevents the account from ever being complete. (iii) The regress contradicts the unity of the Form, and since each member of the infinite series participates in an infinite number of Forms, each Form has an infinite number of parts. I examine these positions in some detail. While each has its virtues, it is impossible to adjudicate between them without a theoretical framework dedicated to infinite regress arguments. I find a reasonable theoretical framework for infinite regress arguments in a little-known work of T. Roy, "What's So Bad about Infinite Regress?". After articulating Roy's framework, and extending it to make it useful for an analysis of the second regress argument of the Parmenides, I propose three different readings of the regress: Reading A, which supposes that resemblance between particular and Form trigger an infinite number of resemblance relations; Reading B, which supposes that the regress is ultimately vicious because it fails to account for the F-ness of a given particular, even when that particular participates in an infinite number of Forms; and Reading C, which supposes that there is an inconsistency between the unity of the Form and many particulars participating in the Form. While

none of these readings is absolutely definitive, and Reading B has some significant textual challenges, I argue that Reading B must be the way we are meant to understand Plato's argument. I then argue that Reading B is the best account of why the second regress is effective."

246. Palmer, John Anderson. 1999. *Plato's Reception of Parmenides*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

"I shall suggest that Plato understood Parmenides as presenting in the deduction that comprises the bulk of B8 a description of the cosmos in its intelligible aspect qua being. This description is compatible with a description of the cosmos considered from another perspective as a differentiated world system. We shall also see that the possibility of considering the cosmos from different perspectives and describing it in its different aspects relates in important ways to the problem of how one thing can have many names." (p. 207)

(...)

"It is a sign of the power of Parmenides' philosophy that it too influenced later thinkers in ways that he himself could never have imagined. Any attempt to describe his influence based on an account of what one presumes he must have meant only betrays his legacy. I hope that the reception-orientated account I have given of a particular chapter in that legacy restores a measure of his true importance in the history of philosophy. I also hope it will point the way to further work on his influence. A properly reception-orientated approach to his influence on Presocratic philosophy, for example, might well lead to significant revisions in our understanding of the history of early Greek thought. Finally, I would like to think that the approach I have taken to this one particular interaction could be extended to other cases of intellectual influence. I will be content, however, if I have achieved the more modest aim of indicating the full complexity of Plato's uses of Parmenides." (p 254)

247. Palumbo, Lidia, and Reid, Heather L. 2020. "Wrestling with the Eleatics in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Athletics, Gymnastics, and Agon in Plato*, edited by Reid, Heather L., Ralkowski, Mark and Zoller, Coleen P., 185–198. Fonte Aretusa: Parnassos Press.

"Conclusion.

It has been our purpose to show that Plato's Parmenides can be interpreted agonistically as a constructive contest between Eleatic and Athenian philosophers. By setting the dialogue at the Panathenaic Games and using athletic language to describe its participants, Plato uses the athletic rivalry between Mainland and Western Greeks to highlight a parallel philosophical rivalry. As a former wrestler, Plato would envision this rivalry as constructive, and imagine the dialectical method, here called gymnasia, as a kind of philosophical training. It is a private, comprehensive, and challenging preparation designed to reveal the weaknesses in hypotheses, but also to develop the kind of "vision" described in Republic V, which distinguishes the philosopher from the mere spectator. This philosophical gymnasia resembles a round-robin training exercise in which the reader is called to participate. In Republic III, Socrates states that gymnastikē primarily benefits the soul (psychē, 410c), while the Parmenides offers a philosophical gymnasium in which all souls are invited to train." (p. 198)

248. Panagiotou, Spiro. 1969. "The Parmenides is the Philosopher. A reply." *Classica et Mediaevalia* no. 30:187–210.
249. ———. 1980. "The 'Range of Forms' in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Philosophical Inquiry* no. 2:420–429.
250. ———. 1981. "The 'Parmenides' and the 'Communion of Kinds' in the 'Sophist'." *Hermes* no. 109:167–171.

"In Plato's '*Parmenides*', Socrates states that he would be indeed amazed if the Forms themselves were shown to be «capable of mingling and separating» (129 D 6- E 3). It seems to be a standing assumption that Socrates' remarks here deny the doctrine of the 'Communion of Kinds' which is put forth and rigorously defended in the '*Sophist*' (251 C ff.)(1) I believe that the truth of this assumption is called into question by two different sorts of considerations.

First, it is debatable whether the '*Parmenides*' passage has in fact anything to do with the 'mixture' of Forms. Second, even if we suppose that the passage is concerned with the 'mixture' of Forms, it is by no means obvious that it contradicts the position on the 'Communion of Kinds' put forth in the '*Sophist*.'" (p. 167)

(1) Cf. e. g. W. Lutoslawski, *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, 436; F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge*, 11-12, 252-3; W. D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, 112; W. G. Runciman, *Plato's Later Epistemology*, 58.

251. ———. 1981. "The Relative Order of Plato's *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus*." *Classical Philology* no. 76:37–39.

"Although stylometric studies generally show that Plato's *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus* are adjacent in the order of composition, the exact order of the two dialogues is not at all certain.' In such cases, arguments from internal evidence might prove crucial in tipping the balance one way or the other. There is a longstanding argument from internal evidence according to which one should seriously doubt the posteriority of the *Parmenides* or even prefer the posteriority of the *Theaetetus*(1). This argument appears never to have been challenged in print, and the considerations offered below are intended to undermine it by questioning some of its implicit premises," (p. 37)

(1) For the order of composition, cf. D. W. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford, 1951), p. 2, and L. Brandwood, *A Word Index to Plato* (Leeds, 1976), pp. xvi-xviii.

252. ———. 1982. "On the date of Plato's *Parmenides*." *Classica et Mediaevalia* no. 33:97–117.
253. ———. 1982. "The Consequences of the Divisibility of Forms in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Phoenix* no. 36:45–52.

"In this paper I wish to suggest a new interpretation of Parm. 131c12-e2, which is perhaps one of the most puzzling passages in the first part of the dialogue." (p. 45)

(...)

"After remarking to Socrates that one cannot really claim that a Form is both incomposite (one3) and actually divided (131c9-10), Parmenides proceeds to the passage with which I am presently concerned. Parmenides presents three examples, all of which presumably illustrate the same issue. That is, the conclusion in each one of the examples is evidently an instance of a common problem, which arises when one believes that the Forms are divisible or, more generally, when one believes that "participation" is nothing but the presence in sensibles of a part of a Form. It appears, therefore, that we cannot discover the point at issue unless we can discern what, if anything, is common to all three examples. This is in fact the procedure followed by most commentators." (p. 46)

254. ———. 1987. "The Day and Sail Analogies in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Phoenix* no. 41:10–24.

"I am here concerned with the following exchange between Parmenides and Socrates in *Parm.* 131a4-e7" (p.10)

(...)

"My principal claim will be that the two illustrations, the Day and the Sail, are analogous in the relevant respects and that hence Plato takes seriously the considerations adduced by Parmenides. Plato presents Socrates' Day analogy not as a step in the right direction, from which he is "forced," unfairly and wrongly, to retreat, but as a false cast which becomes more obviously such when the Day is replaced by the Sail. If this is so, then Socrates' Day cannot save Plato's middle-period theory of participation." (p. 12)

255. Parry, Richard. 2022. "The One and Time: *Parmenides* 151e-153a." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 361–370. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "In the Second Hypothesis, Parmenides draws out the consequences of the one's partaking of being, where partaking of being implies partaking of time. In an elaborate argument (which I divide into four parts) he draws two conclusions, which contradict one another. First, he concludes that: (III.12) The one always both is and is coming to be older and younger than itself. Second, he concludes that: (IV.4) Since the one is or comes to be for an equal time, i.e., a time equal to itself, it neither is nor comes to be younger or older than itself.

We shall see that the first conclusion, (III.12), is achieved by a conjunction of two previous sub-conclusions but that the conjunction is not logically legitimate. However, the second conclusion, (IV.4), has a better fate, in spite of the apparent incoherence of the phrase 'a time equal to (the one) itself.' We will argue that there is a way to make sense of this phrase if we assume that Parmenides' argument uses Zeno's paradox, the Flying Arrow: anything occupying a place just its own size is at rest; in the present, what is moving occupies a place just its own size; thus, the arrow is at rest. If we assume that Parmenides models (IV.4) on (a) by making an analogy between movement through space and movement through time, we can rescue (IV.4) from incoherence."

256. Patterson, Richard. 1999. "Forms, Fallacies, and the Functions of Plato's *Parmenides*." *Apeiron* no. 32:89–106.

"Most studies of the *Parmenides*, ancient or modern, attempt to find in its long and perplexing second part not just a preparatory exercise in 'logic', but positive and even extensive philosophical results. Some very recent studies defend the controversial position that all the arguments of Part II are good ones (sound: valid with true premises) and were meant to establish a series of significant philosophical results."

(...)

"The second approach raises a series of more specific issues: (1) Are there in fact formally or informally defective arguments in Part II? (2) If so, are any of these deliberately bad? (3) Are there any reasonable criteria by which we might identify deliberately bad arguments, or must we rely on a kind of hermeneutic divine madness? (4) Does the presence of deliberately bad arguments prevent our coming away from the *Parmenides* with some positive results in hand? My answers to these questions will be: (1) yes, (2) yes, (3) yes and no, and (4) no, respectively." (p. 89)

257. Pavani, Anna. 2025. "The Nun in the *Parmenides*: Not Another *Exaiphnês*." *Dialogue*:1–19.

Abstract: "After some preliminary remarks about Plato's use of the adverb *nun*, I explain what the *nun* is by offering a close textual analysis of the key passage in which it is explicitly addressed (*Parm.* 151e3–153b7). Its *metaxu* nature, between duration and limit, requires one to consider another temporal notion of the second part of the *Parmenides* that is *metaxu*, namely the *exaiphnês*. I explain why the *nun* does not conceptually overlap with the *exaiphnês*, arguing moreover that there is no model where both notions fit, but rather a model accounting for a switch and another one accounting for continuous change."

258. Peck, Arthur L. 1953. "Plato's Parmenides: Some Suggestions for Its Interpretation." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 3:126–150.

Abstract: "In modern work on the *Parmenides* it is commonly supposed that in the First Part of the dialogue Plato's main concern is criticism of his own doctrine of Forms, or of some formulations of that doctrine, and that the criticisms have some sort of validity and are in some degree 'damaging' to the doctrine. It is thus often assumed that Plato's purpose is to make the reader ask himself, 'Where is Plato wrong? Where is his doctrine of Forms, or his statement of it, inadequate?' This is no doubt due partly to the fact that no reply is offered to the criticisms, and partly to the fact that they are put into the mouth of Parmenides, for whom Plato had a very great respect. Nevertheless, Plato can hardly have had a greater respect for Parmenides than he had for Socrates; and therefore on general grounds it is at least as likely that he intends us to ask ourselves the question, 'Where is *Parmenides* wrong, or inadequate?' It is, of course, obvious that Socrates is represented as a young man, who, in his enthusiasm for a new doctrine which he has invented himself, has not thought out all the difficulties involved in it or prepared replies to all the possible criticisms. Yet again, on general principles it is not likely that Plato would have written a dialogue primarily to represent Parmenides' position as substantially more satisfactory than that of Socrates. It is therefore of the first importance not merely to have clearly in our minds the nature and purpose of the doctrine of Forms, but also to examine carefully the basis of the criticisms which Parmenides is made to bring against Socrates, and the methods by which Parmenides conducts his arguments."

259. ———. 1953. "Plato's Alleged Self-Criticism in the *Parmenides*: Some Recent Views." *Cambridge Classical Journal* no. 2:21–36.

"During the course of some work on the *Parmenides*(1) I found I was coming to a conclusion about the First Part of the dialogue which was at variance with what I supposed to be the traditional and commonly accepted view. It therefore seemed advisable to ascertain precisely what this traditional view was, and what were the arguments in favour of it; and the contents of this paper represent some part of an attempt to do this. As it happens, they also tend to make the writer appear as one playing the part of a Zeno to his own Parmenides, showing that even stranger results follow from the hypotheses of those from whom he differs than from his own.

As is well known, it is fashionable at the present time to hold that in the First Part of the *Parmenides* Plato is criticizing himself by the mouth of Parmenides. I do not propose to go into the history of this belief, but merely to examine it as it appears in the works of three well-known commentators, Professor Cornford, Sir W. D. Ross, and Mr. Richard Robinson. All of them are to some extent influenced by it: Cornford,

as we shall see, the least, and Robinson the most." (p. 21)

(1) *Classical Quarterly*, n.s. III, 1953, 126ff., and IV, 1954, 31 ff.

References

F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, 1939.

Richard Robinson, Plato's Parmenides, *Classical Philology*, xxxv, 1942, 51-76 ((reprinted as Chapter XIII in the second edition of his book *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, 1953)

W. D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas*, 1951.

260. ———. 1954. "Plato's Parmenides: Some Suggestions for Its Interpretation. II." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 4:31–45.

Abstract: "In the space at my disposal I cannot attempt to deal with all the points which arise in the Second Part of the dialogue, and I therefore confine myself to a few which seem to be of special interest and importance. I hope it may be possible to deal more exhaustively with the dialogue in a fuller commentary. As in the previous part of the article, I have assumed the results of my study of the *Sophist* already referred to."

261. ———. 1967. "Plato, Parmenides, Block and Exemplification." *Mind* no. 76:595.

"Students of Plato who have read Professor Irving Block's recent article(1) on Plato's Parmenides may have been surprised at some of the statements in it. I should like to offer some comments on two of these. On page 420 Block twice states that in an article of mine(2) I have 'introduced two kinds of forms 'into Plato, forms apprehended by reason (the genuine kind) and forms apprehended by sense (presumably a spurious kind). This statement is incorrect. Only one kind of Platonic form is mentioned or contemplated in my article.

The explanation of Block's mistake is simple. Following Plato's own practice, I used the word 'largeness' of the largeness in particulars as well as of the form largeness. This has led Block to deduce that I consider the largeness in particulars to be a second kind of Platonic form. His criticisms based on this deduction are therefore irrelevant." (p. 595)

(1) " Plato, Parmenides, Ryle, and Exemplification ", *Mind*, LXXiii (1964), 417-422.

(2) " Plato versus Parmenides ", *Philos. Rev.* lxxi (1962), 159-184.

262. Peddle, Francis K. 2022. "Mass, instance, atoms, and the Seventh Hypothesis of Plato's *Parmenides*." *Science et Esprit* no. 22:1–16.

Abstract: "The purpose of this essay is to glean some concepts out of the seventh hypothesis of Plato's *Parmenides* that can provide a contribution to the often unsatisfying modern debates about the nature of atoms, mass, and what might constitute an instant. The seventh hypothesis (hereafter H7, similarly for the other hypotheses) of Part II of the *Parmenides* is one of the more neglected of all the hypotheses in the dialogue, despite the fact that it introduces some very novel terms and arguments. A brief overview of Part II of the dialogue is followed by a detailed analysis of the argument in H7. The conclusion brings this essay around to the relevance of H7 for contemporary reflections in theoretical physics and cosmology."

263. Pelletier, Francis Jeffry. 1983. "Plato on Not-Being: Some Interpretations of the συμπλοκή εἰδῶν (259E) and Their Relation to Parmenides' Problem." *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* no. 8:35–66.

"In this paper, I am interested in the Platonic response to Parmenides, especially the response that occurs in the middle portion of the *Sophist* (249-265). Since I am going to evaluate this as a response to the "standard interpretation" of Parmenides, it is clear that I owe a justification for my belief that Plato understood his opponent to be our "standard Parmenides." This issue, too, I will avoid here (further discussion can be found in Pelletier [1990], which discusses the "Parmenidean" arguments of *Sophist* 237-241, *Theaetetus*, 188-189, and *Cratylus* 429-430, with an eye toward showing that Plato was aware of these types of argument.)" (p. 35)

References

Pelletier, Francis Jeffry, *Parmenides, Plato, and the Semantics of Not-Being*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990.

264. Pemberton, Harrison J. 1984. *Plato's Parmenides: The Critical Moment for Socrates*. Norwood: Norwood Editions.

"Our analysis will try to follow the movement of the dialogue as Plato presents it. He designed the dialogue to entice us into considering some fundamental problems by a dramatic and engaging First Part; then in a forbidding Second Part he takes us through a maze of arguments to the unifying recognition at the center of the center of the dialogue. At point what has gone before is cast into a new light, and the problems in the First Part can be seen in a different way. After that point the dialogue continues, in Hypotheses 3-8, to round out the central insight for those who have attained it or merely to continue a tedious discussion for those who have not. The last part is then ironic in a way we are familiar with in Plato's writings. Accordingly, we shall start by examining the First Part in a preliminary way, reading it as an introduction, especially as an indication of how the Second Part is to be regarded. A detailed examination of the Second Part will take us to the end of Hypothesis 2 where

the central, unifying point of the dialogues is reached. In light of this we will then have to go back and reconsider the dialogue up to this point, especially the problems in the First Part. Thereafter, we can follow the discussion of the remaining hypotheses with some insight as Socrates could but as Aristoteles does not and come to the eventual but abrupt conclusion." (pp. 8-9)

265. Peterson, Sandra. 1981. "The Greatest Difficulty for Plato's Theory of Forms: the Unknowability Argument of *Parmenides* 133c - 134c." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 63:1-16.

"Plato's *Parmenides* constructs difficulties for the theory of forms. One, called "the greatest" (133b 4), is an argument (133c-134c) which concludes that the forms are unknowable by us.

Plato gives, I think, two routes to the conclusion. The first route, up to 134b 6, achieves the claim that if our knowledge is of something, that something cannot be a form. The second route, after 134b, establishes an equivalent to the achievement of the first: if something is knowledge of a form, that something cannot be knowledge of ours."

(...)

"In giving my reconstruction I have taken seriously Plato's remark that this argument presents the greatest difficulty for the theory of forms."

266. ———. 1996. "Plato's *Parmenides*: A Principle of Interpretation and Seven Arguments." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 34:167-192.

"The outcome of Part II of this paper is that it is possible to understand all the results in the final lines of the first of the *Parmenides*' eight sections as true assertions. One can also see how these final results follow from the arguments given. If these results are true, the passage 141-42, given my conviction that it argues from a true hypothesis, confirms the guiding principle that, all arguments of the gymnastic half being valid, all consequents of conditionals under the true hypothesis should be accepted, i.e., taken to be true. The puzzle about 141-42 is solved. The passage no longer seems an exception to Meinwald's interpretation." (è- 192)

267. ———. 2000. "The Language Game in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 20:19-51.

"We have been asking how the exercise will help Socrates to mark off kinds properly. Parmenides gave Socrates the advice to exercise at 135c; Socrates had just acknowledged that he did not know what to do about philosophy after Parmenides, questioner, had reduced Socrates, answerer, to absurdity. Parmenides' advice created the impression that Socrates' attempt to 'mark off forms too soon had been displayed in Socrates' conversation with Parmenides. Parmenides, however, also says at 135c that Socrates gave evidence of trying to 'mark off forms too soon when Parmenides was listening to Socrates conversing with the young Aristotle 'the other day' (135dl). Plato does not record that conversation with Aristotle, but we naturally imagine that in that conversation Socrates had his role of questioner familiar to us from other dialogues, and that Aristotle was answerer. Plato is inviting us to imagine some familiar Socratic questioning, and to ask: What indications of a need for exercise might have occurred in such a conversation?" (p. 40)

268. ———. 2003. "New Rounds of the Exercise of Plato's *Parmenides*." *The Modern Schoolman* no. 80:245-278.

"Parmenides knows what the young Socrates is interested in, since he has observed that Socrates is trying to define the just and the fine and the good. The *Parmenides* doesn't give us any evidence that the young Socrates has been looking for such definitions as a means to the goal of living a just life. But the question still naturally arises: if even the young Socrates is asking his questions with the aim of living a just life, and if Parmenides knows that Socrates has the project of living a just life, how exactly does Parmenides intend his recommendations to fit into that project? Does Parmenides think that Socrates can't understand what just is, and can't live a just life, without undertaking these arduous logical exercises? How does the exercise, and its many repetitions, help Socrates to do something "about philosophy," if even the young Socrates understands philosophy as the examined life-i.e. the life in which one has tested oneself to be sure that one is not living the wrong kind of life?

These are further questions to consider." (p. 272, notes omitted)

269. ———. 2008. "The *Parmenides*." In *The Oxford Handbook of Plato*, edited by Fine, Gail, 383–410. New York: Oxford University Press.

"Plato's *Parmenides* contrasts with Plato's other works in several ways. For example, Socrates is depicted as "very young" (127c5), perhaps fifteen or perhaps nineteen. Parmenides questions Socrates, who contradicts himself; in other dialogues of question and answer, Socrates typically questions others, who contradict themselves. Parmenides refutes Socrates on the topic of forms, items such as justice itself and good itself, while the older Socrates of other dialogues presents forms as central to philosophy; the dialogue thus raises the question whether its criticism of forms signals Plato's revision of views expressed in previous writings. The *Parmenides* is the only dialogue in which forms are the main topic. The dialogue's second part, 137c-166c, is the longest passage of unrelenting argument in Plato's writings. Its arguments are his most puzzling." (p. 383)

270. ———. 2020. "The Argument of Zeno at *Parmenides* 127e1–7." *Platonic Investigations* no. 12:11–44.

Abstract: "This essay offers an interpretation of *Parmenides* 127e1–7. There Socrates reports Zeno's argument that attacks the thesis that beings are many. The essay's goal is to understand Zeno's argument as reported by Socrates. The author first considers the interpretations of J. Barnes, D. El Murr, and R.E. Allen. They propose that Zeno's target for attack is the thesis that the number of beings is greater than one ("the numerical target"). El Murr also suggests the additional target that each being has many parts. Then the essay considers the interpretations of D. Lee and A. Nehamas. They maintain that Zeno's target for attack is the thesis that a single being may be many by having multiple attributes ("the multi-attribute target"). This essay makes use of insights from all these interpretations. It also revives a suggestion of P. Curd that Zeno argued against both the numerical target and the multi-attribute target. The author proposes that Zeno argues against a disjunction of (i) the numerical target, (ii) the El Murr addition, and (iii) the multi-attribute target. That is, Zeno argued boldly that beings cannot be many in any imaginable way. This essay calls new attention to the important role in Zeno's argument of the claim, "for unlikes cannot be likes."

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- Lee, D. (2014), "Zeno's Puzzle in Plato's *Parmenides*", *Ancient Philosophy* 34.2: 255–273.
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- Nehamas, A. (2019), "The Academy at Work: The Target of Dialectic in Plato's *Parmenides*", *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 57: 121–152.
271. ———. 2022. "Socrates Objects to Zeno at 128e-129a in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 83–90. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "This essay newly defends the view that the youthful Socrates of Plato's *Parmenides* at 128e1-129a1 makes a decisive objection to Zeno's argument against plurality at 127e1-4.

That view requires new defense because Alexander Nehamas has recently given several thought-provoking reasons against it. Zeno's argument is in defense of Parmenides' thesis that being is one. Socrates' objection that I believe is decisive consists in the observation that Zeno's argument presupposes that there are two opposites, likeness and unlikeness.

Nehamas believes (a) that Zeno defends, not the numerical thesis that the number of beings is one, but rather the thesis that each being is predicatively one: it is exactly the one thing that it is. Thus (b) the target that Zeno reduces to absurdity is the thesis that each being has many attributes. And (c) given that target, Socrates' observation that Zeno's argument commits Zeno to the presupposition that there are multiple opposite beings shows no incoherence in Zeno's argument. I here put aside controversy about whether Zeno's target is numerical or predicative plurality to consider the conditional question: If Zeno's target is the thesis that beings are predicatively many, then are Nehamas's considerations sufficient to show that Socrates' observation does not decisively show a flaw in Zeno's argument? I discuss here four of Nehamas's considerations. (I have considered the fifth elsewhere.) I argue that these four considerations fail to show that Plato does not present the youthful Socrates' objection to Zeno's argument as decisive. Socrates' objection against Zeno's argument is devastating no matter which sort of plurality Zeno targets. I observe some further textual reason to suppose that Plato does present Socrates' objection as decisive."

References

Nehamas, A. 2019. 'The Academy at Work: The Target of Dialectic in Plato's *Parmenides*'. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 57: 121-152.

272. Pinchard, Alexis. 2024. "Plato's *Catuṣkoṭi* and Nāgārjuna's *Parmenides*." In *Crossing the Stream, Leaving the Cave: Buddhist-Platonist Philosophical Inquiries*, edited by Carpenter, Amber D and Harter, Pierre-Julien, 117–141. New York: Oxford University Press.

Abstract: "In the dialectical exercise of Plato's *Parmenides*, the intrinsically contradictory deductions drawn from the hypotheses about the One imply that the One is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither endowed with an essence nor deprived thereof. Does this symmetrical negation constitute a self-refutation of Plato's metaphysics, or is it evidence that "the One" refers to the same thing as the sovereign "Good" of the *Republic*, which is also supposed to stand beyond essence? Rewriting the *Parmenides* with Nāgārjuna's concepts could help to answer this question. It looks as if Plato used the various predicative combinations of the *Mādhyamika* tetralemma, especially the symmetrical negation, in order to remove our native oblivion concerning the axiological status of the One, just like Nāgārjuna used it to remove our hypostatizing habits concerning the phenomena of everyday life. Conversely, the soteriological purpose of *Mādhyamika* dialectic becomes clearer when contrasted with the Platonic project to reach an unconditioned principle."

273. Pleše, Zlatko. 2010. "Plato and Parmenides in Agreement: Ammonius's Praise of God as One-Being in Plutarch's *The E At Delphi*." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 93–114. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"Plutarch's dialogue *De E apud Delphos* (*The E at Delphi*) is one of his better known philosophical works, primarily because of its sublime encomium of God delivered by Ammonius, the Platonist from Alexandria and Plutarch's teacher(καθηγητής). Ammonius's discourse concludes a series of solutions aimed at elucidating the meaning of a letter "E" erected on the Delphic temple of Apollo.

The final position assigned to the speech seems to indicate Plutarch's endorsement of its central tenets." (p. 93, a note omitted)

(...)

"The present study proposes to reexamine the alleged link between Ammonius's exalted praise of God as One-Being and Eudorus's derivational monism by pointing to other sources that might have played a more important role in articulating Ammonius's position. Among these sources, one neglected passage from Plutarch's anti-Epicurean treatise *Adversus Colotem* (*Against Colotes*) deserves special attention. The appeal of this passage, in which Plutarch defends the historical Parmenides against Epicurean attacks and relates his ideas to Plato's philosophy, lies in its lexical and conceptual affinities with Ammonius's discourse.

These affinities, if proven true, may seriously undermine the whole "Alexandrian hypothesis" and bring forward some other important lineages, including that of Parmenides and Plato's eponymous dialogue." (p. 94)

274. Pleshkov, Aleksei. 2022. "Eternity for Plato: The Dialogue between *Parmenides* and *Timaeus*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 371–377. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The distinction of time and eternity plays a crucial role in Plato's ontology. Nevertheless, up to the *Timaeus*, Plato does not offer a more or less complete analysis of the concept, and even in this late dialogue, his definition is still ambiguous. The two most common interpretations of eternity in philosophical literature, temporalism and traditional eternalism, I believe, are not suitable for Plato's philosophy. The third interpretation, neo-eternalism, which considers eternity as atemporal duration, i.e., the present that endures without slipping into a succession of past-future, fits Plato's concept of eternity much better. Basing my approach on the analysis of the unique status of the present (ὁ νῦν χρόνος or τὸ νῦν) in the flow of time in the *Parmenides* and the eternity (αἰών) of the Paradigm which abides exclusively in the present (τὸ ἔστιν) in the *Timaeus*, I adapt the neo-eternalistic interpretation of the concept for Plato's eternity. According to such reading, eternity for Plato is not transcendent to time, but the principle and necessary condition of time always given in the present, hic et nunc. In other words, eternity is the fundamental intuition of being expressed in a simple 'is' regardless of temporal differentiation."

275. Plochmann, George Kimball. 1954. "Socrates, the Stranger from Elea, and Some Others." *Classical Philology* no. 49:223–231.

"My principal thesis is that the dramatis personae of the Platonic dialogues constitute an important clue to interpreting Plato, that to neglect the hints he has provided by using the speakers he does is to risk being unplatonic. This is true even of the so-called "late" dialogues, where the persons are seemingly mere names and the drama is no more vivid than a syllogism. But the drama throughout is of a piece with the methods and the doctrines of these great colloquies; it is only in seeing how it is of a piece that we may penetrate these works, so deceptively translucent and so stubbornly opaque.

This conviction, if carried through into living practice, would help solve one of the most vexing of all Platonic problems, that of how much the philosopher was doing his own philosophizing.

How often was he reporting earlier scientific views, or narrating history, as many describe the *Apology*, or telling a rattling good joke, as some call the *Parmenides*? It is my impression that throughout his dialogues, the *Apology* and *Symposium* included, Plato persisted in trying to discover and demonstrate truth - I do not say precisely the same truth. Now to maintain this view entails my having to show that the incessant verbal and doctrinal disparities, the backings and fillings and abrupt transitions, have a meaning in terms of the peculiar form in which Plato wrote his philosophy." (p. 223, notes omitted)

276. Poetsch, Christoph. 2023. *Conceptual Patterns in Plato's Parmenides*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

"Plato's *Parmenides* is hence a text to which – obviously – all the characteristics mentioned at the outset apply, while roughly 2,400 years of intense discussion and careful research have not brought us anywhere close to a broader scholarly consensus. I dare not claim to end these discussions (I suspect they never will, which is in fact a good sign in some sense). But I claim to provide some evidence by help of the conceptual patterns that might be of general interest for every approach to this difficult text. In the following, I shall therefore try to clearly distinguish between, on the one hand, observations on

these patterns and conclusions I consider as fairly uncontroversial with regard to the evidence (chapter 3) and, on the other hand, such arguments and conclusions that imply more far-reaching claims and a more concrete interpretation of the given evidence (chapters 4–5). Thus, I hope, the evidence and results of the former will still be valuable to those who will not follow every aspect of my further interpretation in the latter chapters. Those are the two first main steps of this study. Subsequent to them, in a concluding third main step, I shall then exemplarily address the question as to how these results might actually be able to tackle the difficulties and problems that are raised in the first part of the dialogue with regard to the Theory of Forms (chapter 6). Hence, this study aims to address, in a general manner, the two main questions that scholars are facing with regard to Plato's *Parmenides*: What is its second part all about? How can the second part provide a solution to the problems in the first part?" (pp. 10–11)

277. Polansky, Ron, and Cimack, Joe. 2013. "Counting the Hypotheses in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Apeiron* no. 46:229–243.

Abstract: "Parmenides' exercise assists Socrates who is perplexed about forms and participation. The exercise assumes the one is and is not, and traces consequences for the one with respect to itself and the others and for the others with respect to themselves and the one. There appear to be eight or nine hypotheses. Counting the third makes all the odd-numbered hypotheses draw neither ... nor ... conclusions, while the even-numbered draw both ... and ... conclusions. Odd and even thus link with limit and unlimited principles, so the third hypothesis on the instant clarifies forms and all beings. We also cast light on the Presocratic origin of the theory of forms."

278. Priest, Graham. 2012. "The *Parmenides*: a Dialetheic Interpretation." *Plato Journal* no. 12:1–63.

Abstract: "In this paper, I offer a new (dialetheic) interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*. The key idea is to take the last speech of the dialogue seriously. The forms indeed have contradictory properties. Defending

this idea is what Plato is up to in the second half of the dialogue. And, suitably fleshed out, the idea can be used to answer the objections that Parmenides brings against the theory of forms in the first part."

279. ———. 2014. *One: Being an Investigation into the Unity of Reality and of its Parts, including the Singular Object which is Nothingness*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Part II. Chapter 6: *Enter Parmenides: Mereological Sums*, 79; Chapter 7: *Problems with the Forms—and their Solutions*, 101, Chapter 8: *The One—and the Others*, 118–139.

"The problem of the one and the many around which Part I turns has often been overlooked as a serious problem. Where it has been taken very seriously is in Ancient Greek philosophy. Aristotle and Plato, in particular, were much concerned with it. Aristotle's solution is discussed in Part I. There is much more to be said about Plato's. This is the focus of Part II.

The behaviour of parts is intimately connected both with Parmenides' partless One, and with Plato's form of Oneness. Both come in for scrutiny in this part. In particular, both of these are involved in Plato's *Parmenides*. This dialogue is one of his most important and influential. It is also one of the most tantalizing and obscure. Many commentators despair of a coherent interpretation. The centrepiece of Part II is an interpretation based on gluon theory. This, it seems to me, provides just such an interpretation. □

These are not the only issues traversed in Part II, however. This part concerns itself with the application of gluon theory to questions of meaning, truth, intentionality, and formal mereology. (An interlude after Chapter 6 provides an account of the mereology of nothing.) These are, of course, central issues in contemporary philosophy. However, I have chosen to approach them through the lens of Plato.

This gives the material a unity it might otherwise lack. More importantly, it will remind readers that contemporary problems sink deep into the history of the subject." (*Preface*, p. XVII)

280. Prior, William J. 1985. *Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics*. London: Croom Helm.

Contents: Acknowledgments; Introduction: The problem of Plato's development 1; The metaphysics of the early and middle Platonic dialogues 9; 2. The challenge of the *Parmenides* 51; 3. The response of the *Timaeus* 87; 4. The *Sophist* 127; Appendix: The doctrinal maturity and chronological position of the *Timaeus* 168; Bibliography 194; Index 199-201.

"This book contains an account of the development of Plato's metaphysics. I focus on two metaphysical doctrines of central importance in Plato's thought: the Theory of Forms and the doctrine of Being and Becoming. I discuss Plato's epistemology, psychology, theology and other topics only when they are relevant to the metaphysical doctrines just mentioned. My approach is therefore selective. It is selective also in that I deal primarily with only six dialogues: the *Euthyphro*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Parmenides* (part I), *Timaeus* and *Sophist*. I discuss other dialogues only when their contents illuminate or augment the metaphysics of these six." (*Introduction*, p. 1)

(...)

"The Theory of Forms receives its first real treatment in the *Euthyphro*, an early dialogue. The theory is developed and the Being-Becoming distinction introduced in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, dialogues of Plato's middle period. In the first part of the *Parmenides*, these doctrines are subjected to criticism. This criticism does not constitute a refutation of either doctrine, but it does raise serious questions about both, questions to which the middle dialogues do not contain definitive answers. In the post-*Parmenides* dialogues, and in particular, in the *Timaeus* and *Sophist*, Plato does deal with the questions raised in the *Parmenides*. Without altering either the Theory of Forms or the doctrine of Being and Becoming in their essential natures, he augments and clarifies his metaphysics in such a way that the objections of the *Parmenides* are met. Thus, the dialogues I shall deal with exhibit a genuine development in Plato's metaphysics, a movement from an initial statement of his views through a critique of them to a refined final position." (pp. 1-2)

281. Priou, Alex. 2018. *Becoming Socrates: Political Philosophy in Plato's Parmenides*. Rochester (N. Y.): University of Rochester Press.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Chapter 1: The Problem of the *Parmenides* 1; Chapter 2: Parmenides on Socrates' "Platonism": *Parmenides* 126a1–137c4 17; Chapter 3: Parmenides on Eleatic Monism: *Parmenides* 137c4–166c5 74; Chapter 4: The Problem of Socrates 193; Notes 207; Bibliography 241; Index 245-246.

"Famously, however, Parmenides submits Socrates' εἶδη to thorough critique.

Though Parmenides appears to maintain that his critique is not fatal, how it is to be overcome remains unclear, for it requires making sense of how the dialogue's two parts fit together. As discussed, this is the foremost interpretive task facing the reader, but with whose accomplishment comes Plato's meditation on the necessary centrality of political philosophy. The following interpretation of the *Parmenides* aims to understand how this "greatest impasse" relates both to the arguments that precede it, including the famous "third man" argument, and to the complex dialectical training that subsequently ensues. The specific thesis is that because this generally disregarded passage is explicitly situated as the culmination of Parmenides' critique of the εἶδη and the problem that the subsequent, dialectical training is meant to address, it is the key to understanding how the two divergent parts of the *Parmenides* fit together, and thus to understanding the dialogue as a whole. More generally, however, our concern will be the same as that of Socrates and Parmenides: the question of the possibility and character of philosophy.

(...)

More fundamentally, however, the present study seeks to show that Plato presents metaphysics as the highest aspiration of politics, an aspiration that puts a burden on λόγος and being that neither can fulfill. In this way, Plato shows political philosophy to be first philosophy, as the excavation of reality out of the cave of common opinion." (p. 16)

282. Protopopova, Irina. 2022. "The *Parmenides* and the Typology of *eide* (according to Plato's *Hippias Major*, *Protagoras*, *Republic*, and *Sophist*)." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 229–237. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "The paper deals with the typology of *eide* in Plato considered through the prism of the problems posed in the *Parmenides*. Parmenides asks Socrates how do things participate in *eide*, as in something divisible or otherwise? Already in the *Hippias Major*, Plato differentiates between qualitative, or indivisible, *eide* (beauty, gold, the identical), which can only be divided into homogeneous parts, and assembling ones, in which the parts are not homogeneous in relation to each other and to the whole (numbers, the pleasure of hearing and seeing).

Eide of the second type look divisible, but if we try to divide them, we will completely destroy them as a 'whole'; they may be called quasi-divisible, and partial participation in them is impossible. In the *Protagoras*, the question is raised, how do virtues relate to each other, as gold or as parts of the face? The first is impossible because wisdom, courage, etc. are different from each other, and the second too, because the owner of one virtue may not have another, and then the 'face' (virtue) would be imperfect, which is unacceptable. In the *Republic*, both soul and polis consist of three different principles dissimilar to each other but constituting a 'whole' with a new quality; and the perfect soul and polis have all the four main virtues. We see here a certain mixture of quasi-divisible *eide* (from the point of view of three parts) and assembling *eide* defined by the idea of perfection as a virtue. In the *Sophist*, the interaction of the five summa genera is presented: 'Movement-Rest-Identical-Other-Being' interact as inseparable and undivided *eide* by participating in each other through the Other.

I call this pentad an 'intelligible atom', in which the activity of *nous* is demonstrated and thus the unity of *eidos* as both divisible and indivisibly perfect is achieved."

283. Radde-Gallwitz, Andrew. 2010. "Pseudo-Dionysius, the *Parmenides*, and the Problem of Contradiction." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 243–254. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"For some time now, scholars have acknowledged the influence upon Denys of Neoplatonism generally, and of the Neoplatonist commentaries on the *Parmenides* in particular.(4) Eugenio Corsini's 1962 work on Denys and the *Parmenides* commentaries has garnered scholarly consensus. In this paper, I want to take up the issue of the influence of this commentary tradition upon Denys and frame some questions about Denys's use of the *Parmenides* commentary tradition and the impact this has on his view of the LNC [Law of Non-Contradiction] and LEM [Law of the Excluded Middle]." (p. 244)

(4) The influence of Proclus upon Denys was established in 1895 by Stiglmayr and Stiglmayr 1895, 253–73, 721–48; Koch 1895, 438–54. The first to note the influence of the *Parmenides* upon Denys (so far as I know) was Ivanka 1964, 234–35. The classic statement of the influence of the Neoplatonic commentaries on the *Parmenides* upon Denys is Corsini 1962.

See also Lilla 1994, 117–52.

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Corsini, E. 1962. *Il Trattato De Divinis nominibus dello Pseudo-Dionigi e i Commenti Neoplatonici al Parmenide*. Università di Torino Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia XII,4. Torino: Giappichelli.

Ivanka, E. 1964. *Plato Christianus: Übernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch die Väter*. Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag.

Lilla, S. R. C. 1997. Pseudo-Denys L' Aréopagite, Porphyre et Damascius. Pages 117–52 in *Denys L' Aréopagite et sa Postérité en Orient et en Occident*. Edited by Y. de Andia. Actes du Colloque International, Paris, 21–24 septembre 1994. Paris: Études augustinienes.

Stiglmayr, J. 1895. Der Neuplatoniker Proclus als Vorlage des sog. Dionysius Areopagita in der Lehre vom Übel. *Historisches Jahrbuch* 16, 253–73, 721–48.

284. Rancadore, Maria Antonia. 2024. "Gilbert Ryle and Plato's theory of forms." *Filosofia* no. 69:285–304.

Abstract: "This essay is dedicated to the interpretation that Gilbert Ryle gave to Plato's theory of forms. Despite having distinguished himself as an exponent of Analytic Philosophy and Ordinary Language Philosophy in the context of the University of Oxford, Ryle qualified as a philologist by reading the vast production of Plato's dialogues. Among Ryle's most significant essays are those referring to the dialogues of Plato's maturity (*Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Parmenides*), where the ancient Athenian philosopher expounded his conception of the art of dialectics.

Then Ryle highlighted the relationship between the theory of forms and the theory of being, on the basis of an original rereading of the concept of idea, i.e. of form, separated from the traditional ontologism attributed to both Parmenides and Plato."

285. Rangos, Spyridon. 2014. "Plato on the Nature of the Sudden Moment, and the Asymmetry of the Second Part of the *Parmenides*." *Dialogue. Canadian Philosophical Review* no. 53:538–574.

Abstract: "In this paper, Plato's notion of the sudden moment is fully explored. In the *Parmenides*, the "now" (nun) and the "sudden" (*exaiphnês*), it is argued, refer to one and the same entity from the distinct perspectives of timeless Being and temporal Becoming, respectively. This interpretation tallies well with, and enriches, the Platonic views on time and eternity found in the *Timaeus*. Finally, the paper highlights the pivotal role of the third deduction, where the sudden moment appears, for an understanding of the entire dialectical exercise of the *Parmenides*."

286. Rasimus, Tuomas. 2010. "Porphyry and the Gnostics: Reassessing Pierre Hadot's Thesis in Light of the Second- and Third-Century Sethian Treatises." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 81–110. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"What does this new Sethian evidence mean for Hadot's thesis, and for our understanding of the history of Neoplatonism? I will argue in this article that Hadot's thesis is in itself inconclusive—even problematic—and that Sethian Gnostics were probably the innovators of most of the "Porphyrian" concepts that we find in Hadot's fragments. This seems all the more likely as many of these "Porphyrian" features are already present—some implicitly, others explicitly—in a pre-Plotinian Sethian text, the *Apocryphon of John*. It will be argued that advocates of Sethian Gnosticism brought with them innovative ideas, including the famous being–life–mind triad, to Plotinus's seminars; and that a fruitful exchange of ideas between the Gnostics, and Plotinus and his students, took place before (and perhaps even after) the somewhat exaggerated Gnostic controversy in the 260s." (p. 282, a note omitted)

287. Reagan, James T. 1964. "The Metaphysical Function of the *Parmenides*." *The Modern Schoolman* no. 41:262–272.

288. Reynard, Jean. 2010. "Plato's *Parmenides* among the Cappadocian Fathers: The Problem of a Possible Influence or the Meaning of a Lack?" In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 217–235. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"Far from what one can see among contemporary Neoplatonic philosophers, it seems a priori difficult to find a direct influence of Plato's *Parmenides* in the writings of the Cappadocian Fathers. First, my paper will focus particularly on Gregory of Nyssa, who is rightly considered the most profoundly influenced by Plato and Neo-platonic interpretations. There is no explicit quotation of the dialogue in his works, but some themes exhibit a possible link with certain of its passages: for example, the spiritual ubiquity of God, participation as resemblance, or the impossibility of giving a name or definition of the first principle. But, whether the influence of this dialogue is direct or indirect seems difficult to say.

Only a precise inquiry will allow one to confirm actual borrowings from the dialogue that are not merely general notions inherited from the Platonic tradition, and to indicate the possible influence of Neoplatonic references to the dialogue on Gregory." (p. 217)

289. Rickless, Samuel C. 1998. "How *Parmenides* Saved the Theory of Forms." *The Philosophical Review* no. 107:501–554.

"Here is a brief sketch of the interpretation I propose to defend. In the dialogues of his Middle Period (principally, the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*), Plato had put forward a theory of Forms (call it "MPTF", for "Middle Period Theory of Forms") and had used it to argue for various philosophically significant conclusions (including the thesis that the soul is immortal). In Part I of the *Parmenides*, Socrates appeals to MPTF in order to rebut a troubling argument of Zeno's to the paradoxical conclusion that things are not many. *Parmenides* then proposes a series of arguments designed to prove that every plausible version of MPTF is inconsistent. (A version of a theory is obtained by adding one or more theses to the axioms of the theory.) Taking these arguments to be sound, Socrates recognizes that at least one (perhaps all) of the axioms of MPTF must be rejected. But it is not yet clear to him which (or how many) of them must go. In Part II, *Parmenides* embarks on a series of deductions in order to prove that a particular axiom of MPTF (call it "X") is false. Having followed *Parmenides*' arguments in Part II, Socrates should be able to see that X should be rejected, that the result of removing X from MPTF is a leaner and meaner theory of Forms, and that this leaner and meaner theory can meet at least four of the five main challenges to MPTF raised by *Parmenides* in Part I. The overall message of the *Parmenides*, then, is that, despite having suffered bruises in the first part of the dialogue, the Forms are still very much alive." (pp. 502-503)

290. ———. 2007. *Plato's Forms in Transition: A Reading of the Parmenides*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The project of writing this book began with the realization that my article [*] had provided a cursory, and in the end inaccurate, interpretation of the second half of the *Parmenides*. The article had also failed to draw Plato's various statements about the forms into a coherent theory, with independent axioms and with theorems following deductively from the result of combining these axioms with auxiliary assumptions. The pages that follow are the result of my attempt to atone for these deficiencies by providing a complete logical reconstruction of all the arguments of the dialogue. As I argue below, such a reconstruction provides the key needed to solve the enduring mystery of the *Parmenides*." (Preface, p IX)

[*] *How Parmenides Saved the Theory of Forms* (1998).

291. Rist, John M. 1962. "The *Parmenides* Again." *Phoenix* no. 16:1–14.

About Runciman, Plato's *Parmenides* (1959).

"There is one further question that should be mentioned. Why did Plato write the *Parmenides* in such an obscure form that it has always been an enigma to its readers? The answer to this cannot be a matter of proof, but there are certain indications that may help towards a solution.

The two dialogues nearest in time to the *Parmenides* are the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. In the former of these Plato refuses to discuss the theories of the Eleatics for fear of misinterpreting them (183DE); in the latter he introduces the Eleatic Stranger criticizing some of the most important tenets of his "father" *Parmenides* (e.g. 237A). It is clear that at this stage of his life Plato first faced up to the theories of the Eleatics theories which, though he recognized their worth, in many ways clashed with his own. Here in the *Parmenides* he is presenting the full force of this rival doctrine in the persons and methods of its most distinguished representatives. There is a correlation of theme and form in the second part of the *Parmenides*. The form is that of Eleatic logic; the theme is, in part, the inadequacy of Eleatic conclusions. And together with a

demonstration of this inadequacy Plato is able to include a revision of his own theory, and in particular of that part of it which is most relevant to a consideration of *Parmenides*, namely the role of absolute Unity." (p. 14, a note omitted)

292. ———. 1962. "The Neoplatonic One and Plato's *Parmenides*." *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* no. 93:389–401.

"As Dodds has remarked, Moderatus must still have had considerable importance in the third century. (32) He was read in the schools of both Plotinus and Origen. (3?) If we have interpreted the matter aright, his great importance in the history of ancient philosophy rests on his interpretation of the *Parmenides* on Pythagorean lines. This interpretation was read and accepted by Plotinus, who, in doing so, took a decisive step for the future of Platonism by dethroning the Aristotelian νοῦς from the rank of First Cause. Though other writers, such as Albinus, may have derived theories of "negative theology" from the *Parmenides* either directly or indirectly, only Moderatus before Plotinus explained the second part in a way which was to become, through the metaphysical genius of Plotinus, fundamental for Neoplatonic thought." (p. 401)

(32) Dodds, ["The Parmenides of Plato and the Origins of the Neoplatonic One", *Classical Quarterly* 22 (1928) 129–42] 139, note 3.

(33) Cf. Porphyry, *Vita Plot.* 20 and Euseb., *HE* 6.19.8

293. ———. 1970. "Parmenides and Plato's *Parmenides*." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 20:221–229.

"In two of his dialogues especially, the *Sophist* and the *Parmenides*, Plato concerns himself at length with problems presented by the Eleatics. Despite difficulties in the interpretation of individual passages, the *Sophist* has in general proved the less difficult to understand, and since some of the problems at issue in the two works indicate the same or similar preoccupations in Plato's mind, it is worth considering how far an interpretation of the 'easier' dialogue can be used to forward an interpretation of the more difficult. First, therefore, we must identify problems common to the two works; then we must see whether we can understand what Plato understood Parmenides to have done—this may help towards an understanding of what he did in fact do; finally we can apply our findings to the *Parmenides* itself, particularly to the problem of the unity of the dialogue, in the hope that Plato's intentions may become clearer." (p. 221)

294. Robichaud, Denis J.-J. 2019. "Tearing Plato to Pieces: Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola and Marsilio Ficino on the History of Platonism." *Renaissance and Reformation = Renaissance et Réforme* no. 42:103–133.

Abstract: "This article considers Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola's understanding of the history of Platonism in his *Examen vanitatis*. It analyzes his sources and methods for understanding the history of philosophy—genealogical source criticism, historiographical analysis, and comparative history—and argues that his approach is shaped by anti-Platonic Christian apologetics. It documents how Gianfrancesco Pico closely studies Marsilio Ficino's and his uncle Giovanni Pico's understandings of Platonism and its history, and how his contextualization of their work within the broader history of Platonism is part of a larger endeavour to turn the page and even close the book on this chapter of the Quattrocento. Although neither Ficino nor Gianfrancesco finds universal agreement among ancient Platonists, Ficino explains their history as one of inquiry and interpretation, in which Platonism and Christianity are inexorably united, whereas Gianfrancesco characterizes it as a history of lies and disagreements that threaten Christianity. In trying to protect sacred history, Gianfrancesco Pico helped develop the tools that would eventually critique it."

295. Robinson, Richard. 1942. "Plato' *Parmenides* I." *Classical Philology* no. 37:51–76.

"This study discusses and recommends the following propositions about Plato's *Parmenides*: (1) The arguments in the first part are directed against the existence of Forms, not of sensibles. (2) The theory of Forms discussed in the first part is that of Plato's own middle dialogues. (3) Plato regarded these arguments as neither fatal nor negligible, but serious difficulties requiring serious attention. (4) Plato never answered these arguments in his dialogues. (5) The second part of the *Parmenides* contains no statement of doctrine, either directly or indirectly. (6) The second part of this dialogue contains no statement of method, either directly or indirectly. (7) Both parts of the dialogue are intended to provide Plato's pupils with practice in dialectic and in the detection of errors in reasoning. (8) Professor

Cornford's recent interpretation of the dialogue combines this view with another view; but the two are really incompatible." (p. 51)

296. ———. 1942. "Plato' *Parmenides* II." *Classical Philology* no. 37:159–186.

"The second part of the *Parmenides*, then, is not a statement of doctrine, either directly or indirectly. Is it a direct or indirect statement of method? There is one extremely good reason for holding it to be a direct statement of method, a straightforward example of a method that Plato recommends us to practice, and this is that Plato makes Parmenides deliberately and seriously introduce it as such. The transitional passage says, with every appearance of earnestness, that Socrates' difficulties about the Forms are due to his want of training. Parmenides prescribes for him a training which he defines as Zeno's procedure with certain modifications. He then gives the illustration." (p. 159)

297. ———. 1953. *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Second edition (first edition 1941).

See the chapter XIII: Hypothesis in the *Parmenides* pp. 223-280, previously published in *Classical Philology*, 37, 1942, pp. 51-76.

298. Rochol, Hans. 1971. "The Dialogue "Parmenides": An Insoluble Enigma in Platonism?" *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 11:496–520.

299. Rodriguez, Evan. 2019. "More than a *Reductio*: Plato's Method in the *Parmenides* and *Lysis*." *Études Platoniciennes* no. 15:1–19.

Abstract: "Plato's *Parmenides* and *Lysis* have a surprising amount in common from a methodological standpoint. Both systematically employ a method that I call 'exploring both sides', a philosophical method for encouraging further inquiry and comprehensively understanding the truth. Both have also been held in suspicion by interpreters for containing what looks uncomfortably similar to sophistic methodology. I argue that the methodological connections across these and other dialogues relieve those suspicions and push back against a standard developmentalist story about Plato's method. This allows for a better understanding of why exploring both sides is explicitly recommended in the *Parmenides* and its role within Plato's broader methodological repertoire."

300. ———. 2022. "A Long Lost Relative in the *Parmenides*? Plato's Family of Hypothetical Methods." *Apeiron* no. 55:141–166.

Abstract: "The *Parmenides* has been unduly overlooked in discussions of hypothesis in Plato. It contains a unique method for testing first principles, a method I call 'exploring both sides'. The dialogue recommends exploring the consequences of both a hypothesis and its contradictory and thematizes this structure throughout. I challenge the view of Plato's so-called 'method of hypothesis' as an isolated stage in Plato's development; instead, the evidence of the *Parmenides* suggests a family of distinct hypothetical methods, each with its own peculiar aim. Exploring both sides is unique both in its structure and in its aim of testing candidate principles."

301. Roeklein, Robert J. 2011. *Plato versus Parmenides: the Debate over Coming-into-Being in Greek Philosophy*. Lanham: Lexington Books.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; 1. Parmenides' Argument 13; 2. Parmenides and the Milesian Philosophies: "Nothing Comes from Nothing" --- Physics or Logic? 37; 3. Parmenides' Influence of Empedocles and Anaxagoras 57; 4. Plato's Socrates and His Theory of Causation 83; 5. The *Parmenides*: Plato's Proof of Coming to Be 121; 6. The *Theaetetus*: Plato's Proof That the Objects of Knowledge Are Indivisible 159; Bibliography 187; Index 195-199.

"At the core of this investigation into Plato and Parmenides, one may observe that there is not only a massive and irreducible tension between these two philosophical models: it is also clear that this distinction is one heavily freighted with political implications. Parmenides, as indicated previously, supplies us with a model of scientific knowledge which does not rest upon evidence and fact which is

available to the ordinary speakers, and which is not contained in the ordinary opinions. By contrast, Plato's Socrates, and his theory of cause, recognize an irrefutable and diamond-hard intelligence operative in the substance of the ordinary opinions. In the case of the science that Plato's Socrates presents and develops, expert knowledge is wholly dependent upon the knowledge of fact which is held, in Plato's doctrine, to belong to ordinary opinions, and to in fact be constitutive of what are now commonly referred to as natural languages." (p. 11)

302. Rossvær, Viggo. 1983. *The Laborious Game: A Study of Plato's Parmenides*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

"How can irony tell us about the meaning of the doctrine of ideas?

In *Parmenides*, where Plato at least pretends to say something definite about the ideas, Socrates is made to leave the scene in the second part when the real discussion starts. Socrates' practice seems too poor to handle the intricacies of the dialectical tours-de-force in the second part of this dialogue. The hair-raising effects of the Socratic paradoxes may easily seem out of place if one wishes to understand the notion of idea.

Still, the art and play of Socrates may teach us something important about the second part of the *Parmenides*. Maybe the greatest obstacle to an understanding is our inability to notice what is shown on the surface, so to speak. Instead, we press forward in order to reformulate what we think lies beyond the surface.

The investigation into the nature of the One in the *Parmenides* can be seen as an attempt to register what happens when we try to say what the nature of the One is. When we do this, we will experience an intellectual shock: if we state, in Plato's words, that the One is, we are forced to the conclusion that it isn't. And if we state that it is not, we are forced to conclude that it is.

But this is not all. If we take the above argument as presenting us with an internal inconsistency which may force us to give up the doctrine of ideas, Plato's irony will anticipate the move and urge us to write it down as a new hypothesis. He will then show that the argument to the effect that the doctrine of ideas must be given up cannot itself be formulated without implying the opposite conclusion.

But it would be pointless to try and state the general philosophy of the *Parmenides*. There is no general theory in that dialogue that can be abstracted from the particular arguments. What by way of introduction is suggested about the general theory can be properly demonstrated." (pp. 9-10)

303. Rousakis, Evangelos. 2024. "Parmenides and the horse of Ibycus. The hidden meaning of the personification and its role in the dialogue of the *Parmenides*." *ΣΧΟΛΗ. Philosophical Antiquity and the Classical Tradition* no. 18:44–55.

Abstract: "In this essay, the function of the personification of Parmenides himself with the horse of Ibycus in Plato's *Parmenides* will be elaborated. The analytical process of this reference by Parmenides will focus to demonstrate that the personification is an allegorical element of Plato whose role in the dialogue is crucial for the understanding of the author's objective about the second more extended part of the *Parmenides*."

304. Runciman, Walter Garrison. 1959. "Plato's *Parmenides*." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* no. 64:89–120.

"My purpose in adding to the already considerable literature on the *Parmenides* is as follows: I think it can now be satisfactorily established that the dialogue contains no fundamental modification of the theory of forms, but that it nevertheless represents serious expression of Plato's own comments on the theory. Further, I wish to suggest that the second part contains no explicit exposition of doctrinal or metaphysical teaching, but that its moral is to be deduced from the fact that its contradictions are possible at all; that this moral is both more than the need for dialectical gymnastics and less than the abandonment of the theory of forms; that it can be drawn from the consideration of the second part in its relation to the first; and that the dialogue can accordingly be seen as a coherent and serious whole." (p. 89, a note omitted)

305. Runia, David T. 2010. "Early Alexandrian Theology and Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 175–187. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"When I was first asked to speak about Philo's interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*, I was rather hesitant. My initial response was to say that to my knowledge Philo never makes any reference to this particular Platonic dialogue and that it was hard to talk at any length about nothing. It must of course be agreed that not everyone finds this difficult in equal measure. Philosophers as a rule do not find it at all hard to speak about nothing. In fact some of them appear to revel in it.

Theologians have a little more difficulty in doing this, and are not amused when people say that they do little else. Historians find it much harder, while philologists find it flatly impossible. Both of them, it would seem, need a subject on which to focus their musings. But perhaps on reflection it is possible to say something on the subject, if it is taken in a broader sense than just concentrating on direct use of the original Platonic text. This will be my approach in the remarks that follow." (p. 175, a note omitted)

306. Ryle, Gilbert. 1939. "Plato's *Parmenides*." *Mind* no. 48:129–151.

Second part: *Mind*, 48, PP. 302-325.

Reprinted in: R. E. Allen, *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965 pp. 97-147; G. Ryle, *Collected Papers. Volume I. Critical Essays*, London: Hutchinson 1971 (reprint: New York, Routledge, 2009), *Essay I* pp. 1-44.

"The following observations are arguments in favour of a certain interpretation of Plato's dialogue, the *Parmenides*. According to this interpretation the dialogue is philosophically serious, in the sense that its author thought that its arguments were valid and that its problem was one of philosophical importance. Further, it will be maintained that he was right on the latter point and predominantly right on the former point. The problem is important and most of the arguments are valid.

It will be suggested that the obvious obscurity of the dialogue is due to a very natural cause, namely that Plato could not with the logical apparatus accessible to him propound in set terms what is the general conclusion or even the main drift of the dialogue. For the construction of the required logical apparatus could not be taken in hand until after the inevitability of the sorts of antinomies which the dialogue exhibits had been realised." (p. 1 of the reprint)

307. Sabrier, Pauline. 2019. "Parts, Forms, and Participation in the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*: A Comparison." *Études platoniciennes* no. 15:1–13.

Abstract: "This paper addresses the vexed question of the outcome of the second horn of the dilemma of participation in Plato's *Parmenides* bringing in *Sophist* 257c7-d5 where the Eleatic Stranger accepts what he seems to reject in the *Parmenides*, namely that a Form can have parts and nevertheless remain one. Comparing Plato's treatment of parts of Forms in both passages, and in particular the relation among Being, Change and Rest at *Sophist* 250a8-c8, I argue that unlike in the *Parmenides*, in the *Sophist*, parts and wholes are seen as offering a structure that can explain how things that may, at first, appear unrelated nevertheless belong together."

308. Sanday, Eric . 2009. "Eleatic Metaphysics in Plato's *Parmenides*: Zeno's Puzzle of Plurality." *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* no. 3:208–226.

"If you were to assert that there are many beings in the world—many houses, trees, people, objects, and so on—there is an obvious sense in which this would be true. What is harder to see, however, is the sense in which this is false. The discrete intelligibility and integrity of individual things obscure the deeper sense in which being and intelligibility are prior to individuals, which is a basic insight motivating Socrates' so-called theory of forms. In this article I argue that Zeno's puzzle of plurality in the *Parmenides* is a device for turning attention away from individual beings toward their being and intelligibility and that this metaphysical turn of Zeno's radicalizes a Socratic insight into the "mixing" of particulars.

The first section of this article shows that the historical Zeno was involved in a project of critiquing the incoherent but unavoidable ways we have of describing our world. It is important to see this project of Zeno's as profoundly Eleatic in character and consistent with the "study of the one" outlined by Socrates in book 7 of the *Republic*. In the second part of the article this parallel between Zeno's and Socrates' "study of the one" is used to interpret the implications of Zeno's puzzle of plurality in the *Parmenides*. I conclude by proposing a metaphysics significantly different from the one normally attributed to Plato." (p. 209)

309. Sanday, Eric. 2015. *A Study of Dialectic in Plato's Parmenides*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

"The basic aim of this book is intended to be bold: to show that Plato's "theory of forms" is true and relatively intuitive once we have done the hard work of clearing away misconceptions about the nature of "is." There is perhaps no single idea in the history of philosophy that has been subject to such a wide range of conflicting interpretations, and in some notable cases it has been considered simply implausible. I will argue that the chief obstacle standing in the way of the theory of forms is the distorting effect that our everyday privileging of individual things has on understanding. Furthermore, I will claim that this privileging of what we can own, produce, and exchange, and through which we gain mastery of our surroundings, is understood in Platonic philosophy and the *Parmenides* in particular to be a significant obstacle to philosophical education. The chief philosophical work in the dialogue, in my view then, is to destabilize the false privileging of individual things that stands at the core of our everyday attitude. Once we do this, some version of the "theory of forms" will become relatively intuitive and easily understood." (p. 4)

310. ———. 2018. "Being In Late Plato." In *A Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, edited by Kirkland, Sean D. and Sanday, Eric, 147–159. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

"This chapter examines the shift in Plato's account of the *eidē* or 'forms' from the *Republic* to the *Parmenides*. Forms in the *Republic* are characterized in terms of perfection, purity, and changelessness, with the form being an ultimate explanatory principle for being-X. Participants, while being-X, are also capable of not-being-X, either through qualitative change and coming-to-be, or through external changes in perspective or opinion, by which they "appear [φανήσεται]" not-X (*R.* V. 479a7). The form is treated as prior to participant and as prior to mixture with what would deny what it is. It is intrinsically changeless and not subject to changes in appearance.

In the *Parmenides*, the account of form shifts to accommodate the types of admixture demanded for combination with and division from other forms.

In the Fifth Hypothesis, forms are subject to determinate "bonds of being and not-being," which permits the form to present itself as an object of discursive knowing, being-X, - Y, and - Z, and not-being not- X, not- Y, and not- Z. Forms are still treated as pure and perfect, but now with the power of gathering together intelligible bonds of being and not- being. Thus, in the *Parmenides*, forms are the gathering source and the gathered terms subject to the admixture; they are that by which true speech is explained. In this chapter, I argue that the "turning of the soul from becoming to truth and being" (*R.* VII.525c) announced in the *Republic* is partially fulfilled through the account of veridical speech in the *Parmenides*." (p. 147)

311. ———. 2022. "The Subject and Number of Hypotheses in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 309–316. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "I address two seemingly unrelated topics: the first is the subject and formulation of the hypotheses and the second is the number of hypotheses. On the topic of the subject of the hypotheses, my position is that we are initially given an indefinite monad, a "one", which is in no case "the one", "the one itself", or the form of unity. We are meant to read the hypotheses with the question in mind, "what one is this?" If we do so, we are confronted with strikingly different answers, which, when taken together, point us toward key insights into the nature of intelligibility. On the topic of the number of hypotheses: we are led to expect four, but we are given eight. My position is that we are meant to disarm apparent contradictions between paired hypotheses, especially H1-H2 but also H3-4, 5-6, and 7-

8, because doing so will help us further determine the different types of monad Parmenides has in view. In the end, two primary types of monad emerge from the process of disambiguation, namely, form and sensible particular, and we, having differentiated these types of "one", will have gathered resources for understanding how sensible particulars are grounded in forms."

312. Santoro, Alessio. 2022. "Eleatic training. The aim and uses of dialectic in Plato's *Parmenides* and Aristotle's *Topics*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 201–208. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "This paper analyses the "transitional" section of Plato's *Parmenides* by focusing on the explicit aim and uses of Parmenides' exercise and by comparing them with Aristotle's description of the aim and uses of dialectic in the *Topics*. In short, it suggests that, in the *Parmenides*, Plato displays not merely a dialectical exercise, but more specifically a method of philosophical inquiry. It begins by analysing how Plato introduces Parmenides' exercise (*gymnasia*) at 135c-136e. It then clarifies the relationship between this exercise and the method used by the character Zeno of Elea in the first part of the work. Finally, it turns to the description of dialectic in Aristotle's *Topics* 1.2 and 8.14, which bears striking similarities with *Parmenides* 135c-136e. Based on this line of argument, on the one hand, it concludes that Aristotle's dialectic can be regarded as a refinement of the Zenonian method described in the *Parmenides*; on the other, it suggests that the second part of the dialogue showcases an example of good dialectic at the service of philosophical investigation."

313. Sanzotta, Valerio. 2014. "Some unpublished notes by Marsilio Ficino on Plato's *Parmenides* in MS Laur. 89 sup. 71." *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* no. 77:211–224.

"It is well established that Marsilio Ficino's account of Plato's *Parmenides* depends on the onto-theological reading of it endorsed by Proclus and other Neoplatonists. Already in antiquity, this approach stood opposed to that of Albinus and Alcinous, who both held that the *Parmenides* should be interpreted as a logical treatise. It was Proclus's commentary on the dialogue which Ficino had on his desk, as his main source, while working on his own full-scale commentary, written between 1492 and 1494 and published in 1496. The work was the fruit of Ficino's reflections on the *Parmenides* over thirty years, developing from his early reading of Proclus. References to the theological interpretation of the *Parmenides* can already be found in his autograph notes on Proclus's *Platonic Theology* in Florence, Biblioteca Riccardiana MS 70 (folios 1^r - 4^v), copied by Matthaeus Camariota; this manuscript contains Proclus's *Platonic Theology*, *Elements of Theology* and *Elements of Physics*, as well as Ocellus Lucanus's *On the Nature of the Universe*, which Ficino

studied and probably translated before 1463." (p. 211, notes omitted)

314. Sattler, Barbara M. 2019. "Time and Space in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Études platoniciennes* no. 15:1–33.

Abstract: "In this paper I investigate central temporal and spatial notions in the second part of Plato's *Parmenides* and argue that also these notions, and not only the metaphysical ones usually discussed in the literature, can be understood as a response to positions and problems put on the table by Parmenides and Zeno. Of the spatial notions examined in the dialogue, I look at the problems raised for possessing location and shape, while with respect to temporal notions, I focus on the discussion of 'being in time' and *exaiphnês* (the latter notion will be shown to be also an important influence for Aristotle's *Physics*).

In displaying a paradoxical character and taking up crucial notions from Parmenides, the second part of the *Parmenides* seems to display some resemblance to Zeno's paradoxes. I will show, however, that in contrast to Zeno, the second part of Plato's *Parmenides* also demonstrates Parmenides' One to be problematic on its own terms. Furthermore, the dialogue presents not only important problems that these spatial and temporal notions seem to lead us into, but also establishes some positive features necessary to think of time and space.

In this way, Plato's *Parmenides* can be seen as contributing to the development of temporal and spatial conceptualisations in ancient Greek thought."

315. Sayre, Kenneth M. 1978. "Plato's *Parmenides*: Why the Eight Hypotheses Are Not Contradictory." *Phronesis. A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* no. 23:133–150.

"One purpose of this paper is to argue (1) that the order of pairing assumed by the commentators in fact is erroneous, and can be seen to be erroneous on textual grounds. Another purpose is to show (2) that the eight hypotheses properly paired are not contradictory.

It is not among the purposes of this paper to argue for or against any of the standard interpretations of the eight hypotheses. If I am correct in claiming that all these interpretations rest upon a mistaken conception of how the hypotheses are related, it is reasonable to presume that each interpretation itself is to some extent mistaken. To test this presumption in each individual case, however, would be far too ambitious for the present project. My own view is that the second part of the *Parmenides* has as one of its primary aims the development of a number ontology, similar in scope but not in detail to the Pythagorean system.(6) But this also is more than can be argued in a single article." (pp. 133-134)

(6) Evidence for this interpretation includes (i) the language and content of *Parmenides* 140B-E and 149D-151B, which reflect Eudoxus's method of defining ratios, allowing the construction of both rational and irrational numbers on the basis of measure (great and small) and (ii) the progression of the several theorems under the second hypothesis from the generation of numbers out of the unlimited multitude (143A-144A) to the derivative definition of things admitting shape (145A-B), motion (145E-146A), self-identity (146A-147C) and ultimately change in time (155E-157B). Interpreted in detail, these and associated passages may be construed as substantiating Aristotle's claim that Plato "agreed with the Pythagoreans in saying that the One is substance and not a predicate of something else; and in saying that the Numbers are the causes of the reality of other things he agreed with them; but positing a dyad and constructing the infinite out of great and small, instead of treating the infinite as one, is peculiar to him; and so is his view that the Numbers exist apart from sensible things. . ." This passage from *Metaphysics* 987B 23-8 (Random House edition), which generally has been understood to refer to an unwritten doctrine of Plato, instead describes succinctly what Plato appears to be trying to accomplish in his development of the consequences of the second hypothesis of the *Parmenides*.

316. ———. 1983. *Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

New edition with a new Introduction and the Essay "Excess and deficiency at *Statesman* 283c-85c", Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing 2005.

"Be this as it may, I am convinced that *Parmenides II* was written after the *Timaeus* and close in time to the *Philebus*. My reasons for this conviction are (i) that *Parmenides II* contains a massive and formally conclusive refutation of the Eleatic conception of Being which stood behind the *Timaeus*, and (ii) that it provides a number of important links in the conceptual development leading to the ontology of the *Philebus*. According to the viewpoint of the present study, in brief, the *Parmenides* as a whole is a transitional link between the old theory of the middle period, inadequately repaired in the intermediate dialogues,

and the radically new theory of the *Philebus*—Plato's final discussion of ontological topics. The primary task of Chapter 1 is to establish the *Parmenides* in this transitional role." (p. 16)

(...)

"The present section develops my reasons for thinking that *Parmenides*' arguments against the early theory represented by Socrates were not intended by Plato to be conclusive at all, but that they were intended to serve a rhetorical function instead.

To this end, I argue that the main purpose of *Parmenides I* is to highlight those aspects of the theory of Forms in the middle dialogues which Plato thinks must be reexamined if an adequate theory is to be forthcoming. The following section shows how *Parmenides II* explores the conditions of the required alterations, thereby establishing continuity between the two parts of the dialogue." (p. 20)

317. ———. 1992. "A maieutic view of five late dialogues." In *Methods of Interpreting Plato and His Dialogues*, edited by Klagge, James C. and Smith, Nicholas D., 221–243. New York: Oxford

University Press.

Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. Supplementary volume.

"There are five dialogues of Plato's late period, each consisting of a conversation with a master philosopher, in which the conversation is organized by methodological principles explicitly proposed by the philosopher himself. In the case of the *Theaetetus*, the method was stated by Socrates in earlier dialogues, notably the *Phaedo* and book 6 of the *Republic*. In each of the remaining four, however, the method is expounded and applied within the same conversation-by the Stranger from Elea in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, by Parmenides himself in his namesake dialogue, and by a renovated Socrates in the late *Philebus*. I shall refer to these five as the methodological dialogues." (p. 221)

(...)

"I have made two claims concerning the methodological dialogues.

The first is that the conversational format of these dialogues is intended to serve the maieutic function described by Socrates in the *Theaetetus*, and characterized in the *Seventh Letter* as the only path to the flame-like revelation of philosophic knowledge. The second is that the respective methods of these conversations provide the structure by which they are enabled to lead the reader to that state of fulfilment.

The first claim is supported by the texts involved, the second by the experience of the attentive reader. Neither claim by itself, perhaps, is particularly adventuresome. I have suggested further, however, that together these claims answer the question posed at the beginning of this discussion: namely, how the conversational format of these five late dialogues relates to the methods they severally illustrate. The answer, in summary, is that the method in each case provides the discipline by which the reader is enabled to follow the path of the conversation, to the state of wisdom that can be found at its end." (p. 243)

318. ———. 1996. *Parmenides' Lesson: Translation and Explication of Plato's Parmenides*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

"It is time now to explain, by way of anticipation, how the present approach differs from its many predecessors. Despite their many differences, all previous interpretations of *Parmenides II* of which I am aware share the assumption that the eight hypotheses are properly paired for interpretive purposes according to the order of their respective appearances. Thus we find hypothesis 1 paired with 2, 3 with 4, etc., which is the source of the apparent contradictions that have exercised commentators across the centuries. But there is no clear warrant for this pairing in Plato's text. What a careful reading of the relevant passages indicates, to the contrary, is an importantly different pairing schema associating hypotheses 1 and 6, 2 and 5, 3 and 7, and 4 and 8 in turn. While the textual basis of this alternative pairing-schema is examined in detail below, its vindication lies primarily with its success in making sense of Plato's arguments." (*Introduction* p. XVIII)

(...)

"Another positive result of this alternative pairing is that it indicates with greater clarity than before the historical contexts relevant to the interpretation of the various hypotheses. For reasons examined at length below, it now appears (i) that the arguments of hypotheses 1 and 6 are to be understood as pertaining to the conception of a singular Being associated with the historical Parmenides, (ii) that the arguments of hypotheses 2 and 5 pertain to the traditional Pythagorean program of deriving sensible properties from numerical quantities based on a mathematical unity, (iii) that those of hypotheses 3 and 7 relate to a particular feature of Plato's version of this Pythagorean program (as reported by Aristotle) according to which such quantities are generated by Unity in combination with the Indefinite Dyad, and (iv) that those of hypotheses 4 and 8 in turn expose further problems associated with the alleged unity of the Forms according to the theory espoused by Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue. If these claims can be sustained, the effect is not only to vindicate Cornford's judicious insight that *Parmenides II* takes sides in the ancient debate between the Eleatics and the Pythagoreans, but also to

suggest that the surface-level arguments of *Parmenides II* resolve the aporia induced in the first part of the dialogue with more success than Miller estimates." (*Introduction* p. XIX)

319. ———. 2005. "The method revisited: *Parmenides* 135e9-136c." In *Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Ales and Karfik, Filip, 125–140. Prague: Oikoymenh.
320. Schofield, Malcolm. 1972. "The Dissection of Unity in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Classical Philology* no. 67:102–109.

"At the beginning of the second deduction in part two of the *Parmenides*, Parmenides argues that his premise, "one is," implies that the one consists of two elements, one (or unity) and being (142B5-D9). He goes on to offer a proof that the whole they constitute must contain infinitely many elements of this sort (142D9-143A3). From this he passes to a long proof that not only this complex whole, but also the element one or unity which forms a part of it is infinitely many, inasmuch as it is distributed and divided up among the infinitely many parts of being (143A4-144E7). Here is his argument, in barest outline: If unity is, unity, being, and difference (that in virtue of which unity and being are different things) must be (143A4-B8). But to speak of these things naturally involves one in treating them each severally as one, and together as two or three (143C1-D7); and if there are these numbers, there must be all numbers (143D7-144A5). So all the numbers exist. Now each number (or alternatively, each unit in every number) is part of being, and so one part of being. But the only way that unity can be distributed among all these parts of being is by being divided into parts itself, into infinitely many parts (144A5-E7)." (p. 102)

(...)

"So Plato is at 144A-E concerned with the specifically Eleatic tendency to treat reality as necessarily extended. But-and here I come to my final point-his interest in this Eleatic characteristic was no doubt developed partly because he saw it as a philosophically sophisticated elaboration of a very common mode of thinking among ordinary people.

(...)

I am accordingly inclined to suppose that Plato is absorbed here in something he took to be a very widespread form of mistake about numbers. It was a mistake on which notoriously the Pythagoreans built a whole philosophy, at least on Aristotle's account,(20) and it may be that Plato had them in mind when he wrote this passage." (pp. 108-109)

(20) See e.g., *Metaph.* 1, 985b32-986a3, 986a1S-21, 987b27-28; 13, 1083b8-13 (with e.g., W. Burkert, *Weisheit und Wissenschaft* [Nuremberg, 1962], pp. 28-37).

321. ———. 1973. "A Neglected Regress Argument in the *Parmenides*." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 23:29–44.

"In recent years a great deal of scholarly and philosophical discussion has been devoted to the interpretation and evaluation of the regress arguments which Parmenides is made to deploy against the theory of Ideas in the first part of the dialogue which takes its name from him. By contrast, scarcely anything has been written about the infinite regress argument which Parmenides presents at the start of the second of the deductions which make up the dialogue's second part. Yet while it may contain less to reward the philosopher than the earlier regresses, it can hardly fail to perplex the scholar. In this paper I aim to expound and resolve some of the difficulties attaching to the passage in which the argument occurs (142 c 7-143 a 3); and in particular to examine the interpretation of the argument offered by Professor Owen, and provide an alternative account of my own." (p. 29)

322. ———. 1973. "Eudoxus in the *Parmenides*." *Museum Helveticum* no. 30:1–19.

"If any of Plato's dialogues was written exclusively for the Academy, then the *Parmenides* must have a strong claim to be such a work. Parmenides' critique of the Ideas in the first part of the dialogue is very plausibly read as Plato's contribution to the debate in the Academy (known to us from Aristotle) about

the viability of the theory(1). And he must have expected the huge and baffling dialectical exercise of the second part to appeal to readers in the Academy and to hardly anyone else: certainly that is where it made an impact, as Aristotle's exploitation of the dialogue proves(2). It seems reasonable, therefore, to scrutinize the *Parmenides* for signs that Plato is not merely discussing topics which interested or were to interest other members of the Academy, but actually responding to theories already presented by them. It has sometimes been felt that he makes some allusion to the views of the mathematician and astronomer Eudoxus of Cnidus, in particular. I want to reconsider the question. I shall begin by considering the opinions of two recent writers." (p. 1)

(1) Aristotle attacked the views of Plato and of Eudoxus in *Περὶ Ἰδεῶν* (for the fragments of this work, see *Aristotelis Fragmenta*, ed. V. Rose [Leipzig 1886] nos. 185-189). Comprehensive criticisms of Plato's theory are put forward in *Metaph.* A 9, M 4 and 5; and, of course, Aristotle discusses it more or less incidentally in many other places. The evidence for the views of Speusippus and Xenocrates on Ideas is collected in P. Lang, *De Speusippi Academici scriptis* (Bonn 1911) nos. 42-43, and in R. Heinze, *Xenokrates* (Leipzig 1892) nos. 30-34. For the *Parmenides* as a contribution to a debate, see e.g. D. J. Allan, *Aristotle and the Parmenides*, in *Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth Century*, ed. I. During and G. E. L. Owen (Göteborg 1960) 133-144.

(2) For Aristotle's use of the *Parmenides* in the *Physics*, see G. E. L. Owen, 'τι&έναι τὰ φαινόμενα', in *Aristote et les problèmes de méthode* (Louvain/Paris 1961) 92-102 (= *Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. J. M. E. Moravcsik [New York 1967] 177-190.

323. ———. 1974. "Plato on Unity and Sameness." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 24:33–45.

"In my concluding section I first say something about the logic of the argument I attribute to Parmenides in my first section [*Parmenides* 139 d1-e4], and about the place of the argument within the first deduction of the second part of the dialogue. Then I consider the relevance of the passage to certain characteristic theses of Plato's middle and later metaphysical dialogues. Finally, I compare Plato's treatment of sameness and unity here with Aristotle's in the *Metaphysics*." (p. 38)

(...)

"We have stumbled into that obscure but central dispute about ἀρχαί which so occupied members of the Academy; and, as so often, the *Parmenides* and the *Philebus*, the two dialogues of Plato which might be expected to throw light at least on his own attitudes, give us very little to go on. The forceful argument of the *Parmenides* that being the same does not entail being one makes it look as though Plato thought sameness was not to be explained in terms of unity, at any rate when he wrote that dialogue. Whether we should press his incidental use of Pythagorean 'columns' similar to Aristotle's in the *Philebus* as indicating conversion to something like Aristotle's contrary opinion we cannot know.

Even supposing it were right to do so, we should be unable to give any acceptable account of why he changed his mind." (p. 45)

324. ———. 1977. "The Antinomies of Plato's *Parmenides*." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 27:139–158.

"In this paper, therefore, I attempt to advance discussion on an absolutely fundamental question concerning the logical character of Part II of the dialogue." (p 139)

(...)

"I side with Ryle in believing the antinomies to be, at least in Plato's intention, genuine antinomies. But there is an evident complexity in Plato's treatment of 'one', and a hardly less obvious variety in his manner of argument, which Cornford's account accommodates much more successfully than Ryle's simple picture. I take as my task the construction of a more sophisticated conception of Platonic antinomy than either Ryle or Cornford envisaged, which will embody both Ryle's central insight and Cornford's sensitivity to the shifting focus and status of Plato's arguments. Perhaps I should speak of application rather than construction. For the idea of antinomy I shall be using is in essence that worked out by Professor Owen in his article on the *Parmenides*. He himself has used it mainly to diagnose and describe the conflict of specific arguments within a single chain of deductions or in two different

chains. I shall employ it and elaborate it with respect to the large-scale structure of antinomies." (p. 140)

References

F.M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1939).

G.E.L. Owen, 'Notes on Ryle's Plato', in *Ryle: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. O.P. Wood and G. Pitcher (London: Macmillan, 1971) [pp. 341-372].

G. Ryle, 'Plato's Parmenides', *Mind* N.S. 48 (1939), 129-51, 303-25 (reprinted with an Afterword in *Studies in Plato's Metaphysics*, ed. R.E. Allen (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), and without it in G. Ryle, *Collected Papers*, Vol. 1 (London: Hutchinson, 1971).

325. Schroeder, Frederic M. 1978. "The Platonic Parmenides and imitation in Plotinus " *Dionysius* no. 2:51–73.

"The language of imitation is for Plotinus the greatest and most satisfactory mode of metaphysical discourse. With this tool he seeks to show that the many problems which surround his proclamation of transcendence admit of a common solution. These problems, which are very much still with those who would assert a metaphysical dimension in our lives, receive their classical form in the *Parmenides* of Plato. Of particular interest to the discussion of imitation in Plotinus are the introductory arguments of that dialogue." (p. 51)

326. Scolnicov, Samuel. 1974. "Philebus 15b1-8." *Studi Classici e Orientali* no. 1:3–13.

"Opinions have been sharply divided over the interpretation of *Philebus* 15B1-8. The focus of the controversy is in the determination of how many questions there are in this passage, and what they are." (p. 3)

(...)

In short, on the "two questions" interpretation, there is a discrepancy between the statement of the problem at 15B and the solutions proposed to it, either explicit or implicit. Of course, Plato *could* have failed to provide a solution for his problems. But, as it seems to me, this would be too easy a way out. A viable interpretation should, to my mind, conform to the following criteria:

- a. it should read the text in an unforced way;
- b. it should provide questions for the answers and answers for the questions;
- c. it should show the importance of the passage to the problem under discussion;
- d. it would be expected, as well, that such an interpretation would fit well into some overall view of Plato's thought.

I propose, therefore, accepting Burnet's text at 15B1-8, to offer a revised version of the "three questions" approach, which will be relevant to the metaphysical discussions of the *Philebus* as well as to an understanding of Plato's later philosophy." (p. 4)

"What I am suggesting is that the *Philebus* picks up not only the problems of the *Parmenides* as a whole, but also this particular passage at 128E-130A (and the parallel is close enough to be taken seriously into consideration). It comes back to the one-many problem in its Zenonian form, dismisses it as trivial, and then states the real problems, namely problems c. and b. above. The exposition of these problems is certainly very economic, to say the least, but if it is - as I am suggesting - a near quotation from Prm. 128E- 130A, it should be quite clear. The *Philebus* sets out to give its answer to what the earlier dialogue had considered to be the more fundamental part of the problem: the relation between the one and the many within the conceptual realm. In fact, it would have been pointless to state the problem again if no progress was about to be made beyond what was already discussed in the *Parmenides*.(4)" (p. 7)

(4) The *Parmenides*, I should like to maintain in a forthcoming paper, solves part of the problem at the level of the ideas. The *Philebus* carries it to the level of the "elements of the ideas".

327. ———. 2003. "Things Worth Wondering At: A Response to Sandra Peterson." *The Modern Schoolman*:279–287.

328. ———. 2005. "The Conditions of Knowledge in Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, edited by Havlíček, Ales and Karfik, Filip, 165–180. Prague: Oikoymenh.

329. Scoon, Robert. 1942. "Plato's *Parmenides*." *Mind* no. 51:115–133.

"One significant result of the increasing agreement among scholars on the historical order in which Plato's dialogues were composed has been the tendency to regard each of them as the expression of some philosophical interest in the author's mind at the time of composition; and this tendency has on the whole been strengthened by many fresh and valuable studies of the later dialogues, which, reveal attitudes to some degree new as compared with the earlier works. But the *Parmenides* is so extraordinarily difficult to interpret that it has not fitted well into any picture of Plato's intellectual development, and to a certain extent has been left as a kind of occasional piece by itself. Accordingly, I wish to explore the possibility of interpreting the dialogue as a documentary expression of Plato's state of mind at the time it was written." (p. 115)

330. Shorey, Paul. 1931. "Note on Plato, *Parmenides* 129-30." *Classical Philology* no. 26:91–93.

"Among the passages of Plato which seem destined to what seems to me repeated and incorrigible misinterpretation, *Parmenides* 129-30 holds in my opinion a prominent place.(2)

What Socrates there says in substance is that to exhibit the contradictions of the one and the many in concrete material things is no great trick. Zeno's dialectics in that kind, he courteously says, is a valiant piece of work. But it would be much more wonderful and admirable to illustrate the same antinomies(3) in the realm of abstractions, of pure thought, of ideas. And when Parmenides asks him if he himself has made (and makes) this distinction between pure ideas and the things that participate in them, he replies that he does.

What commentators usually make him say is, [1] that he would be surprised (because he thinks it impossible) if anyone should find these contradictions in the ideas themselves; and [2] that he is the inventor of the distinction.

The second point is of comparatively little importance for the interpretation of Plato's philosophy, though it may easily be misused in support of the Burnet-Taylor hypothesis that Plato is virtually Socrates. I will discuss both points." (p. 91)

(2) Cf. *AJP*, IX, 286-87.

(3) It is an ἀπορίᾱ, not an impossibility (130 A).

331. Silverman, Allan. 2002. *The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of Plato's Metaphysics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chapter Four: *Refining the Theory of Forms*, pp. 104-136.

"My concern here will be with the first two Hypotheses of the second part. These contain seminal insights into the very nature of what it is to be a Form. Before turning to them, however, some brief remarks are in order about the first part of the dialogue. The sequence of arguments in the first part has provoked some of the fiercest and best debates about a cardinal issue in Plato's metaphysics, the nature of "separation."

This doctrine is typically viewed in terms of Forms and particulars, although the fact that Forms can participate in other Forms suggests that it cannot be understood wholly in those terms. Besides,

reaction to these arguments in large part seems almost to define one's take on Plato's later metaphysics.

The fulcrum of interpretations is the two so-called Third Man arguments at 132a1–b2 and 132c12–133a6. Scholars have hotly debated the nature of these One-Over-Many arguments and the peculiar premises about Forms that Plato may or may not have employed in their construction. If thought to be telling objections to the Theory of Forms, these arguments signal a massive change in Plato's metaphysics. If thought to be objections that Plato knew how to dissolve, then these arguments indicate how Plato hopes to articulate a more elaborate theory of Forms. My view, in brief, is that none of these arguments is effective, and Plato knew it." (pp. 107-108, a note omitted)

332. Sinaiko, Herman L. 1965. *Love, Knowledge, and Discourse in Plato: Dialogue and Dialectic in Phaedrus, Republic, Parmenides*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Chapter 4: *Dialectic in the Parmenides: Being and the Reality of Discourse*, pp. 191-283.

"Through a detailed analysis of several discussions of dialectic in the dialogues, I hope to articulate an adequate conception of what Plato meant by the term —a conception which will comprehend both views described above and bridge the gap between them. For the nature of dialectic is such that at its lower limits it includes inconclusive and faulty arguments based on hastily conceived opinions such as are found in the *Euthyphro* and the *Jon*, and at its upper limit it involves a kind of argumentation and reasoning of which the dialogues provide only the faintest momentary glimpses.

Specifically, I shall discuss dialectic as it is described in the *Phaedrus*, the *Republic*, and the *Parmenides*. The brief statement on dialectic in the second half of the *Phaedrus* is seemingly straightforward and explicit, and it is illustrated by examples taken from the two speeches which Socrates gives earlier in the dialogue. From this passage and the speeches on which it is based. I shall develop a general account of what dialectic is. Then I shall present a fuller and more rigorous explanation of how dialectic functions through an examination of the somewhat longer description of dialectic near the end of Book VII of the *Republic* and the earlier simile of light in which this description is grounded. Finally I shall take up the *Parmenides*. In this, perhaps the most mysterious and difficult of the dialogues, there is only a single explicit remark on dialectic. 'The understanding of this brief statement, however, requires a summary exploration of the whole dialogue, particularly Parmenides' critique of the theory of ideas in the first half and his famous eight hypotheses on "the one" in the second. Here an attempt will be made to articulate more fully the subject matter of dialectic." (pp. 20-21)

333. Sprague, Rosamond Kent. 1967. "Parmenides' Sail and Dionysodorus' Ox." *Phronesis* no. 12:91–98.

"The purpose of this paper is to point out that a brief passage in Plato's *Euthydemus* 300E3-301 A 7 is an objection to the theory of Forms of the same general type as one of those raised in the first part of the *Parmenides*, and that this similarity should be taken into account when the meaning of those objections is discussed." (p. 91, a note omitted)

(...)

"The passage in the *Parmenides* with which I wish to compare the *Euthydemus* passage runs from 130 E 5 to 131 C 11." (è. 93)

(...)

"My own views on the matter are probably already obvious from the comments I have made on the two passages. I not only see the objections to the theory of Forms made by Dionysodorus in the *Euthydemus* as those of an Eleatic monist unwilling to concede the duality essential to the theory (and, as a result, unwilling to understand the relationship between Forms and particulars in any way which admits this duality), but I see the objections made by Parmenides in that dialogue as being of the same sort. And, further, as I do not believe Plato to have been shaken by the objections of a Dionysodorus neither do I believe him to have been shaken by those of a Parmenides.^o (pp. 97-87, a note omitted)

334. Steel, Carlos. 1997. "Iamblichus and the theological interpretation of the *Parmenides*." *Syllecta classica* no. 8:15–30.

"The development of Neoplatonism is in many ways interconnected with the history of the interpretation of the *Parmenides*. The different views about the first principles that were defended in the School since Plotinus often depended upon a particular understanding of the hypotheses of the *Parmenides*. But one could as well say that a specific reading of the *Parmenides* started from a particular set of philosophical premisses. This interdependence of hermeneutics and philosophical speculation is particularly manifest in the case of Iamblichus who, in his interpretation of the Platonic texts, always intended "to consider the truth and reality" and was never satisfied with purely philological or literary explanations.¹ His important *Commentary on the Parmenides* is unfortunately lost. However we can reconstruct the basic principles of his interpretation thanks to the information we may gather from Proclus' monumental commentary.²" (p. 15)

(...)

"In this paper, however, I will examine his most controversial interpretation of the first hypothesis, and, subsidiary, of the second. As Proclus says, all interpreters from Plotinus on had agreed "that the first hypothesis concerns the primal God," the One or the Good, the first principle and ultimate end of all things.³ Iamblichus, however, seems to be an exception. For according to Proclus he argued that the first hypothesis is concerned "with God and the gods" (περί θεοῦ καὶ θεῶν), "for the argument is not only about the One, but about all the divine henads."⁴ The position of Iamblichus about the first hypothesis is not just an eccentric view of a bizarre philosopher occupied more with theurgy and religion than philosophical questions.

On the contrary, it marks an important step in the history of the interpretation of the *Parmenides*, as is indirectly evident from the rather extended reaction of Proclus against his position."

(1) On Iamblichus' hermeneutical method, see the article of H.J. Blumenthal in this volume, pages 1-13.

(2) Although Proclus uses extensively materials from previous commentators, and particularly from Porphyry and Iamblichus, he never explicitly mentions the names of his authorities, except for Syrianus. However, it is possible to identify many anonymous positions with great certainty.(...)

(3) *In Platonis Parmenidem Commentarii* 6.1053.39-1054.1.

(4) *Ibid.*, 6.1051.37-52.2.

References

Henry J. Blumenthal, Iamblichus as a Commentator, *Syllecta Classica*, 8, 1997, pp. 1-13.

335. ———. 1999. "« Negatio negationis »: Proclus on the final lemma of the first hypothesis of the « Parmenides »." In *Traditions of Platonism: Essays in Honour of John Dillon*, edited by Cleary, John J., 351–368. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"Is it then possible that about the One these things are so? It does not seem possible to me (142a6-8) (1)

As Proclus observes in his Commentary, this is a very paradoxical conclusion which gives us much perplexity. For what does Parmenides mean when he suggests that all the preceding negative conclusions about the One are "impossible"? It seems that by this one phrase the whole preceding argument is discredited, and that we must give up the hypothesis of a pure One altogether." (p. 351)

(...)

"As we have seen, the last phrase of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* confronts us with the most difficult questions about the First. Must we abandon an absolute One as an impossibility and accept as

first principle the One-Being or Intellect (as did Origen)? And if we admit the existence of a One beyond Being, must we identify it with the First, or accept an Ineffable even beyond the One? And what is the significance of a dialectical method that ends in silence because it asks us to remove even negations?

The expression "negatio negationis" does not as such appear in Proclus' text. We took it from Meister Eckhart who gives it an important role in his theological discourse. According to Eckhart we first have to

remove from God all attributes linked to the creatures. However, ultimately we have to deny even the negations seeing that no negation is possible of God because we cannot deny something of God. Therefore we have to deny all negations, and this is *negatio negationis*. All this sounds similar to Proclus' arguments and some scholars even assume there has been an influence of Proclus on Eckhart. Apart from the historical implausibility of this thesis, it is evident that Eckhart understands this negation of negation in a quite different sense. For him indeed the *negatio negationis* is the most pure and most perfect affirmation as is God's self revelation "I am who I am." (32) The combination of negative theology with the affirmation of pure Being is in fact characteristic of all Christian Neoplatonism. In Proclus, however, the negation of negation never can have an affirmative power. It brings us into the absolute silence." (pp. 367-368)

(1) This is a dreadfully literal translation of this question, but needed to understand all the subtleties of Proclus' subsequent interpretation.

(32) *In Ex. N.74 [Latin Works II, 77.6-12](...)*

336. ———. 2004. "Definitions and ideas. Aristotle, Proclus and the Socrates of the « Parmenides »." *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* no. 19:103–121.

"For Aristotle, the doctrine of the Ideas originated because the Platonists gave separate existence to the universals, which are expressed in definitions. Given this interpretation it was not difficult to criticise the doctrine. If we have to posit transcendent Forms for each universal predicate that may be defined, we will end up with Forms of relative or negative terms and other absurdities.(5) But, as Proclus argues, Aristotle

did not understand that there is a radical difference between the universal, which is object of a definition, and the Idea or the transcendent Form, which Socrates and Plato attempt to reach by "their divine impulse." (6) Contrary to what Aristotle thinks, there is no simple correspondence between universals and Ideas. Many of the universal concepts we form by abstraction have no corresponding Idea, existing by itself and separately. There are, for example, no transcendent Ideas of artificial objects.

Moreover, the Ideas themselves escape all attempts to define them and are grasped only through an intuitive thought, which transcends all discursive dialectic.

This position, however, confronts Proclus with an embarrassing problem of interpretation. Plato uses in the text of the *Parmenides* five times the verb ορίζειν with respect to the Ideas. It is even said that those who refuse to "define" for each particular being its specific form, will destroy the basis for all dialectic. (7) How, then, can Proclus deny the possibility of defining the Ideas? It is this question, on how definitions and ideas are related, not so much the question of the historical Socrates, that will occupy our attention in this paper." (p. 105)

(5) Cf. *Metaph.* A 9, 990b4-34.

(6) 6 See *In Parm.* III 784.9-10 (Cf. also *In Parm.* I 634.25; 676.23; V 992.15). See *Parm.* 135d2-3 [Greek text omitted]

(7) See the following texts: *Parm.* 133a8-b2: *Parm.* 135a1-3: *Parm.* 135c7 [Greek text omitted]

337. ———. 2009. "Syrianus' theological interpretation of the « Parmenides »: the time of the divine souls " In *Syrianus et la métaphysique de l'Antiquité tardive : actes du colloque international, Université de Genève, 29 septembre-1er octobre 2006*, edited by Longo, Angela, 201–229. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

"Proclus calls his master Syrianus «the most theological of all interpreters» of Plato(1) The theological perspective of his reading of Plato is particularly evident in his interpretation of the *Parmenides*. As Proclus witnesses in the preface of his commentary, it is Syrianus who «has unfolded to us with his own very pure intuitions» «the most sublime (ἐποπτικωτάτη) »(2) and mystical doctrine that Plato reveals to us in

the *Parmenides* with a profundity appropriate to its subject»." (p. 201)

(...)

"In this contribution I propose to examine a passage in the *Parmenides* that seems to offer serious problems for Syrianus' theological reading, namely the last deduction from the One-that-is, which demonstrates that the One partakes of time." [*Parmen.* 151 E3 - 152 A3] (p. 205)

(1) Cfr. Procl.. in *Tim.* III, p. 1 4 , 19.

(2) Cfr. *Theol. plat.* I, 1 0 , p. 44, 5·6 where the *Parmenides* is called «the most epoptic of Plato's treatises». The term *epopteia* is used for the highest degree in the initiation rituals.

338. ———. 2016. "A rhetorical reading of Plato's « Parmenides » " In *Philosophus orator: rhetorische Strategien und Strukturen in philosophischer Literatur: Michael Erler zum 60. Geburtstag*, edited by Männlein-Robert, Irmgard, Rother, Wolfgang and Schorn, Stefan, 279–296. Basel: Schwabe.

"In the introduction of his commentary on the *Parmenides* Proclus surveys the interpretation of this dialogue in the Platonic tradition.(1) He distinguishes two types of interpretation, one called *logikos*, another *pragmateiôdês*. The latter, which he favours, assumes that the dialogue, and in particular the dialectical discussion on the One, discusses *pragmata* – realities – whether they be the Forms (as some thought), or the first principles, or the gods. The former type of interpretation is called *logikos* because it focuses on the literary form and method of the dialogue, rather than on its presumed metaphysical doctrine. In fact, as these interpreters argue, it is not possible to discover a definite doctrine in the *Parmenides*, since the dialogue ends with a host of contradictions. Within this 'logical' genre Proclus distinguishes two distinct approaches to the dialogue which are nevertheless related to one another.(2) In the present contribution, I will focus on the first of these approaches, which – in my view – should be understood as a rhetorical interpretation of the dialogue. This rhetorical reading of the *Parmenides*, which was adopted by some Platonists before Plotinus, has not been sufficiently noticed by scholars, since it is easily classified – and dismissed – under the heading 'logical'. My analysis will be based upon Proclus' summary of this interpretation in 631, 4–633, 9, a summary that he (or already Syrianus) probably took up from an earlier commentary on the *Parmenides*. There are certain editorial problems affecting the organisation of this text, which I shall discuss in a concluding philological note." (pp. 279–280, a note omitted)

(1) See on this survey Carlos Steel: *Une histoire de l'interprétation du Parménide dans l'antiquité*, in: Maria Brabanti, Francesco Romano (a cura di): *Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradizione. Atti del III Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo* (Catania 2002) 11–40; Luc Brisson: *The Reception of the Parmenides before Proclus*, in: ZAC [Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum] 12 (2008) 99–113.

(2) On this logical interpretation see Carlos Steel: *Proclus et l'interprétation logique du Parménide*, in: Linos G. Benakis (éd.): *Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale. Actes du Colloque international de Corfou, 6–8 octobre 1995* (Turnhout 1997) 69–92; Luc Brisson: *Columns VII–VIII of the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides. Vestiges of a Logical Interpretation*, in: Kevin Corrigan, John D. Turner (eds.): *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Volume 2: Its Reception in Neoplatonic, Jewish and Christian Texts* (Atlanta 2011) 111–117.

339. Steel, Carlos, and Friedrich, Rumbach. 1997. "The Final Section of Proclus' *Commentary on the Parmenides*. A Greek Retroversion of the Latin Translation." *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* no. 8:211–267.

With an English Translation by D. Gregory MacIsaac.

"The last section of Proclus' *Commentary on the Parmenides* has not been preserved in the Greek manuscript tradition, presumably because in the codex on which all of the Greek manuscripts depend, the last quire was lost. Fortunately, William of Moerbeke still had the complete text in his Greek manuscript when he translated the *Commentary* into Latin between 1280 and 1286. Since the rediscovery of this translation by R. Klibansky in 1929, this final section of the *Commentary* has aroused much interest. It is, in fact, a most interesting text, one of the major expositions of negative theology, in which Proclus gives reasons why we must ultimately negate all of the negations of the One, and even reject that the One « is » and that it is one. However, the Latin text is often very obscure, and even unintelligible, for readers not used to Moerbeke's method of translation.

When R. Klibansky, together with L. Labowsky, first published the Latin translation of the lost Greek text, they also made an English translation of it.

It is a polished and readable version, but often more a paraphrase than a translation, as whenever the Latin text was obscure, they paraphrased it. In their edition of the Latin text, they introduced some excellent conjectures, but other corrections were superfluous. They also provided a series of explanatory notes quoting many parallel texts in the other works of Proclus that contributed much to the understanding of the Latin section(1). Their translation was integrated in the complete English translation of the *Commentary* by Morrow and Dillon, with some corrections suggested by L. Westerink(2)." (p. 211)

(...)

"The substrate of the Greek text that is published here is the work of Dr. F. Rumbach. Without his scrupulous preparation, and talented Greek translation skill, I would never have had the courage to undertake this ambitious enterprise." (p. 213)

(1) *Parmenides usque ad finem primae Hypothesis nee non Procli Commentarium in Parmenidem pars ultima adhuc inedita interprete Guillelmo de Moerbeke ediderunt praefatione et adnotationibus instruxerunt R. Klibansky et C. Labiowsky (Plato Latinus, Vol.III), London 1953. We will refer to this edition as K-L.*

(2) *Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides*, translated by G.R. Morrow and J.M. Dillon, Princeton 1987.

340. Stella, Aldo, and Ianulardo, Giancarlo. 2020. "Plato and Parmenides' parricide. Some theoretical reflections." In *Mélanges en l'honneur du Professeur Jean-Marc Trigeaud*, edited by Zabalza, Alexandre, 203–213. Pompignac: Éditions Bière.

Abstract: "In this article we reconsider Parmenides' Parricide, which is notoriously thought to have been accomplished by Plato, and show that is not based on strong reasons but on the alleged undeniability of experience. Instead we think that such undeniability is only formal, being based on an extrinsic denial which requires that which is denied.

Moreover we show that those who oppose the unity of being, which is its absoluteness – as Parmenides maintains –, to the multiplicity of entities do not consider that they are not disposed on the same level, so that their opposition is untenable. Since the One

(Being) and the Many (non-being) are on different levels, one can understand the level of being as emerging beyond the universe of determination (finite being), which is that which Parmenides identifies with non-being."

341. Sternfeld, Robert, and Zyskind, Harold. 1980. "Plato's *Parmenides* and the Transcendental Conditions for Discourse." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 34:599–609.

"The *Parmenides* is thought to be Plato's most perplexing dialogue, occasioning much interpretation and controversy (1). This sketchy note presents a unifying thesis about the dialogue. Since our aim is to grasp the dialogue as a whole with the major parts in place in the developing argument, we pass over much of the detail in the total argument. Further, since we concentrate on Plato's terms directly, we do not deal with the vast commentary. We hope this will provide a stronger sense of direct contact with the original intention of the work. The scholarly task of embracing or rejecting ideas expressed elsewhere is thus left to a subsequent study."

(1) (I) We are indebted to Robert S. Brumbaugh's massive scholarly and interpretive study of the Parmenidean hypotheses in his book, *Plato on the One* (New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1961).(…)

342. ———. 1986. "Plato's *Parmenides*: The Drama and the Problem." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 40:140–156.

"In our account of the Parmenidean hypotheses(1), we noted, but were not there concerned with showing, that the dramatic structure of the dialogue reinforces the logical structure of the argument and we only sketchily listed the issues raised about the Theory of Ideas - these issues providing the occasion for Parmenides' exposition of his hypotheses. In this paper, we wish to show how the dramatic structure reinforces the argument and how the issue raised about the Theory of Ideas by Parmenides prepare for the hypotheses. We are apparently following the old comic routine: after giving the answers, we now specify what is the question appropriate to that answer. Certainly, having specified the answer as a unified argument, we do have a guide for understanding the general setting of the problem. This understanding enables us to refine one point made in our conclusion to our study of the hypotheses. We can now state more precisely the sense in which the *Parmenides* constitutes a study of the transcendental conditions of discourse." (p. 140)

(1) Robert Sternfeld and Harold Zyskind, "Plato's *Parmenides* and the Transcendental Conditions for Discourse", *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, No. 133-34 (1980) pp. 599-609.

343. ———. 1987. *Meaning, Relation and Existence in Plato's Parmenides. The Logic of Relational Realism*. New York: Peter Lang.

Table of Contents: Preface IX; Acknowledgements XV; Chapter I. Some Interpretations of and Some Themes in the *Parmenides* 1; Chapter II. The Eight Hypotheses Schema 21; Chapter III. The Nine Hypotheses Schema: The Tripartite Matrix 35; Chapter IV. The Socratic Theory of Ideas and the Hypotheses 53; Chapter V. Plato's General Theory of Abstract Relations 77; Chapter VI. Relations in Existence 93; Chapter VII. The Human Dimension 123; Chapter VIII. Conclusion: The Parmenidean Method 161; Index 181-187.

"We have gone through several stages in our coming to understand the *Parmenides*. The obvious problem is of course understanding the hypotheses. Our first paper(1) combined the schema of repeated pairs of hypotheses (our present chapter II) with the more complex matrix structure of hypotheses (our present chapter III). Our second paper(2) raised questions about the dramatic structure and about the problem of the *Parmenides* which ultimately led to more penetrating insights now found in chapters VI and VII. Chapters IV, V, and VII present our final theoretical findings about the hypotheses, these also having led us to the new insights of chapters VI and VII. The repeated return in the hypotheses to an apparently identical starting point (or its negation) suggests analogously that some sort of "reading backwards" or "recursive reading" is needed to understand this dialogue. Perhaps, understanding is cumulatively developed by moving from diverse conclusions back to an apparently "common" starting-point." (*Preface*, pp. IX-X)

(1) "Plato's *Parmenides* and the Transcendental Conditions for Discourse," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 133-34, 1980, pp. 599-609.

(2) "Plato's Parmenides: The Drama and the Problem," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 156-157, 1986, pp. 140-156.

344. Stough, Charlotte. 1976. "Explanation and the *Parmenides*." *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* no. 6:379-401.

"In what follows I propose to consider the relevance of Plato's early claim that his Forms are explanatory to the structure of, and several of the main arguments of, the *Parmenides*. The first section of the paper looks into some implications of separate existence, exploring connections between the criticism of separation and the conception of Forms as explanatory principles. I focus attention on what the Forms do not explain, and suggest that the burden of much of Parmenides' criticism centers on that question. Part two deals with Plato's evidently changing stance on the issue of explaining the Forms themselves. The third section takes up passages from the *Parmenides* in support of the view that Plato came to believe that his Forms stood in need of the same sort of explanation as he had originally thought was required for sensory particulars. The discussion is largely exploratory, and the connections adumbrated are intended as guidelines for further investigation." (p. 379)

345. Sumi, Atsushi. 2006. "The « species infima » as the infinite: Timaeus 39 E 7-9 ; Parmenides 144 B 4-C 1 ; and Philebus 16 E 1-2 in Plotinus, Ennead VI, 2, 22." In *Reading Plato in Antiquity*, edited by Tarrant, Harold A. S. and C., Baltzly. Dirk, 73-88. London: Duckworth.

"In this paper I will explicate the ne plus ultra of Plotinus' philosophical reading of Plato in VI.2.22. Here Plotinus treats together Timaeus 31b1 and 39e7-9, Parmenides 144b4-c1 and Philebus 16e1-2, viewing the former two texts as Platonic riddles. This complicated situation makes the interpretation of the key passage in lines 11-23 extremely difficult. Hence translations of that passage differ widely. Then I suggest some necessary modifications to Armstrong's translation, and clarify this extreme case of Plotinus' reading of Platonic enigmas, so that our inquiry must proceed rather like a running commentary. The basic text used in this paper is the minor edition (H-S²) by Henry and Schwyzer. Several translations in European languages are referred to, where 'the German translators' collectively stand for Harder, Beutler and Theiler. Before our careful analysis of the key passage, we must review the related context." (pp. 73-74, a note omitted)

References

Beutler, R. and W. Theiler (1960-7), *Plotins Schriften*, übersetzt von R. Harder, Neubearbeitung mit griechische Lesetext und Anmerkungen, 6 vols, Hamburg.

Henry P. and R. R. Schwyzer (eds) (1964-82), Plotinus, *Enneads*, Oxford, cited as HS². (Previous edition HS¹, 1951, Brussels.)

346. Sweeney, Leo. 1988. "Participation in Plato's Dialogues: *Phaedo*, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Timaeus*." *The New Scholasticism* no. 62:125-149.

"The aim of this paper is to give a synthetic and overview interpretation of what Plato intends by "participation" in several dialogues. "Phaedo", 100 sqq.: participation is the effect of the Forms' presence in things and of their having something in common. "Parmenides", 248-249: participation consists of things "being-caused-as-images-of Forms," where "cause" will in later dialogues be disclosed to be the Forms as models and goals and intellects as agents. "Sophist", 219 sqq. and 266a sqq: by productive art intelligent agents -- human and divine -- cause products to participate through contemplation of Forms as models. "Timaeus", 26b-30d and 47e sqq.: working with the receptacle as the participant underlying all participation, the divine craftsman uses the Forms as models and telic causes in producing individual souls and bodies, together with the entire visible universe itself. "Symposium", 210e-211b, "Phaedo", 79d and "Republic", vi, 511d suggest that Plato's philosophy is not a phenomenology."

347. Szaif, Jan. 2022. "Pseudo-Objects in a World of Seeming (*Prm.* 164b-165e)." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 439-451. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "What place, if any, did illusory and fictitious objects have in Plato's ontology? If he viewed them as a valid topic for ontological inquiry, did he grant them some minimal level of being (reality) because of their distinguishability, or how else did he account for them?"

The aim of this essay is to show that Deduction VII in Plato's *Parmenides* yields some hypothetical answers to these questions. The essay describes how the inferences about "the Others," under the assumption that "the One is not," construct a world of pseudo-objects whose unity and identity is a matter of mere seeming. They are nevertheless temporarily distinguishable from the subjective standpoint of an observer and hence allow for some form of mental or linguistic reference. Devoid of being, they still stand out against the limiting case of total nothingness evoked in the counterpart to VII, Deduction VIII. I argue that this deduction explores how one could understand reference to illusory or fictitious entities while maintaining that an object cannot have genuine attributes unless it is real.

The essay also discusses how the ontology of the Others as pseudo-objects in Deduction VII compares to the role of the Others as a numerically indeterminate substrate for real objects, introduced Deduction III. It explains why the absence of the One, which in III acts as a generative principle for real objects, leaves room for a world made up of illusory objects. As part of my interpretation, this essay also elucidates the meaning of the central analogy with *skiagraphia* paintings."

348. Szlezák, Thomas. 2010. "The Indefinite Dyad in Sextus Empiricus's Report (*Adversus Mathematicos* 10.248–283) and Plato's *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 79–91. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"Sextus Empiricus's report in the tenth book of *Adversus mathematicos* about a theory of the principles of all things, which the Pythagoreans are supposed to have held, is one of the most problematic texts in the history of ancient philosophy." (p. 79)

(...)

"Thus, we have good reasons for considering Sextus's report as a "Neopythagorean" version of an older report on Plato's lecture "On the Good."

The interpretation of the Platonic *Parmenides* that we find in Simplicius's quotation taken from Moderatus, and that seems to contain the key to the Neoplatonic hierarchy of hypostases is also considered to be Neopythagorean. This raises the question of whether one might be able to find a connection between Sextus's report and the *Parmenides*, or a certain interpretation of the *Parmenides*.

Clearly the challenge stems from the fact that there is no clear reference in the one text to the other, nor an easily recognizable concurrence. I intend to determine the position of Sextus's report relative to Plato and Neoplatonism more precisely by considering the ἀόριστος δυάς in both texts." (p. 82)

349. Tabak, Mehmet. 2015. *Plato's Parmenides Reconsidered*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; 1 Forms in the Middle-Period Dialogues 5; 2 *Parmenides*, Part I 29; 3 *Parmenides*, Part II 59; 4 *Parmenides* in *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* 127; Conclusion 163; Notes 167;

Bibliography 215; General Index 221; Index Locorum 225-229.

"I intend to provide an accessible interpretation of *Parmenides* and— to this end— of five other Platonic dialogues. Chapter 1 basically summarizes the TF [*Platonic Theory of Forms*] found in three of Plato's middle-period dialogues: *Phaedo*, *Cratylus*, and *Republic*. The main purpose of Chapter 1 is to supplement the TF Socrates briefly presents and defends in part I of *Parmenides*. Chapter 2 gives a detailed analysis of part I, with the purpose of illustrating how *Parmenides*'s criticisms of Socrates are obviously invalid. Chapter 3 offers a close reading of part II. It shows that the eight arguments conducted in part II are, in the main, based on the hypotheses of Plato's Eleatic and sophist opponents. Plato's aim in part II is to parody the doctrines of his opponents, often with obviously fallacious and

absurd deductions. Chapter 4 illustrates how *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* confirm my reading of *Parmenides*." (p. 3)

350. Tarrant, Harold. 1993. *Thrasyllan Platonism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Chapter 6: The Neopythagorean *Parmenides*, pp. 148-177.

"Here I attempt to understand the work of a man whom I see as an important figure both in the history of attempts to understand the Platonic corpus as a whole and in the development of a specifically Pythagorean approach to Platonic exegesis that had a major role to play among the Neoplatonists. As ever, my purpose is to make people aware and to make them think. I want my conclusions to be given consideration rather than acceptance.

I have included, in the hope that it will be useful for those who take up my challenge to work in this field, those testimonia and fragments of Thrasyllus of which I am aware, arranged according to subject." (*Preface*, p. IX)

(...)

"This chapter began by asking the question, If Moderatus held a metaphysical progression interpretation of the *Parmenides*, what was that interpretation? The question now can be answered with surprising confidence: he would have held the interpretation usually associated with Amelius, or a very similar one. The results were sufficiently convincing to justify the claim that Moderatus had indeed interpreted the *Parmenides* in this fashion. The attribution of such an interpretation to Moderatus makes it seem highly likely that there were other metaphysical progression interpretations before him, probably going back to Posidonius and probably involving Thrasyllus. After him it is likely that Numenius adhered to such an interpretation (though some very different interpretations flourished in the second century A.D.), and it is quite likely that Plotinus (like Amelius) drew upon Moderatus for his own view of the dialogue, possibly via Numenius." (p. 176)

351. ———. 2022. "Apuleian Evidence regarding Pre-Plotinian Interpretation of the *Parmenides*." In *Plato's Parmenides: Selected Papers of the Twelfth Symposium Platonicum*, edited by Brisson, Luc, Macé, Arnaud and Renault, Olivier, 483–489. Baden-Baden: Academia Verlag.

Abstract: "Both Plotinus in *Enn.* V. 1. 8 and Proclus (*Theol. Plat.* 2. 4. 31) are reluctant to attribute originality to his very incomplete interpretation of the final part of *Prm.* As also in Alcinous, it is possible to see from the newly published *Expositio* that Apuleius saw the dialogue as making contributions not only to logic but also to metaphysics, including first principles.

After restoring the text of *de Platone* 190, I show how it can be seen to be dependent upon reading the negative epistemology of *Prm.* 142a4-5 as applied to the first god. Philo *de Somniis* 1. 67 offers a close comparison. I conclude that before Apuleius, indeed before Philo, there had been an attempt to interpret the first hypothesis of Parmenides as describing a supreme god who is properly thought of as one and is marked by non-possession of the properties that Plato there denies to the one. Eudorus is thus a likelier influence on Apuleius than Moderatus. Like Alcinous and Calcidius, Apuleius thus finds metaphysical, or epoptic, material in *Prm.*, while avoiding the extreme transcendence and causal priority characteristic of the Plotinian One. Apuleius' position agrees with his picture of Plato as blending both Eleatic and Pythagorean material with the Socratic."

352. ———. 2023. "Soul in the Earliest Multilevel Interpretations of the *Parmenides*." In *Soul Matters: Plato and Platonists on the Nature of the Soul*, edited by Ahbel-Rappe, Sara, Layne, Danielle A. and Addey, Crystal, 251–279. Atlanta: SBL Press.

"Those who work on Plotinus are well used to his three hypostases, One, Intellect, and Soul, which he detected in Plato (*Enn.* 5.1.8), both in the *Second Epistle* (dubiously ascribed to him) and in the first three hypotheses of the final part of the *Parmenides*—an exercise in which Parmenides bombards young Aristoteles with strings of questions concerning the existence or nonexistence, and the unity or diversity, of the One. Plotinus's previous chapter (7) also relates the three hypotheses to the mythical triad of three rulers, Ouranos, Kronos, and Zeus, and perhaps less directly to the passage of Plato's

Cratylus that discusses their names (*Crat.* 395e–396c);¹ however, to the extent that it does not suggest the relevance of numbers and counting, that dialogue will not be central to this contribution." (p. 251)

(...)

"The problem for Plotinus's interpretation of the hypotheses of the Parmenides is that it cannot satisfy us until it offers a view about the remaining hypotheses. If these do not offer us further levels of the divine, then what lessons do they offer, and what are they supposed to present? And how many other arguments should we be counting, given that Plato has not given us any numbering except at the third level? It was left to Porphyry to sketch out a comprehensive interpretation that Plotinus might perhaps have been satisfied with and to establish the conventional number of nine hypotheses." (pp. 252–253)

(1) The etymologies connect Kronos with pure intellect and Zeus with the cause of life (and so perhaps with soul), and Ouranos perhaps with the source of intellect that may be glimpsed on high.

353. Taylor, Alfred Edward. 1896. " On the interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*. (I)." *Mind* no. 5:297–326.

"The task I have set before me is a far simpler one, though I venture to think that until it has been performed it is premature to raise these vaster issues. The question I shall attempt in some degree to answer is no more than this. Can we discover under the apparent incoherence of our dialogue any one leading conception by the help of which its puzzles may be reduced to simplicity ? What right I have for thinking that this question can be answered in the affirmative I must leave the reader to judge." (p. 298)

354. ———. 1896. " On the interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*. (II)." *Mind* no. 5:483–507.

"We have thus four questions before us which may be tabulated thus :—

(1) If the unity of the world be affirmed, what judgments can we make about that unity ? (1, 2, 3.)

(2) If the unity of the world be affirmed, what judgments can we make about its multiplicity ? (4, 5.)

(3) If the unity of the world be denied, what judgments can we make about that unity ? (6, 7.)

(4) If the unity of the world be denied, what judgments can we make about its multiplicity ? (8, 9.)

We shall however see directly that this arrangement of the hypotheses is based on the merely superficial characteristics of external form: their real relations of agreement and opposition we shall only be able to formulate at a later stage of our inquiry, after detailed examination of their contents." (p. 485)

355. ———. 1897. " On the interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides*. (III)." *Mind* no. 20:9–39.

"The second part of my apology relates to the somewhat free way in which I have at times interpreted Plato in the language of modern philosophy. And on this score I would plead that for the most part these interpretations are intended rather as illustrations for the modern reader than as professed translations. Moreover, if we would form any sort of understanding of ancient thought, some process of this kind seems unavoidable, and the most we can do in order to guard against misrepresentation is to perform the process carefully and conscientiously. And of all the Platonic dialogues there is none in which this kind of interpretation can do less mischief than in the *Parmenides*. For its main result, as I have tried to show, is to arrive at the conception of the world as a systematic unity or whole, making almost entire abstraction from the concrete character of its contents, and there can be no assignable reason for thinking that this conception of abstract system appeared to Plato any otherwise than it does to us, though, no doubt, his notion of what the system contained was in many respects widely divergent from our own. Hence I can hardly suppose that even the freest of my restatements of Parmenidean arguments seriously vitiates my theory of the general purport of the dialogue ; and the general drift and purport of the whole is all I undertook to explain." (p. 39)

356. ———. 1903. "On the first part of Plato's *Parmenides*." *Mind* no. 12:1–20.

"The thesis which I wish to maintain is briefly this. There is no essential difference but a most essential agreement in respect to the position of the Ideas between the *Parmenides* and the *Phaedo*, with which dialogue the *Republic* is universally admitted to be in complete accord. What difference there is is simply due to the fact that the *Parmenides* expressly recognises and attempts to answer questions of which the earlier dialogue simply presupposed the solution. If this can be established it will follow that the *Republic* must still possess for us the central position which it has always hitherto held in the exposition of Platonic philosophy, and the various recent theories which see a revision rather than a development of its teaching in the later dialogues will have to be abandoned. My purpose, as far as the *Parmenides* is concerned, will be accomplished if I can show that both the problems and the results of the dialogue are inevitably presupposed by the view taken in the *Phaedo* of knowledge and its objects. In arguing this point I desire to confine myself in the main to the earlier portion of the dialogue (pp. 126-136), in which Parmenides states his objections to the doctrine of Ideas as formulated by the youthful Socrates. Of the longer and more perplexing second half of the dialogue I have previously propounded an interpretation,⁽¹⁾ in the main agreeing with that of Zeller, but very different from that suggested by Mr. Benn. From his silence I infer that he does not think the principle of that interpretation worth examination, while I for my part am as strongly convinced as ever of its general rightness; hence controversy on the point would probably be useless. As however the key to the second part, in my judgment, lies in a right understanding of what goes before, it will be enough for my purpose to deal with the introduction, as we may call it, to the dialogue, which was rather too perfunctorily treated in my former papers." (pp. 2-3)

(1) See *Mind*, N.S., Nos. 19, 20, SI. Subsequent study of the dialogues, and more especially the perusal of M. Milhaud's *Les Philosophes-geomètres de la Grèce* [1900], has satisfied me that, while the general character of the interpretation there advocated is correct, insufficient attention was given to the mathematical bearings of the dialogue.

357. ———. 1916. "Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, *Supplementary Volumes* no. 1915-16:234–289.

Reprinted in A. E. Taylor, *Philosophical Studies*, London: Macmillan 1934, pp. 28-90.

"I cannot, of course, undertake to deal here with so wide a subject as the purpose and argument of the *Parmenides* considered as a whole. All that I intend is to offer a slight contribution to the history of early Greek logical theory by attempting to throw some light on one or two lines of reasoning which are made prominent in the dialogue, and I shall select for special consideration two topics, the use made by Parmenides of the appeal to an infinite regress, and his attempted refutation of Idealism. Before I can deal with either point in detail it will be necessary to say something in general about the dramatic setting which Plato has provided for the discussion, a subject on which the commentators, so far as I am acquainted with them, have been unduly silent." (pp. 234-235)

358. Tejera, Victorino. 1995. "The dialogical composition of Plato's *Parmenides*." In *The Third Way: New Directions in Platonic Studies*, edited by Gonzalez, Francisco J., 211–221. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

"The *Parmenides* shows, in other words, that in composing his dialogues, Plato designed them to be not only interesting, challenging, and amusing, but also to dramatize and teach the need for achieving perspective and observing proportion in intellectual matters. It is a problem for the neoplatonic interpretation of Plato, for the intellectual historian, and for the sociologist of knowledge that the antidialogical tradition has persisted for so long in reading the dialogues literalistically, in abstraction from their allusive irony and wit and as solemn tractates seeking to develop or enforce doctrine. But it is not a problem that dialogical readers of Plato's ever-intelligent, ever-rewarding constructions have to address - except perhaps to help literalist readers see that the burden of proof that what looks, sounds, and reads like a dialogue may be treated as if it was not a dialogue falls on those who make it their practice to treat them so." (p. 221)

359. Teloh, Henry. 1976. "Parmenides and Plato's *Parmenides* 131a-132c." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 14:125–130.

"Recent discussions about the arguments of *Parmenides* 131a-132c suffer, I believe, from a lack of historical perspective. While commentators have seen that Plato casts the middle period Forms in Eleatic language⁽¹⁾ they have not connected this legacy with the *Parmenides* arguments. There is, however, a connection, and the persistent failure to see it has led to an inadequate appreciation of the arguments. I will argue that Plato inherits from the Eleatics the predicate "one," and applies it to each of the Forms--"Each Form is one." Then I will show that the thrust of "Parmenides'" attacks at *Parmenides* 131a-132c is that "Socrates" is unable to state how Forms are related to phenomena while at the same time preserving the Eleatic legacy, the oneness of each Form. Finally I will suggest the importance of this interpretation to Plato's later philosophy." (p. 125)

(1) See F. Solmsen, "Parmenides and the Description of Perfect Beauty in Plato's 'Symposium'," *American Journal of Philology*, XCII (1971), 62-70; R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedo* (Cambridge, 1955), p. 84; P. Friedländer, *Plato, An Introduction*, trans. H. Meyerhoff (New York, 1958), pp. 23-26; and my "The Isolation and Connection of the Forms in Plato's Middle Dialogues," forthcoming in *Apeiron* [vol.10, 1976, pp. 20-33]. Also see F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (London, 1939), pp. 80-81, for interesting, but as I will show, inadequate comments on "Parmenides'" objections to the theory of Forms.

360. Thatcher, Michael. 2023. "Heidegger's Answer to Plato's *Parmenides*." *Sophia*:1–17.

Abstract: "Plato's dialogue *Parmenides* remains one of—if not, the—most perplexing text in the Platonic corpus. Specifically, it examines the difficulties surrounding the concepts of unity, multiplicity, and Being that are required for participation in the Ideas.

One of the problems forced upon the young Socrates by *Parmenides* and Zeno in the second half of the dialogue concerns the relationship between Being (ὄν) and the One (ἓν), namely, how defensible is the oneness, or the unity, of the Idea if it also partakes of Being? The text culminates in an aporia as to how to articulate the difference between the One (ἓν) and the many (πολλά), since if the one is, it becomes many. How do many beings share in the one mode of Being? Crucially, how are we to articulate the difference between the One and the many, or Being and beings?

Where Plato's answer invoking the enigmatic concept 'exaiphnēs' (ἐξαίφνης), the temporal becoming of the unity and plurality of the One, seems to contradict the privileging of presence that Heidegger charges him with, he nonetheless fails to offer an understanding of difference that has neither Being nor unity. I argue that Heidegger's engagement with the problem of the ontological difference, and its development into the identification of Being with difference itself, offers solutions to this aporia in Plato's *Parmenides* by addressing a difference that is irreducible to the one or the many, the relational or the derivative. This has significant consequences for understanding Heidegger's critique of Plato as not just consisting of the privileging of presence but also the failure to respond to the problem of difference."

361. Trabattoni, Franco. 2016. "Socrates' error in the *Parmenides*." In *Essays on Plato's Epistemology*, 189–198. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

"The part of the *Parmenides* that is regarded as marking a transition from the author's discussion of the doctrine of the ideas to his analysis of the eight (or nine) hypotheses illustrated in the dialogue has chiefly been studied with the aim of understanding the nature of the exercise which *Parmenides* presents the young Socrates with, sometimes in order to evaluate to what degree the executive part of this project matches the guidelines provided in these pages.⁽¹⁾ What has not been studied as much – at least, judging from the articles and comments I have examined – is the issue of what Socrates' error precisely consist in. In this paper, I aim to provide an answer to this question by examining some sentences *Parmenides* addresses to Socrates, partly as a reproach." (p. 189)

(1) See Casertano, [*Il nome della cosa. Linguaggio e realtà negli ultimi dialoghi di Platone*, Naples] (1996), esp. pp. 48-49 ff.

362. ———. 2016. "On the distinguishing features of Plato's 'metaphysics' (Starting with the *Parmenides*)." In *Essays on Plato's Epistemology*, 199–217. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

"The *Parmenides* is arguably the most difficult and puzzling dialogue in Plato's corpus. This may be the reason why interest in the text on the part of philosophers, including ones chiefly engaged on the theoretical level, has not lapsed but has even gathered momentum in recent years. From a historical and exegetical perspective, it is most tempting to approach the many problems the dialogue raises from new points of view and to present what are at least partly original solutions. This repeated work of analysis concerns both the dialectical can of worms of the second and longer part of the dialogue, and the aporetic discussion on the doctrine of the ideas which unfolds in the first section, as well as all the possible interconnections between the two – the aim being to find a common thread running throughout the work (to say nothing of other, equally thorny issues, such as the role played by the setting of the dialogue, the issue of the spokesman chosen, the degree of historical reliability of the characters portrayed, and the relation between Plato's philosophy and Eleatic thought). In the present study, I set out from the second of the above-mentioned problems, namely the issue of understanding the meaning of Parmenides' criticism of the doctrine of the ideas in the opening section of the dialogue." (p. 199, a note omitted)

363. Tuozzo, Thomas. 2021. "Rethinking Deduction Five of Plato's *Parmenides* (160b5-163b6)." *Plato Journal* no. 21:69–77.

Abstract: "The fifth 'deduction' in Plato's *Parmenides* (160b5-163b6) concerns the consequences that follow for a (or the) one from the hypothesis that it is not. I argue that the subject of this hypothesis is, effectively, any Form, considered just insofar as it is one Form. The hypothesis, I further argue, does not concern any essential aspect of a Form, but rather posits its contingent non-instantiation ('a one is not' = 'a Form is not instantiated'). The motion this deduction attributes to its one is a special type of motion: motion into and out of instantiation."

364. Turnbull, Robert G. 1984. "On R. E. Allen's Plato's *Parmenides*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 4:206–217.

365. ———. 1998. *The Parmenides and Plato's Late Philosophy*. Toronto: Toronto Studies in Philosophy.

Translation of, and commentary on the *Parmenides* with interpretative chapters on the *Timaeus*, the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist* and the *Philebus*.

"The present book provides a total explanation of the text of the *Parmenides* and uses that explanation in accounting for the first philosophy of other late dialogues. To undertake careful and appropriate critique of other purported explanations of the text would require greatly complicating an already complicated account and at least doubling the size of the book. I try to take note of other accounts of the text of the *Parmenides* at various points, undertaking only a relatively brief critique of their lines of interpretation and explanation in an appendix.(2)" (*Preface*, pp. IX-X)

(...)

"My point has been to show that a great deal of the effort to explain the *Parmenides* (and the other late dialogues) requires the attempt to understand the sorts of philosophical problems Plato was looking at and the language in whose terms he stated them. Even though in the end the explanations must conform to the text as we have it (unless there is good reason to believe it corrupt), coming up with adequate explanations is at least as much a philosophical task as it is a philological one.

And, in the end, of course, objectivity in the history of philosophy is lost if texts are either patronized or ignored. So let us proceed to the real task of explaining the *Parmenides* and its connections with several of Plato's late dialogues." *Preface*, p. XII)

(2 The appendix takes note of, in particular, the work of Neoplatonists P.M. Cornford, Reginald Allen, Kenneth Sayre, Mitchell Miller, and Constance Meinwald.

The effort is not to offer detailed summaries but rather to comment on the use of rather different interpretative clues. The list is not exhaustive of proposed interpretations, but I believe it includes the most plausible lines of interpretation.

366. Turner, John D. 2006. "The Gnostic Sethians and Middle Platonism: Interpretations of the *Timaeus* and *Parmenides*." *Vigiliae Christianae* no. 60:9–64.

Abstract: "One may construe the Sethian Gnostic picture of the world and its origins as an interpretation of the biblical protology of the book of *Genesis* in the light of the Platonic distinction between an ideal, exemplary realm of eternal stable being and its more or less deficient earthly and changeable copy, in which the principal Platonic dialogues of reference are the *Timaeus* and the *Parmenides*. Various Sethian treatises offer us accounts of the origin and generation of both these realms; while their portrayal of the origin and deployment of the earthly realm is unmistakably influenced by their readings of Plato's *Timaeus*, their account of the origin and deployment of the ideal realm is noticeably influenced by readings of Plato's *Parmenides*. This article attempts to show that the shift from the *Timaeus* as the primary Platonic dialogue of reference for the Middle Platonic thought of the first two centuries to the *Parmenides* as the primary dialogue of reference for the emerging Neoplatonism of the third century is also visible in the Sethian treatises. In mid- to later second-century Sethian treatises, the cosmology of the *Timaeus* serves as an exegetical template to interpret the *Genesis* protology, but with the turn to the third century, the Sethian treatises that circulated in Plotinus' circle have abandoned all interest in the *Genesis* protology in favor of a theology of transcendental ascent."

367. ———. 2007. "Victorinus, « Parmenides » commentaries and the Platonizing Sethian treatises." In *Platonisms: Ancient, Modern, and Postmodern*, edited by Corrigan, Kevin and Turner, John D., 55–96. Leiden: Brill.

"Sometime during the first and second centuries, Platonists such as Moderatus and Numenius were attracted by certain Neopythagorean doctrines espoused by such figures as Eudorus and Thrasyllus, aspects of which probably stemmed ultimately from Old Academicians like Speusippus." (p. 58)

(...)

"It is at this time that the *Parmenides*, with its thoroughgoing exploration of the nature of ultimate Unity, gradually comes to supplement or even supplant the *Timaeus* as the primary dialogue of reference.(8)

The "hypotheses" occupying its second half could be identified with a Neopythagorean hierarchy of hypostatic principles: 1) a supreme One beyond being; 2) a second One or Monad, paradoxically conceived as a dyad of unity and determinate being identified as a Middle Platonic Intellect containing multiple Forms; 3) a third hypostasis(9) where multiple otherness undergoing change merely participates in unity and thus can account for the motion typical of Soul or the sensible universe, and so on, ending with the realm of pure disordered matter, identifiable with the *Timaeus*' receptacle. Such an "episodic" scheme appears to have been adumbrated already in the Old Academic thought of Speusippus.(10) The three highest of these hypostatic entities could also be recognized in the three kings mentioned in the pseudonymous second Platonic Letter (*Letter II* 312e), perhaps composed in these same Neopythagorean circles during the first century." (pp. 58-59)

(8) See, e.g., Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* I.7–8.

(9) Taking in *Parm.* 155e5 (ἐτι δὲ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν) as designating a third hypothesis rather than as part of the second hypothesis.

(10) Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12 1090b19–20 (...)

368. ———. 2010. "The Platonizing Sethian Treatises, Marius Victorinus's Philosophical Sources, and Pre-Plotinian *Parmenides* Commentaries." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 131–172. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"Coupled with the recent arguments for a pre-Plotinian origin of the Anonymous Commentary on the *Parmenides*,(77) Professor Tardieu's observation that the *Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides* may depend on both the *Chaldaean Oracles* and the common source presently embedded in Victorinus

and Zostrianos makes a strong case indeed that the *Commentary* is not by Porphyry, but—perhaps together with others like it—is a product of pre-Plotinian Middle Platonic Parmenides interpretation." (p. 155)

(77) See Corrigan 2000, 141–77: all the apparent innovations in the *Commentary* are already to be found in Plotinus, and there is a remarkable affinity of thought between Plotinus, Amelius, and the anonymous Commentator that stems from a still earlier tradition of commentary (in *Vit. Plot.* 20, Porphyry apud Longinus mentions Numenius, Cronius, Moderatus, and Thrasyllus) necessitated by the need for an intelligent reading of difficult passages in Plato's *Parmenides*. Moreover, the doctrine of participation apparently espoused by the Commentator (12.16–22; 14.17–20; 33–35)—namely, that the Second One receives determinate being by substantivizing its own vision of the “idea” of being that it sees in the “First One”—is exactly the sort of participation that both Syrianus (*In metaph.* 109,12–14 [Kroll 1902]) and Proclus (*In Tim.* 3:33,31–34,2 Diehl) specifically deny to Porphyry, but attribute to earlier Plotinian-circle thought that has its root in Middle Platonism and Neopythagoreanism (Numenius, Cronius, and Amelius).(...)

369. ———. 2010. "The Chaldaean Oracles and the Metaphysics of the Sethian Platonizing Treatises." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 213–232. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"In this paper, I would like to discuss the metaphysical structures and functions of the various entities comprising the transcendent realms depicted in the *Chaldaean Oracles*, the Sethian Platonizing treatises, especially Allogenes, and in the *Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides*, focusing mostly on certain apparent triadic structures featured in each, namely the Father, Power, Intellect triad in the Oracles, the Triple-Powered One in the Sethian treatises, and the Existence, Life, and Intellect triad in the Commentary as well as upon their associated feminine principles, the figures of Barbelo in the Sethian treatises and of Hecate in the Oracles." (p. 213)

370. Turner, John D., and Corrigan, Kevin, eds. 2010. *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 1: History and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism*. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

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371. ———, eds. 2010. *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

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References 255; Contributors 269; Subject–Name Index 273; Index Locorum 289–310.

372. van Campe, Leen. 2009. "Syrianus and Proclus on the attributes of the One in Plato's « Parmenides »." In *Syrianus et la métaphysique de l'Antiquité tardive : actes du colloque international, Université de Genève, 29 septembre-1er octobre 2006*, edited by Longo, Angela, 247–280. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

"In the present paper, I will instead investigate a question often left unaddressed or not dealt with at any great length: what is the nature of the attributes that are denied or affirmed of the One, and why are they discussed in this particular sequence?"

In particular, the first two hypotheses confront us with an odd dialectical exercise(4), Whatever is denied of the One in the first - viz. that it is many, a whole, in itself, in motion, and so on- is predicated of the One in the next hypothesis. Moreover, the order of the sequence of attributes is the same in the two cases, with one important exception (5). That the same premise leads both to denying and to predicating of the One an identical list of attributes is not the only puzzling thing here. One cannot but wonder why Parmenides predicates and denies of the One these attributes and no others, and why he does so in this particular sequence. Some attributes recall examples of Platonic Forms that were discussed in the first part of the dialogue, such as sameness, likeness, equality, plurality (6). Others, by contrast, are properties of corporeal beings, such as being in place or in time. Could Parmenides have obtained the same results with his dialectical exercise by using other attributes, or by using them in another order? It seems to me that an answer to the preceding questions might help to solve the central enigma of the *Parmenides* concerning the nature of the "one." (pp. 247–248)

(4) Cfr. Plat. *Parmen.* 137 c 4– 142 A 1 and 142 B 5–155 D 1.

(5) Cfr. *infra*, pp. 275–279.

(6) Cfr. Plat. *Parmen.* 128 E 6–129 c 2; 129 D 6–E 4; 131 c 12–E 2.

373. van der Heiden, Gert-Jan. 2014. "Deciding on Plurality? Plato's *Parmenides* between Badiou and Agamben." In *Phenomenological Perspectives on Plurality*, edited by van der Heiden, Gert-Jan, 195–209. Leiden: Brill.

"In this essay, I want to discuss two contemporary approaches to the question of the one and the many in order to get a sense of the options for thought "after" onto-theology or, rather, for thought on the threshold of onto-theological constitution of metaphysics. Does such a thought require the affirmation of the many instead of the one, as some authors claim, or does such a thought require us to leave the question in suspense?(2) To examine these two options, I will discuss the work of Alain Badiou, which represents the first option, and the work of Giorgio Agamben, which represents the second. Rather than straightforwardly interpreting these works, I will bring them into play in relation to the classical text dealing with the question of the one and the many: what types of interpretation of Plato's *Parmenides* do Badiou and Agamben offer us? I do so since exploring the differences between these interpretations will provide a clear overview of the differences in the ontology to which these two options open to contemporary thought lead." (pp. 195-196)

(2) As I explain elsewhere, there is also a third option represented by the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, cf. Gert-Jan van der Heiden, *Ontology after Ontotheology: Plurality, Event, and Contingency in Contemporary Philosophy* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2014), chapter 2.

374. Vanni, Leonida. 2023. "Amelius' Interpretation of the Hypotheses of Plato's *Parmenides*." no. 23:27–61.

Abstract: "In book VI of his *Parmenides* commentary, Proclus surveys the previous Neoplatonic interpretations of the "hypotheses" of Plato's *Parmenides*, starting with Amelius, a disciple of Plotinus. This paper analyses Amelius' exegesis of the hypotheses.

After presenting the extant evidence about his *Parmenides* commentary, I explore three puzzling aspects of his interpretation: 1) unlike most Neoplatonists, Amelius distinguished eight hypotheses instead of nine. I argue that he considered the last section (*Prm.*

165e2-166c2) to be devoid of any positive content and merged it with the previous one – contrary to the modern advocates of an eight-fold *divisio textus*. 2) Amelius assumed that each hypothesis deals with one layer of reality, but the precise meaning of some identifications is elusive: what are the three kinds of matter matched to hypotheses 5-7? I show that these three material layers probably correspond to three entities whose existence is posited on the basis of the *Timaeus*: the *chora*/prime matter, the level of the element traces, and the ordered universe. 3) In at least one point, Amelius' exegesis disrupts the descending hierarchical ordering of the subject-matters of the hypotheses (i.e. from the highest to the lowest-ranked entity), which was an undisputed governing principle of the Neoplatonic interpretations. This irregularity depends, as I argue, on a further interpretative rule: the negative quality of a hypothesis (except for the first one) is taken to indicate some sort of debasement of the corresponding entity. Since, in the second part of the *Parmenides*, the negative hypotheses alternate with the positive ones, this further principle clashed with the linear downward arrangement implied by the hierarchical principle. In the conclusion of the paper, I sketch how the insights gained by this analysis can shed some light on the subsequent development of the ancient *Parmenides* exegesis."

375. Vázquez, Daniel. 2021. "Getting Younger." *Rhizomata* no. 9:84–95.

Abstract: "I argue that in Plato's *Parmenides* 141a6–c4, things in time come to be simultaneously older and younger than themselves because a thing's past and present selves are both real. As a result, whatever temporal relation is predicated of any of these past and present selves is true of the thing in question. Unlike other interpretations, this reading neither assumes that things in time have to replace their parts, nor that time is circular. I conclude that the passage is committed to a conception of the ongoing present and a rejection of presentism and endurantism in favour of a growing universe theory and perdurantism."

376. Vorwerk, Matthias. 2010. "Plotinus and the *Parmenides*: Problems of Interpretation." In *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Vol. 2: Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, edited by Turner, John D. and Corrigan, Kevin, 23–33. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

"The second part of Plato's *Parmenides* with its dialectical exercises on the One has received remarkable attention in the history of Platonism.(1) Interestingly, the more-or-less systematic interpretation of the hypotheses seems to have begun only with Plotinus, who understood the hypotheses of the *Parmenides* ontologically and referred the first three of them to the three hypostases of his own metaphysical system, that is, the One (or Good), Intellect, and Soul.(2) While it is undisputed that Plotinus adapted the first three hypotheses and exploited them for the formulation of his version of Platonic metaphysics, it still remains a matter of discussion whether Plotinus depended on the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* to invent, as it were, the absolutely simple One, transcending being and predication, or whether he merely used it as justification for his metaphysical innovation.

I will argue that the answer lies in between: Plotinus was both inspired by the first hypothesis and needed it as evidence for his Platonic orthodoxy. In the following, I will first give a brief survey of the most relevant scholarship on Plotinus's interpretation of the *Parmenides*. Then, I will focus mainly on a close analysis of what could be called Plotinus's "apology," namely, chapter 8 of *Enn.* 6.1 [10]: *On the Three Primary Hypostases*, in which Plotinus explicitly introduces the *Parmenides* in support of his metaphysics." (p. 23)

(1) Proclus, *In Parm.* 630,37–643,5 Cousin provides a survey of ancient interpretations of the *Parmenides*, however, without giving names; in *Theol. Plat.* 1.10 = 1:42,4–9 Saffrey-Westerink, Plotinus is named as one of the old, i.e., first, interpreters of the *Parmenides*. See Saffrey and Westerink 1968–1997, 1, lxxv–lxxxix; Brisson 1994, 285–91.

(2) These three hypotheses of the *Parmenides* are I: 137c3–142a6; II: 142b1–155e2; and III: 155e3–157b4. III is actually a corollary to II, but Plotinus considers it to be a separate hypothesis; see Brisson 1994, 46 with n. 96.

References

Brisson, L. 1994. *Platon. Parménide*. Translated, with introduction and notes, by Luc Brisson. GF 688. Paris: Flammarion. 2nd rev. ed. 1999.

Saffrey, H. D. and L. G. Westerink 1968–1997. *Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne. Texte établi et traduit par H.D. Saffrey and L.G. Westerink*. 6 Vols. Collection des universités de France. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

377. Waddell, W. W. 1896. "The Place of the *Parmenides* in the Order of the Platonic Dialogues, Further Considered." *The Classical Quarterly* no. 10:287–291.

"Finally the argument that because of resemblance in matter such works as the *Parmenides*, *Sophistes*, and *Politicus* are closely linked in time, fails to carry conviction.

Plato - to continue our assumption - would hear criticisms upon the *Parmenides* only after its publication, and might naturally finish the *Republic*, with any other work already outlined, before resuming that branch of inquiry. One of the clearest indications of sequence, and even of close sequence, supplied by Plato himself is the passage in which the *Timaeus* seems to be affiliated to the *Republic*, yet nobody alleges that nothing came between." (p. 291)

378. Walker, Merle G. 1938. "The One and Many in Plato's *Parmenides*." *The Philosophical Review* no. 47:488–516.

"The present essay, therefore, is devoted to the thesis that the antinomies of *Parmenides* I37c–i66c present Plato's own solution to the problem of the One and Many as it grows out of the processes of his own thinking. The development of his conception of Being in the other dialogues leads to an apparent paradox for which the *Parmenides* affords the necessary and, indeed, the only possible solution." (pp. 495–498)

379. Walter, Denis. 2023. "Definitional Structure and the Same, the Different, and Part-Whole Relations in Plato's *Parmenides*." *Ancient Philosophy* no. 43:425–440.

Abstract: "This article argues that the second part of the Parmenides (137-166) consists not only of the well-known logical structure that has been widely studied but also of a great variety of definitions of forms. My aim is to show how these definitions depend on a specific group of closely connected primary forms (i.e., same, different, part, whole). The definitions that Parmenides provides help Socrates overcome his failure in attempting to define forms in the first part of the dialogue."

380. Wear, Sarah Klitenic. 2011. *The Teachings of Syrianus on Plato's Timaeus and Parmenides*. Leiden: Brill.

"While it is clear that Proclus adopts the bulk of his metaphysics from his teacher, it is difficult to sort through precisely what in his thought is purely Syrianic and what is his own elaboration of Syrianus' teaching.

First of all, "fragment", as a term used in this work could better be replaced by the more accurate "testimonium." The selections of Syrianus given in this collection as numbered fragments are testimonia, or reports,

taken from Proclus' commentaries on Plato's Timaeus and Parmenides.

The passages from Proclus and Damascius were gathered from sections where they explicitly mention Syrianus with reference to either Plato's *Timaeus* or *Parmenides*. Such a "fragment" collection, thus, poses the

difficulty that the teachings of Syrianus as gathered from Proclus and Damascius are all non-verbatim, and possibly, as we shall see, based on oral teachings, for the most part, rather than written commentaries. It is difficult, thus, to know for certain how much of Proclus' or Damascius' own opinions on philosophy are included in their reports of Syrianus." (p. 20)

381. ———. 2011. "The One in Syrianus' Teachings on the *Parmenides*: Syrianus on *Parm.*, 137d and 139a." *The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition* no. 5:58–84.

Abstract: "This article describes Syrianus' teachings on the One, as found in his testimonia on the *Parmenides*. In order to preserve the transcendence of the One, while still providing a fluid universe connected to the One, Syrianus shows how the nature of the One is seen in the structure of the *Parmenides* itself: the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* outlines the primal God, while the intelligible universe is the subject of the second hypothesis, in so far as the intelligible universe is a product of the One. Thus, whatever is negated of the One in the first hypothesis contains a positive analogue in the second hypothesis. With this description of the One in the *Parmenides*, Syrianus is able to create a complete, fluid universe. Readings of two lemmata, in particular, illuminate Syrianus' manner of interpreting the *Parmenides* to show how the One is both transcendent and connected to the universe.

In his interpretations of *Parmenides* 137d and 138a, Syrianus shows how the One is partless with respect to itself, but contains parts with respect to the rest of the universe; and that the One is in itself and in another, again, with respect to itself and with respect to the rest of the universe. With his interpretation of the *Parmenides*, moreover, one can see how Syrianus differs from the interpretations of Porphyry and Iamblichus, and how he paves the way for Proclus' reading of the dialogue."

382. ———. 2017. "Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus on Parmenides 137d: On Parts and Wholes." In *Proclus and his Legacy*, edited by Butorac, David D. and Layne, Danielle A., 219–231. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"*Parmenides* 137d discusses whether the One has parts and whether or not these parts function as a beginning, middle, and end of the One.(5) In Proclus' interpretation of this passage, he discusses how something unitary can interact with a universe full of multiplicity while still maintaining its own oneness. Proclus further questions how a uniquely unitary entity, such as the One, could contain parts at all. For, on the one hand, the One seems to be a whole with no parts, but on the other hand, it should contain all the parts of the universe. Moreover, all the parts not only have their beginning in the One, but they remain in the One and proceed from it, and then return to the One, which is the end. Proclus solves this dilemma by speaking of the One and wholes and parts in one way in the second hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, and another in the first hypothesis. Namely, the negative argument (that the One has

no parts) has its positive counterpart (that the One contains parts) in the second hypothesis at 145a4–8, which argues that that One is an unlimited entity which contains wholes and parts in a transcendent fashion. Proclus, relying on Syrianus' interpretation of this passage,(6) argues that the One contains no beginning, middle, or end because it is aschesis; rather, parts have a relationship (or schesis) with it only. Proclus appropriates the role of "relationship" to the One-Being, which can be said to contain parts and have a beginning, middle, and end." (pp. 219-220)

(5) For a discussion on the history of commentary on this lemma, see Wear [The Teachings of Syrianus on Plato's *Timaeus* and *Parmenides*] (2011), 246–50.

(6) On Syrianus' contribution to this argument, see Wear (2011) p. 242–270, fragments 4 and 5.

383. Weingartner, Rudolph H. 1973. *The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue: the Cratylus, the Protagoras, the Parmenides*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill.

"In this book, I take three dialogues—the *Cratylus*, the *Protagoras*, and the *Parmenides*—and attempt to show, in some detail, that each of them can—and therefore should—be understood as a unified whole. The dialogues discussed differ considerably from each other, as do the themes which serve as their principles of unification. On the one hand, this dissimilarity should make whatever success I may have in exhibiting the philosophical-dramatic structure of each of these dialogues all the more convincing support of my general thesis about the unity of Platonic dialogues; but on the other hand, the fact that our dialogues differ so from one another requires that each be dealt with in a somewhat different fashion." (p. 7)

(...)

"I try, in the final chapter, to show that the *Parmenides* as a whole performs a complex task to which all its parts contribute.

Plato is here engaged in revising his views on both the method by which knowledge is attained and on the nature of the objects of knowledge themselves. This principle not only holds together the two major parts of the dialogue, but serves as a key, as well, to the puzzle of the first section. In the larger part of the chapter on the *Parmenides* I propose to show that if the arguments Parmenides makes against the forms are taken cumulatively, that is, in relation to one another and to the purpose of the entire series, a good deal of the mystery that has surrounded them disappears." (pp. 11.12)

384. Wild, John. 1946. *Plato's Theory of Man: An Introduction to the Realistic Philosophy of Culture*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Chapter 6: Being and its inversion (the *Parmenides*), pp. 205-241.

"It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the first of the later dialectical dialogues, the *Parmenides*, is devoted to the task of distinguishing different senses of being and non-being, in conscious opposition to the simple ontology of Parmenides and his disciple Zeno. The inversion which results from the confusion of these different modes or levels of being with one another distorts every act of understanding, corrupting reason at its very source, since the concept of existence is involved in all other concepts. Hence we are here approaching the very root of sophistry, or philosophical misunderstanding, and the primal source of those subordinate distortions to which we have thus far been devoting our attention." (p. 207)

(...)

"Unless they can be distinguished, and philosophy of the upward ascent can be established in the individual intellect, human life, both in its individual and social phases, must be inverted, and the whole cultural hierarchy overturned. Such cultural anastrophe has its ultimate root in the ontological inversions so clearly indicated in the exercises of the *Parmenides*. To misunderstand being is to misunderstand everything. There are no more fundamental misunderstandings than these. This inversion of being, however, is associated with an allied inversion of the apprehensive faculties. Being not only is. It is also known. Hence these ontological inversions are allied with certain inversions of the

apprehensive faculties, which always attend them in the complex human phenomenon of sophistry." (p. 241)

385. Willis, W. H. . 1971. "A New Fragment of Plato's *Parmenides* on Parchment." *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* no. 12:539–552.

"In Autumn 1969 Perkins Library of Duke University acquired among a group of unrelated texts on papyrus a small palimpsest fragment from an ancient parchment codex containing Plato's *Parmenides* (PDuk. inv. G 5)." (p. 539)

"If these comparisons are convincing, the Duke Plato joins the rare company of the Berlin leaves from Euripides' *Cretans*, the London leaf of Demosthenes, and possibly the fragment in Florence of Hesiod's *Catalogue* (PSI 1383) as sole survivors of the earliest Greek codices on parchment. Only the Plato is written in <Homeric majuscule>,' but there is no logical reason why this most splendid bookhand should not have appeared early on parchment. Meantime the Duke Plato becomes the first ancient fragment of the *Parmenides* to come to light, the earliest manuscript of Plato on parchment, and the earliest Plato in codex form." (pp. 551-552)

386. Wolfe, C. J. 2012. "Plato's and Aristotle's Answers to the Parmenides Problem." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 65:747–764.

"The first section of this paper will summarize the history of pre-Socratic philosophy and explain why Parmenides was a turning-point. The second section will explain the sophist Protagoras' relation to the Parmenides problem. The third part will present Aristotle's complete answer to the Parmenides problem, and in the fourth part I will compare that approach with Plato's solution in the *Sophist*. Lastly, I will sum up by characterizing how I think Plato and Aristotle would have responded to Protagoras' Parmenidean sophistry in political life." (p. 748)

387. Wood, Kelsey. 2005. *Troubling Play: Meaning and Entity in Plato's Parmenides*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"To conclude, if the *Parmenides* is unambiguous, then it is thoroughly contradictory and says nothing. But multiplying distinctions indefinitely to avoid all possible contradiction approaches a limit: there is no unqualified being or unqualified becoming. The alternative left open by the *Parmenides* is that ideal possibilities of repetition only signify in relation to being; ideal expression derived toward-itself yields no intelligibility. Within these limits, knowing is necessarily goal-oriented and incomplete. By repeating this loss of focus in both directions, the dialogue indicates the instability of the ratio that is reason. Human temporal existence implies the potentiality to remember this *chōris*. Participatory being is this unified manifold, or opening of identity and difference. The dialogue is an icon of the cosmos: not a collection of entities (or predications) but an organically interconnected whole, a unification of ambiguous disclosures informed by signifying oppositions. The formal structure of the *Parmenides*, like that of any being, is in itself transcendent: it is evoked throughout in a negative way. If for Plato human being is participatory, nonetheless the ratio that is rationality is an odd juxtaposition, not a harmonious sharing.

The *Parmenides* discloses this paradox in order to show that the presence of self-identity is not simple. The dialogue shows that *chōris* is is not a problem to be solved; rather it is an essential feature of logos." (p. 177)

388. Wyller, Egeil Anders. 1962. "Plato's *Parmenides*: Another Interpretation." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 15:621–640.

"My intention in this paper is to state some main points of an elaborate interpretation of mine of the Platonic *Parmenides* written in German, which was published in Oslo a while ago.(1) Thus I do not here intend to present and discuss all the separate arguments of the dialogue. All I wish is to state - for readers already acquainted with the Platonic text - the results of my researches in a not too loose and disconnected way. For a full presentation and discussion of Plato's arguments the reader, if interested, should consult my book." (p. 621)

(1) *Platons Dialog Parmenides in seinem Zusammenhang mit Symposion und Politeia. Interpretationen zur Platonischen Henologie*. Skrifter utgitt av Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi i Oslo, II. Hist.-Filos. Klasse, 1959.

No. 1. Oslo, 1960.

389. ———. 1995. *Henologische Perspektiven I/I-II: Platon - Johannes - Cusanus*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Two recent Interpretations of Plato's *Parmenides* 89-104.

Review of William F. Lynch, S.J., *An Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the Parmenides*, Georgetown University Press, 1959 and Robert S. Brumbaugh, *Plato on the One. The Hypotheses in the Parmenides*, Yale University Press, New Haven 1961.

The *Parmenides* is the "Philosopher", 131-146.

"The thesis I shall defend here is part of a larger thesis which I propounded in the summer of 1965 in a series of lectures at Tiibingen(1) The larger thesis is concerned with the entire group of "late" dialogues which includes the *Parmenides* and the hypothetical dialogue, the *Philosopher*, that is the group of dialogues following the *Republic*. It claims some form of "architectonic" unity for all those dialogues, consisting of two main "paths": a preliminary, upward path towards the *Philosopher* (comprising the dialogues *Cratylus*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Parmenides*) and a subsequent downward path to the Academy-State (comprising the dialogues *Philebus*, *Phaedrus*, *Timaeus*, *Critias*, *Laws*, *Epinomis*)

The lesser thesis supports the "architectonic" view by claiming that the extant dialogue *Parmenides* is identical with the missing *Philosopher*. It is my intention here to subject this thesis, which on the occasion mentioned could only be very roughly sketched and argued for, to a closer scrutiny and to give it more detailed support." (pp. 131-132)

(1) Published in the book "Der späte Platon. Tübinger Vorlesungen 1965" (Meiner), Hamburg, 1970. This paper was read to "Klassisk forening", Oslo, Nov. 1965 and made ready for print that winter.

(2) A synopsis of this thesis is given in "The Architectonic of Plato's later dialogues" *Classica et Mediaevalia* XXVII, Cph. 1968.

390. Yi, Byeong-uk, and Bae, Eunshil. 1998. "The Problem of Knowing the Forms in Plato's *Parmenides*." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* no. 15:271–283.

"In the first part of Plato's *Parmenides*, Parmenides presents several arguments against the theory of forms, propounded by young Socrates as his interlocutor in the dialogue. He puts special significance on one of them. He says that it is of the greatest difficulty to defend the theory against the objection that "it does not even pertain to the forms to be known [by humans] if they are such as we say they must be" (133b5-6), 2 and presents an argument to substantiate the objection (133c3- 134c3).³ In this paper, we shall examine the argument and present a solution of the difficulty on behalf of Socrates. In section I, we shall give an analysis of the argument. In section II, we shall discuss some objections to the argument and argue that they fail to address the central issue. In section III, we shall present our own objection to the argument and

the consequent solution of the difficulty." (p. 271)

391. Young, J. 1980. "*Parmenides* 133A-134B." *Prudentia* no. 12:84–86.

392. Yu, Jyuan. 1991. "On Plato's Theory of the "*Metheksis*" of Ideas." *Philosophical Inquiry*:25–37.

393. Zhang, Huaiyuan. 2023. "The Instant between Time and Eternity: Plato's Revision of the Parmenidean Now in the *Parmenides*." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 76:426–446.

"In this article, I will present Plato's later temporal solution to the problem of participation in his early theory of forms.

To understand Plato's view of time, it is necessary to look at both his and Parmenides' conceptions of temporality. Many scholars focus on the *Timaeus* in discussing the concept of time in Parmenides and Plato, but in fact the analysis of time in the *Parmenides* is equally fruitful and even more profound. Although some scholars have noticed this, relevant studies are still relatively lacking. Sattler specifically interprets how Plato's deductions in the *Parmenides* respond to Parmenides' deductions in fragment B8 based on formal, linguistic, and conceptual resemblances.(13) I will follow her approach and draw further conclusions regarding what Plato's response consists in with respect to time." (pp. 427-428, some note omitted)

(13) See Barbara M. Sattler, "Time and Space in Plato's *Parmenides*," *Études platoniciennes* 15 (2019): 1–69.

394. Zuckert, Catherine H. 1998. "Plato's *Parmenides*: A Dramatic Reading." *The Review of Metaphysics* no. 51:875–906.

"Modern commentators have generally followed the neo-Platonists in treating Parmenides' arguments as a version or stage of Plato's metaphysical teaching, although some continue to treat it primarily as an exercise in logic.(3)

I shall argue, on the contrary, that the conversation related in the *Parmenides* sets the stage for all the other Socratic dialogues which follow it in terms of their dramatic dating. In the *Parmenides* Plato shows, first, how the Socratic teaching about the "ideas" responds to certain difficulties in the Eleatic teaching. Second, he has Parmenides bring out difficulties in Socrates' teaching about the ideas, particularly with regard to the connection between the purely intelligible ideas and sensible things. Finally, in an extremely playful demonstration of logical gymnastics, he has Parmenides present a devastating critique—not merely dramatic, but substantive—of the teaching of the poem written by the historical philosopher.(4)" (p. 876)

(3) For example, Constance Meinwald, *Plato's Parmenides* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). For an excellent and more complete statement of the history of interpretation of the dialogue see Kenneth M. Sayre, *Parmenides' Lesson* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), xi–xix.

(4) See Kenneth M. Sayre, *Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 47–50.

395. ———. 2009. *Plato's Philosophers: the Coherence of the Dialogues*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Chapter 2: Plato's *Parmenides*. Parmenides' critique of Socrates and Plato's critique of Parmenides, pp. 147–179.

"The most important thing we learn from Plato's *Parmenides* is, however, the outcome of the long "demonstration." What Parmenides' proof and disproof of his own thesis that one is show is that it is not possible to give an account of the whole on the basis of one intelligible unit. Neither the Ionians nor the Italians, whether Pythagorean or Eleatic, could provide an adequate explanation, because they tried to reduce everything to one fundamentally undifferentiated underlying substance, motion, unit, or being.

Nor, Plato's *Parmenides* shows, can being be defined simply through negation, as the historical Parmenides seems to have thought. By opposing being to everything it is not, one gets either no attributes or all attributes.

In neither case has one discovered what is distinctive about being in itself.

To explain the whole—and so, presumably, being as a whole—one has to explain the interrelation of things essentially different in kind. Whether Socrates, *Timaeus*, or the Eleatic Stranger succeeded remains to be seen.

As Plato indicates first in the *Laws* and then demonstrates dramatically in the *Parmenides*, this was the task facing the philosophers of the future." (pp. 178-179)